European Advent & Settlements
High-Yield Fact Sheet
📊 High-Yield Data & Statistical Fact Sheet
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| List the core chronological anchors, named actors, factories, farmans, and quantitative markers for European advent through French foundation, the three Carnatic Wars, and structural causes of British success over the French. | Portuguese Chronology & Anchors:
Dutch Chronology & Anchors:
English EIC Chronology & Anchors:
French Foundation Anchors:
Carnatic Wars Chronology & Anchors:
Causes of British Success Anchors:
|
Overview
Overview
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What is the central historical problem of European advent, Anglo-French struggle, and British structural success for UPSC Mains in this note? | From Armed Trade to Struggle for Supremacy: The landing of Vasco da Gama at Calicut in `1498`, guided by Abdul Majid, is treated as the beginning of a new era in Asia–Europe relations: a direct sea-link that challenged Arab–Turkish intermediaries after the fall of Constantinople (`1453`) and imported a Mediterranean tradition of armed, monopolistic trade into an Indian Ocean system long based on open multi-participant commerce. Portuguese governors — Almeida’s Blue Water/*cartaze* naval supremacy, Albuquerque’s territorial-commercial system anchored at Goa (`1510`), and Nino da Cunha’s consolidation and Gujarat acquisitions — built the first European seaborne empire in India, while Dutch corporate entry (`1602`), English charter consolidation from `1600` through Farrukhsiyar’s `1717` farmans, and French company foundation under Colbert (`1664`) through Pondicherry (`1674`) and the `1720` reorganisation completed the early European settlement map. Between `1720` and `1740` French trade rose nearly to half the English Company’s value; yet both companies remained commercial settlements under native princes until European wars — the War of the Austrian Succession (`1740–48`) and the Seven Years War (`1756–63`) — fused with Deccan and Carnatic succession disputes to produce the three Carnatic Wars. St. Thome (`1746`) revealed the superiority of small disciplined European-led forces over large Indian armies; Arcot (`1751`) and Wandiwash (`1760`) shifted the balance decisively to the English, and the Treaty of Paris (`1763`) confined the French to trading posts, eliminating their Indian imperial ambition. Beyond battlefield narratives, structural causes of British success over the French include naval supremacy and control of the sea route; England’s superior European position and secure geography; private joint-stock company autonomy versus the French company as a department of State; sound commercial finance versus French subordination of commerce to territorial ambition; the post-`1757` Bengal base (V.A. Smith’s Pondicherry thesis); superiority of English commanders (Clive, Lawrence, Eyre Coote) and French self-inflicted misfortunes (Aix-la-Chapelle restitution, Dupleix recall, Lally’s withdrawal of Bussy); Industrial Revolution timing; stable British government; lesser religious zeal; and the innovative use of the Bank of England debt market to fund wars. The three Carnatic Wars proved a boon for the British (training sepoys, artillery lessons, selfish princely interests) and a curse for the French (Company wound up `1769`); Crown troops and the elimination of the main European rival left the English de facto masters of the Carnatic and ready for subcontinental expansion. |
1. Portuguese Advent: Sea Route, Motives and Context
1. Portuguese Advent: Sea Route, Motives and Context
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why is Vasco da Gama’s landing treated as a new era in Asia–Europe relations? | Landing and Symbolic Break: The landing of Vasco da Gama at Calicut on the Malabar coast in `1498` with three ships, guided by a Gujarati pilot, Abdul Majid, is generally regarded as the beginning of a new era in the relationship between Asia and Europe. Although Asia and Europe had been in commercial relations since antiquity, the opening of direct sea-relations was not only the fulfilment of an old dream — according to the Greek historian Herodotus, the Phoenicians had rounded Africa in the 6th century BC — it also presaged a big increase of trade between the two. |
| How did the fall of Constantinople and Arab–Turkish control push Europeans toward a direct sea route? | Blocked Routes and Monopoly of Intermediaries: In `1453`, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks. Merchandise from India went to European markets through Arab Muslim intermediaries. The Red Sea trade route was a state monopoly from which Islamic rulers earned tremendous revenues. The land routes to India were also controlled by the Arabs. In these circumstances, Europeans were keen to find a direct sea route to India. A direct sea-link would displace the virtual monopoly of the Arabs and Turks over the trade in eastern goods, especially spices. |
| How did commercial and religious objectives reinforce each other for the Portuguese? | Commercial–Religious Nexus: For the Portuguese, the opening of a sea-route to India would give a big blow to the Muslims — the Arabs and Turks — who were the traditional enemies of Christianity and were posing a new threat to Europe by virtue of the growing military and naval power of the Turks. They also hoped that by exploring Africa they would link up with the kingdom of the legendary Prester John and attack the Muslims from two sides. Thus commercial and religious objectives supported and justified each other. |
| What role did the Pope play in legitimising Portuguese discoveries? | Papal Interest and Bull of `1453`: The Pope showed growing interest in the search for a sea-route to India when in `1453` he issued a Bull granting Portugal “in perpetuity” whichever lands it “discovered” beyond the Cape in Africa upto India, on condition of converting the “heathens” of those lands to Christianity. |
| How did the Renaissance and earlier travellers spur interest in oriental sea routes? | Renaissance Spirit and Pre-Gama Travellers: Interest in the sea-route was spurred by the Renaissance, which gripped Europe in the 15th century, challenged rooted modes of thought, and created a new spirit of daring; Renaissance called for exploration. Growing interest in oriental trade was shown by the arrival of many Genoese traders in the Indian Ocean from the thirteenth century onwards. The names of the Venetians Nicolo Conti and Barbosa, and of the Russian Nikitin, are only a few among many who travelled on the Indian Ocean and reached India during this period. |
| How did European economic development raise demand for oriental spices? | Agrarian Prosperity and Spice Demand: Economic development of many European regions progressed rapidly with expansion of land under cultivation, an improved plough, scientific crop management such as crop rotation, and increased supply of meat — which called for spices for cooking as well as preservation. Prosperity grew and with it demand for oriental luxury goods. Dietary habits changed toward more meat consumption. Much cattle had to be killed during winter due to fodder shortage, and the meat salted away. Oriental spices were even more in demand to make salted meat more palatable. |
| What technical advances enabled adventurous eastern voyages? | Ship-building and Navigation: Europe made great advances in the art of ship-building and navigation. Hence there was eagerness all over Europe for adventurous sea voyages to reach the unknown corners of the East. |
| Why did Genoa back Portugal and Spain against Venetian and Ottoman constraints? | Genoese Interest and Rivalry with Venice: The principal rivals of the Venetians in Europe were the Genoese. The Genoese distributed oriental goods in Europe but had been side-lined by the Venetians. Venice and Genoa, which had earlier prospered through trade in oriental goods, were too small to take on the mighty Ottoman Turks or to take up major exploration on their own. Capture of Constantinople by the Turks in `1453` was a big blow to the Genoese because the Black Sea ports — their principal mart for oriental goods — were gradually closed to them. This, and their old rivalry with Venice, led Genoa to help Portugal and Spain with ships, money and nautical skills in searching for a sea-route to India. Christopher Columbus, who ‘discovered’ America in `1492` in his effort to find a sea route to India, was a Genoese. |
| Why was Portugal positioned to lead Christendom’s oceanic push to India? | Portugal, Islam, and Prince Henry the Navigator: Portugal had assumed leadership in Christendom’s resistance to Islam even as it took on the spirit of exploration. The idea of finding an ocean route to India had become an obsession for Prince Henry of Portugal, nicknamed the ‘Navigator’; he was keen to circumvent Muslim domination of the eastern Mediterranean and all routes connecting India to Europe. |
2. Arrival of Vasco da Gama and Clash of Trade Philosophies
2. Arrival of Vasco da Gama and Clash of Trade Philosophies
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the Zamorin receive Vasco da Gama, and how did the first visit end? | May `1498` Reception, Factory, and Rupture: The arrival of three ships under Vasco da Gama, led by Gujarati pilot Abdul Majid, at Calicut in May `1498` profoundly affected the course of Indian history. The Hindu ruler of Calicut, the Zamorin (Samuthiri), had no apprehensions as to European intentions. As the prosperity of his kingdom was due to Calicut’s position as an entrepot, he accorded a friendly reception, permitted trade in spices, and allowed a factory (warehouse) on the coast. Over the objections of Arab merchants, Gama secured a letter of concession for trading rights from the Zamorin. But the Portuguese were unable to pay the prescribed customs duties and price of goods in gold. They wanted monopoly over the spice trade to Europe and claimed the right of searching Arab traders’ ships. This led to a fight in which Portuguese living in their factory were massacred. In retaliation, Portuguese ships bombarded Calicut before withdrawing. Vasco da Gama stayed in India for three months. |
| What commercial proof of direct access did the return voyage provide? | Profit Scale and Demonstration Effect: When he returned to Portugal, he carried a rich cargo and sold the merchandise in the European market at a huge profit. Spices carried back were computed at sixty times the cost of the entire expedition. The importance of direct access to the pepper trade was made clear by the fact that elsewhere Europeans, who had to buy through Muslim middlemen, would have had to spend ten times as much for the same amount of pepper. Not surprisingly, other profit-seeking merchants of European nations were tempted to come to India and trade directly. |
| How did the second voyage (`1502`) complete the rupture with the Zamorin? | Second Voyage, Muslim Expulsion Demand, and Malabar Forts: In `1502`, Vasco da Gama returned with a fleet of twenty-five vessels and demanded that the Zamorin expel all Muslim merchants settled there and not allow any Muslim merchants to land at any of his ports or have trade relations with them. The Zamorin rejected these demands on the ground that the port of Calicut was open to all and that it would be impossible to prohibit anyone from trade, whether Muslim or not. Gama’s answer was a brutal assault on Calicut. This was followed by establishing a number of forts at Cochin, Quilon etc. to dominate Malabar trade. His rupture with the Zamorin thus became total and complete. Vasco da Gama set up a trading factory at Cannanore. Gradually, Calicut, Cannanore and Cochin became important Portuguese trade centres; under the pretext of protecting factories and trading activities, the Portuguese got permission to fortify these centres. |
| What two philosophies of trade and state power clashed in the Indian Ocean? | Open Asian Trade vs Mediterranean Armed Monopoly: At issue were two different philosophies of relationship between trade and the state. The Asian convention was of open trade, with governments backing and supporting trade but not using military or naval strength to promote or protect it. The Mediterranean tradition which the Portuguese brought was a combination of trade with warfare on land and sea. This approach was profoundly upsetting to Asian traders and to many small states of the region — Calicut, Cochin, etc. — which, like some European city-states, were heavily dependent on trade but followed open trade without military or naval force. For centuries the Indian Ocean trading system had had numerous participants — Indians, Arabs, Africans from the east coast, Chinese, Javanese, among others — acting according to tacit rules of conduct; none had sought overwhelming dominance though all sought profit. The Portuguese changed that: they wanted to monopolise the hugely profitable eastern trade by excluding competitors, especially the Arabs. |
3. Portuguese Governors: Almeida, Albuquerque and Nino da Cunha
3. Portuguese Governors: Almeida, Albuquerque and Nino da Cunha
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was Francisco De Almeida’s mandate and Blue Water Policy? | Francisco De Almeida (`1505`) and Blue Water/*Cartaze*: In `1505`, the King of Portugal appointed a governor in India for a three-year term on condition that he would set up four forts on the southwestern Indian coast: at Anjediva Island, Cannanore, Cochin and Quilon. He was equipped with sufficient force to protect Portuguese interests. Almeida’s vision was to make the Portuguese master of the Indian Ocean. His policy was known as the Blue Water Policy (*cartaze* system). He said: “As long as you may be powerful at sea you will hold India as yours; and if you do not possess this power, little will avail you a fortress on shore.” |
| How did the `1509` naval victory reshape Portuguese supremacy? | Egyptian–Indian Coalition Defeated (`1509`): Alarmed at growing Portuguese power, the Sultan of Egypt fitted a fleet and sent it towards India. The fleet was joined by a contingent of ships from the ruler of Gujarat. The Zamorin of Calicut and the rulers of Bijapur and Ahmednagar also lent support. After an initial victory in which the son of the Portuguese governor De Almeida was killed, this combined fleet was routed by the Portuguese in `1509`. This naval victory made the Portuguese navy supreme in the Indian Ocean for the time being and enabled them to extend operations towards the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. |
| Why is Albuquerque called the real founder of Portuguese power in the East? | Alfonso de Albuquerque: Forts, Navy, and Monopoly Logic: Albuquerque, who succeeded Almeida as Portuguese governor in India, was the real founder of Portuguese power in the East, a task he completed before his death. He advocated and embarked upon a policy of dominating the entire oriental commerce by setting up forts at various strategic places in Asia and Africa, supplemented by a strong navy. Defending his philosophy, he wrote: “A dominion founded on a navy alone cannot last.” Lacking forts, he argued, “neither will they (the rulers) trade or be on friendly terms with you.” Under Albuquerque the Portuguese bolstered their stranglehold by introducing a permit system for other ships and exercising control over major ship-building centres in the region. Non-availability of timber in the Gulf and Red Sea regions for ship-building also helped Portuguese objectives. |
| Why was the acquisition of Goa (`1510`) strategically decisive? | Goa from Bijapur (`1510`) as Principal Eastern Base: Albuquerque initiated this new policy by acquiring Goa from the Sultan of Bijapur in `1510` with ease; the principal port of the Sultan of Bijapur became “the first bit of Indian territory to be under the Europeans since the time of Alexander the Great.” The island of Goa was an excellent natural harbour and fort. It was strategically located, and from it the Portuguese could command Malabar trade and watch Deccan rulers’ policies. It was also near enough to Gujarat seaports for the Portuguese to make their presence felt there. Goa was thus suited to be the principal centre of Portuguese commercial and political activity in the east. They extended possession on the mainland opposite Goa and blockaded and sacked Bijapuri ports of Danda-Rajouri and Dabhol, paralysing Bijapur’s sea-trade until the Adil Shah came to terms by ceding Goa. |
| How did Albuquerque extend Portuguese control beyond Goa? | Colombo, Achin, Malacca, Socotra, Ormuz, Diu: From their base at Goa, the Portuguese further strengthened their position by establishing a fort at Colombo in Sri Lanka, at Achin in Sumatra, and at the Malacca port which controlled exit and entry to the narrow gulf between the Malay peninsula and Sumatra. They also established a station at the island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea and besieged Aden. Vasco da Gama had failed to capture Aden — his only failure in the area. However, he forced the ruler of Ormuz, which controlled entry into the Persian Gulf, to permit establishment of a fort there. A major Portuguese concern was to bring under control the forts of Diu and Cambay, centres of Gujarati trade to the Red Sea. Two attempts in `1520–21` to capture Diu were defeated by its governor, Ahmad Ayaz. |
| What social policies marked Albuquerque’s rule in India? | *Sati* Abolition and Mixed Marriages: An interesting feature of his rule was the abolition of *sati*. In order to secure a permanent Portuguese population in India he encouraged his men to take Indian wives. |
| How did Nino da Cunha reorganise Portuguese India and expand in Gujarat and Bengal? | Nino da Cunha (`1528–1538`): HQ Shift, Gujarat Cessions, Hooghly: Nino da Cunha was governor of Portuguese possessions in India from `1528` to `1538`. He shifted the headquarters of the Portuguese government in India from Cochin to Goa. Before the Gujarat–Turkish alliance could be consolidated, a bigger threat to Gujarat appeared from the Mughals. Humayun attacked Gujarat. Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, during his conflict with Humayun, secured Portuguese help by ceding in `1534` the island of Bassein with its dependencies and revenues, and promised a base in Diu. Relations soured when Humayun withdrew from Gujarat in `1536`. Following expulsion of the Mughals from Gujarat, Bahadur Shah again appealed to the Ottoman sultan and tried to limit Portuguese encroachments at Diu. During negotiations he was invited to a Portuguese ship and killed in `1537`. Subsequent efforts to recapture Diu failed. Hence the Portuguese acquired several territories from the Sultans of Gujarat: Daman (occupied `1531`, formally ceded `1539`); Salsette, Bombay, and Baçaim (occupied `1534`); and Diu (ceded `1535`). Da Cunha also attempted to increase Portuguese influence in Bengal by settling many Portuguese nationals there with Hooghly as their headquarters. |
4. Ottoman–Portuguese Struggle and the 1566 Settlement
4. Ottoman–Portuguese Struggle and the 1566 Settlement
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Ottoman expansion reshape the Indian Ocean balance against Portugal? | Ottoman Ascent and Gujarat Alignment: The Ottoman Turks under Sulaiman were passing through the most magnificent period of their history; they were poised to attack Europe and complete conquests in Asia. Turks had defeated the ruler of Iran in `1514` and then conquered Syria, Egypt and Arabia — implying an increasing Ottoman role in the Indian Ocean. The sultan of Gujarat sent an embassy congratulating the Ottoman ruler on his victories and seeking support. In return, the Ottoman ruler expressed a desire to combat the infidels — the Portuguese — who had disturbed the shores of Arabia. From this time onwards there was continuous exchange of embassies and letters between the two countries. |
| What major Ottoman naval interventions failed to dislodge the Portuguese? | Sulaiman Rais, Rumi Khan, Sulaiman Pasha, Ali Rais: After ousting the Portuguese from the Red Sea in `1529`, a strong fleet under Sulaiman Rais was despatched to aid Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Bahadur Shah received it well; two Turkish officials given Indian names were appointed governors of Surat and Diu respectively. Of these, Rumi Khan later earned a great name as a master gunner. In `1531`, after intriguing with local officials, the Portuguese attacked Daman and Diu, but Ottoman commander Rumi Khan repulsed the attack. However, the Portuguese built a fort at Chaul lower down the coast. The Turks made their biggest naval demonstration against the Portuguese in Indian waters in `1536`. Many sailors had been pressed into service from Venetian galleys at Alexandria. The fleet, commanded by Sulaiman Pasha — an old man of 82 appointed governor of Cairo — appeared before Diu in `1538` and besieged it. Unfortunately the Turkish admiral behaved arrogantly so that the Sultan of Gujarat withdrew support. After a siege of two months, the Turkish fleet retired following news of a formidable Portuguese armada to relieve Diu. |
| How did the Turkish threat end and what long-term alliance was precluded? | Persistence to `1554`, Agreement of `1566`, and Missed Mughal Alliance: The Turkish threat to the Portuguese persisted for another two decades. Meanwhile the Portuguese strengthened their position by securing Daman from its ruler. A final Ottoman expedition was sent under Ali Rais in `1554`. Failure of these expeditions resulted in a change in Turkish attitude. In `1566`, the Portuguese and the Ottomans came to an agreement to share oriental trade, including spices, and not to clash in the Arab seas. Following this, the Ottomans shifted interest once again to Europe. This precluded a future alliance of the rising Mughal power and the Turks against the Portuguese. |
5. Favourable Conditions and Why Indian Powers Accepted Oceanic Domination
5. Favourable Conditions and Why Indian Powers Accepted Oceanic Domination
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What Indian and Asian conditions favoured early Portuguese success? | Fragmented Polity, Weak Navies, Limited Chinese Reach, Unorganised Arabs: In India, excepting Gujarat ruled by the powerful Mahmud Begarha (`1458–1511`), the northern part was much divided among many small powers. In the Deccan, the Bahmani Kingdom was breaking up into smaller kingdoms. None of the powers had a navy worth its name, nor did they think of developing naval strength. In the Far East, the imperial decree of the Chinese emperor limited the navigational reach of Chinese ships. As regards Arab merchants and ship-owners who until then dominated Indian Ocean trade, they had nothing to match Portuguese organisation and unity. Moreover, the Portuguese had cannons placed on their ships. |
| Was Portuguese success purely technological? | Technological Parity, Manoeuvre, Hulls, and Determination: Technologically, the Indo-Arab boom and the Chinese junk could match Portuguese galleons and caravelles in strength, holding capacity for goods in view of tonnage, and capacity to sail even in the face of the wind with their lateen (triangular) sail. They had sufficient nautical skills to travel on open seas. Where the Portuguese were superior was the manoeuvring capacity of their ships — Indo-Arab ships being slow and clumsy on account of heavy sails. Also, hulls of Portuguese ships were stronger to withstand the shock of firing cannons. But it was above all the determination of Portuguese sailors which decided the issue. Indians, more used to fighting pirates, had no stomach for fighting on sea, unbacked by their own rulers. Thus it was not military and naval technology alone, but a number of other factors, which enabled Portuguese naval domination over the Indian seas for more than a century. |
| Why did Indian mainland powers not prioritise a naval challenge? | Political Non-Threat and Low Expected Return: Indian powers reconciled themselves to this domination because it did not threaten their own political positions on the mainland. Nor did it adversely affect their income from overseas trade. Hence the task of undertaking a naval conflict with the Portuguese appeared difficult, uncertain of success, and likely to yield little financial returns. |
6. Portuguese Religious Policy and Relations with the Mughals
6. Portuguese Religious Policy and Relations with the Mughals
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Portuguese religious policy evolve from Muslim persecution to Hindu Inquisition? | Christian Zeal, Muslim Intolerance, Later Hindu Persecution: Portuguese brought with them the zeal to promote Christianity and the wish to persecute all Muslims. Intolerant towards Muslims, the Portuguese were initially quite tolerant towards Hindus. However, over time, after introduction of the Inquisition in Goa, there was a change and Hindus were also persecuted. |
| Why did Jesuits impress Akbar’s court without converting the emperor? | Jesuits at Fatehpur Sikri (`1580–1583`): In spite of intolerant behaviour, the Jesuits made a good impression at the court of Akbar, mainly due to the Mughal emperor’s interest in questions of theology. In September `1579`, Akbar forwarded a letter to the authorities at Goa requesting two learned priests. Church authorities in Goa eagerly accepted the invitation, seeing a chance to convert the emperor to Christianity, and with him his court and people. Jesuit fathers Rodolfo Aquaviva and Antonio Monserrate reached Fatehpur Sikri in `1580`. They went back in `1583`, belying Portuguese hopes of Akbar’s conversion. Jesuit priests continued contact with the Mughal emperor even during Jahangir. |
| How did Hawkins and the Battle of Swally erode Portuguese favour at Jahangir’s court? | Hawkins (`1608–1611`) and Battle of Swally (`1612`): In `1608`, Captain William Hawkins with his ship *Hector* reached Surat, bringing a letter from James I of England to Jahangir requesting permission to do business in India. Portuguese authorities did their best to prevent Hawkins from reaching the Mughal court but did not succeed. Jahangir accepted the gifts and gave Hawkins a very favourable reception in `1609`. As Hawkins knew Turkish well, he conversed with the emperor without an interpreter. Pleased with Hawkins, Jahangir appointed him a Mansabdar of 400. Grant of trading facilities to the English offended the Portuguese. After negotiations, a truce was established between Portuguese and the Mughal emperor. The Portuguese stopped English ships from entering Surat. A baffled Hawkins left the Mughal court in `1611`, unable to counter Portuguese intrigues or check vacillating Mughal policies. However, in November `1612`, the English ship *Dragon* under Captain Best successfully fought the Portuguese fleet (the naval Battle of Swally). Jahangir, who had no navy worth its name, learnt of the English success and was greatly impressed. |
| How did Portuguese piracy provoke Jahangir in `1613`? | Capture of Mughal Ships and Demand for Compensation: Portuguese acts of piracy also resulted in conflict with the imperial Mughal government. In `1613`, the Portuguese offended Jahangir by capturing Mughal ships, imprisoning many Muslims, and plundering cargoes. An enraged Jahangir ordered Muqarrab Khan, then in charge of Surat, to obtain compensation. |
| How did Shah Jahan’s capture of Hooghly end Portuguese court advantages? | Hooghly Settlement, Slave Trade, Siege of `1632`: It was during the reign of Shah Jahan that advantages the Portuguese enjoyed in the Mughal court were lost forever. In `1579`, the Portuguese had settled on a river bank a short distance from Satgaon in Bengal to carry on trading activities. Over the years they strengthened their position by constructing big buildings which led to migration of trade from Satgaon to the new port known as Hooghly. They monopolised manufacture of salt, built a custom house of their own, and started strictly enforcing levy of duty on tobacco, which had become an important article of trade since its introduction at the beginning of the 17th century. The Portuguese not only made money as traders but also started a cruel slave trade by purchasing or seizing Hindu and Muslim children, whom they brought up as Christians. In the course of their nefarious activities, they seized two slave girls of Mumtaz Mahal. On 24 June `1632`, the siege of Hooghly began, ending in its capture three months later. Shah Jahan ordered Bengal governor Qasim Khan to take action. The Mughals suffered a loss of 1,000 men, but also took 400 prisoners to Agra. Prisoners were offered the option to convert to Islam or become slaves. Persecution of Christians continued for some time after which it died down gradually. |
7. Cartaz System, Monopoly Trade and Limits of Portuguese Control
7. Cartaz System, Monopoly Trade and Limits of Portuguese Control
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What structural impact did the Portuguese have on Indian Ocean trade? | End of Unarmed Open Sea-Trade: The Portuguese ended the era of unarmed open sea-trade in Indian waters and gave a big blow to the virtual Muslim monopoly of trade in the western Indian Ocean and of eastern goods to Europe. Right from arrival at Calicut they had demanded that other merchants, Indian as well as foreign, should be ousted and a complete monopoly over trade be granted to them. Portuguese ships equipped with arms and ammunition threatened other merchants and confiscated their merchandise and vessels — the beginning of armed trade. |
| What was the cartaz system and how did it operate? | Cartaz: Sea-Pass, Monopoly Commodities, Search and Prize: In `1502`, the Portuguese demanded exclusive right over trade at Calicut; the Zamorin did not yield. Vasco da Gama declared war on all ships plying in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. He introduced an expedient under which ships carrying a *cartaz* duly signed by Portuguese authorities — namely the royal factor — were not to be attacked. This certificate was first issued in `1502`. It was a sea-pass or trading license. They declared trade in spices, drugs, dyes including indigo, copper, silver and gold, and arms & ammunition and war horses as royal monopoly. Traders of no other country, whether in Asia or Europe, including Portuguese private traders and royal officials, were permitted to trade in these commodities. Ships engaged in other commodities had to take a permit or *cartaz* from Portuguese officials. Its aim was to control and enforce Portuguese trade monopoly over a wide area in the Indian Ocean and to ensure that merchants paid tax in Portuguese trading posts. Indian merchants, rulers and all engaged in maritime trade had to take *cartaz* from the Portuguese. While issuing such passes, it was specifically mentioned that monopoly items were not to be loaded. Routes and destinations of such ships were also sought to be controlled. The Portuguese attempted to force all ships going east or to Africa to pass by Goa and pay custom duty there. To enforce these rules, they searched any ships suspected of trading without *cartaz* or in monopolised commodities. Any ship suspected of carrying “contraband” or banned goods, or which refused to be searched, could be treated as a prize of war, sunk or captured, and men and women aboard treated as slaves. Rulers like Akbar and his successors, Nilam Shah of Ahmednagar, Adil Shah of Bijapur, kings of Cochin, Zamorins of Calicut and rulers of Cannanore purchased passes from the Portuguese to send ships to various places. |
| How did Portuguese monopoly demands transform a previously open commercial order? | From Multi-Merchant Ports to Treaty Monopoly: When Portuguese arrived, merchants from various quarters of the world were found on India’s coastal regions engaged in trade and commerce. As Vasco da Gama reported in `1498`, there were merchants from Mecca, Tenasseri, Pegu, Ceylon, Turkey, Egypt, Persia, Ethiopia, Tunis and various parts of India at Calicut. Chinese merchants as well as merchants from Red Sea areas used to frequent Indian ports. There is no record of any group of merchants demanding exclusive right of trade in general, nor of any attempt to declare a few or all commodities set apart for anybody. With Portuguese arrival this underwent considerable change. Kings were pressurised to forbid other merchants from trading with their ports. Certain commodities were declared forbidden to be traded by others. In other words, the Portuguese demanded monopoly of trade. Treaties with Indian rulers specifically mentioned this. Setting up fortresses at strategic places, surveillance by patrolling vessels, and insistence on passes for other ships were attempts to establish monopoly of trade in Asian waters. |
| Did total monopoly uproot Indian rulers’ and merchants’ trade? | Continuing Indian and Gujarati Commerce: Portuguese attempts at total monopoly did not bring about a situation in which trade conducted by Indian rulers and merchants was totally uprooted. The king of Cannanore, for instance, used to collect passes from the Portuguese to send vessels laden with commodities to Cambay and Hormuz. He imported horses from these places though horses were identified by the Portuguese as a monopoly item. Sometimes such vessels ran the risk of being confiscated. The same was the case with the kings of Tanur, Challe and Calicut on the Malabar coast. Nobles of Gujarat continued their trade despite Portuguese monopoly. Malik Gopi, Malik Ayaz, Khwaja Sofar and others interested in trade plied ships with or without passes from the Portuguese. |
| Why was monopoly never fully effective? | Leakage, Piracy, Pepper Diversion, Private Trade, Incomplete Geography: Local and foreign merchants settled in India carried on trade with or without *cartaz*. The Portuguese soon found they stood to lose more on land than gain on sea by continuing their practices, because traders who lost on sea put pressure on their governments to retaliate against Portuguese trade in their areas. It was impossible to police trade along the huge coasts of Asia. Sea-pirates preying on Portuguese ships were active in areas such as Oman, Malabar, and South-East Asia, and Portuguese policies brought them greater encouragement and support from traders and small rulers. It was estimated that out of the 60,000 quintals of pepper produced annually in the area between Calicut and Cape Comorin, only 15,000 quintals were delivered to Portuguese factories and the remaining three-fourths were taken to other ports — termed illegal by the Portuguese. The Portuguese were not willing to enhance the price of pepper agreed upon in `1503` even after several decades. Hence producers had no alternative other than supplying merchants who might buy and send it to other centres without Portuguese knowledge. Arabs and Gujarati traders found ways around the Portuguese trade embargo and regulation. Even Portuguese private traders were unhappy due to royal monopoly and *cartaz*; royal officials who received small salary were often bribed by private traders (Portuguese, Arabs, Gujarati etc.). Several Portuguese officials conducted their own private trade without government knowledge. Portuguese control over the Indian Ocean remained incomplete because of failure to capture Aden and thereby control entry to the Red Sea. Turkish conquest of Syria, Egypt and Arabia, and expansion of naval power in the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, made it difficult for the Portuguese to effectively blockade Bab-el-Mendel, the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Portuguese monopoly was never effective in the Red Sea zone. |
| How did Acheh and Asian networks undercut Portuguese spice control? | Sumatra Challenge and By-pass Routes: At the other end of the Indian Ocean, Portuguese control even on the Spice Islands weakened. They had to contend with a naval power willing to take on their warships. Using traditional Javanese naval skills, Sumatra ruler Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah was able to defeat the Portuguese in many naval skirmishes and capture large numbers of guns from the Portuguese to fortify Acheh. He also approached the Ottoman Sultan for military equipment. The Ottomans supplied bronze guns of a calibre to enable Acheh in north Sumatra to withstand a siege. This enabled Acheh to emerge as a major centre of spice export in competition to Malacca under Portuguese control. Arabs and Gujaratis well entrenched at Malacca used Acheh as a centre for export of spices to the Red Sea via the Laccadives, thereby by-passing Portuguese-controlled Malabar waters. |
| What factors limited Portuguese success and forced liberalisation of cartaz? | Structural Limits and Profit over Prejudice: Important factors limiting Portuguese success were: the structure of the Asian trade network; the strength and resourcefulness of Asian merchants — Arabs, Gujaratis, Tamils and others — who had long experience of operating the system; the naval and military strength of Turkey and of the ruler of north Sumatra; and internal limitations of the Portuguese and of the working of the *cartaz* system in the Portuguese Empire of India (*Estado da India*). Complete control over oceanic trade by using the *cartaz* system did not succeed much and rules regarding giving *cartaz* to local traders had to be liberalised. This included Muslim traders. Trade in horses, exclusively in Muslim hands, was highly profitable and of great strategic importance to various rulers. Muslims were also active in many other commodities — textile products, glass, aromatics and coffee — in which the Portuguese had neither the money nor the ships to engage. Hence dictates of trade and profit soon overcame religious prejudices. Portuguese effort to push Muslims out of oriental goods trade and establish monopoly over West Asian trade had only limited success. Thus, by the middle of the sixteenth century, in spite of the large volume of spices brought to Lisbon and marketed in Europe mainly through Antwerp, the Black Sea ports and markets of the Levant and Egypt were as well supplied with eastern goods — spices, dyes, and cotton and silk textiles — as before. The Portuguese used the *cartaz* system to control oceanic trade, though not completely, until other European powers like the Dutch and English made their appearances in the 17th century. |
8. Limitations of Portugal and Significance of the Portuguese
8. Limitations of Portugal and Significance of the Portuguese
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What structural economic weaknesses constrained the Portuguese enterprise? | Small Country, Foreign Financiers, Redistributive Enterprise: Portugal itself was a small country, and though it developed rapidly in commerce, its financial resources were limited. Thus German and Italian merchants and merchant houses became the principal agents for distributing all over Europe the eastern goods brought to Lisbon by the Portuguese. Demand in Asia for European goods which could be exchanged for purchase of pepper and other eastern goods was limited. Hence precious metals, especially silver, had to be exported. But unlike Spain, Portugal did not have silver mines in America to fall back on, and had to depend heavily on Italian and German financiers. The expectation of the Portuguese king that control of India’s coastal trade would pay for export of pepper and other eastern goods to Europe also remained a misnomer. Hence Portuguese trade to Europe remained confined to only twelve to thirteen ships being sent each year from Lisbon to India. However, this picture changed by the end of the 16th century. The share of private Portuguese traders in Portuguese trade to Europe rose sharply, amounting to over 90 per cent of the total. Additional cargo consisted mainly of textiles and precious stones. Portuguese private traders financed this trade by large-scale involvement in Asian trade. However, for the Portuguese government the enterprise in the western Indian Ocean remained largely a “redistributive enterprise” — its main source of income was taxing the trade of others rather than expanding trade or opening new lines of trade. A real expansion of trade between Europe and the East had to await the coming of the Dutch and the English in the 17th century. |
| What was the Portuguese political impact in Asia? | Limited Territorial Ambition and Racial Hierarchy: Portuguese impact on the political system in Asia was small. They were too few in numbers to try to capture and keep hold of any large territories on the mainland in India or elsewhere. Hence they wisely decided to keep control confined to islands and to forts on the coast which could be defended and supplied by sea. The island of Goa, which became their seat of government, was a prime example. Apart from this, they could, by threats and persuasions, induce rulers of small states — Calicut, Cochin, Craganore etc. — to act as their agents or brokers in the spice trade. The Portuguese set-up at Goa was controlled by a Governor-General, assisted by a Council which included the Ecclesiastical Head. On account of small numbers, the Portuguese encouraged mixed marriages and, in course of time, a new Indo-Portuguese or Goanese society came into being. But society and government itself was organised on rigid racial lines, people of pure Portuguese origin being at the head of society, and people of mixed origins at the bottom. Nor were the latter given any share in political power. The Church exercised on occasions the dreaded “auto da fe” or burning at the stake to root out heresy among Christians. Thus the contribution of the Portuguese in the field of politics or expansion of world trade remained negligible. |
| Why was the opening of the direct sea-route historically significant? | World Economy Integration and Naval Power: Opening the direct sea-route to India opened the way for India’s closer integration with the growing world economy and contributed to further growth of a market economy in India. It was also a blow to India’s “introspectiveness.” Most historians have observed that the coming of the Portuguese not only initiated what might be called the European era; it marked the emergence of naval power. The Cholas, among others, had been a naval power, but it was now for the first time a foreign power had come to India by way of the sea. The Portuguese were first among Europeans to come (in `1498`) and last to leave (in `1961`). |
| What new trade links, coinage and technologies did the Portuguese introduce? | Global Links, *Cruzado*, Naval and Military Technique: They established India’s trade links with Japan, Philippines, Latin America etc. The Portuguese also paved the way for the advent of other European powers like Spain, Dutch, English, French etc. They introduced their coins *Cruzado* in Goa and neighbouring areas; these coins were accepted in areas of Vijayanagar and Bahmani Kingdoms also. The Portuguese were masters of improved techniques at sea. Under Portuguese supervision, ship-building using western techniques was started at Cochin. Their multi-decked ships were heavily constructed, permitting heavier armament. In the Malabar of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese showed military innovation in their use of body armour, matchlock men, and guns landed from the ships. The Portuguese may have contributed by example to the Mughal use of field guns, and the ‘artillery of the stirrup’. Some other technologies which had made an impact or had far-reaching effects — such as printing, clocks etc. — though introduced in Goa, did not find acceptance on the mainland. They are also known for building new roads and irrigation works. |
| Which New World crops and plants entered the Indian rural economy? | Agricultural Transfers from Latin America: Many products of the Latin American world — maize, potato, corn, pineapple, tobacco, chilli — entered the Indian rural economy, just as new breeds of fruits had come in the wake of the Turks. Out of these, tobacco became a major trade item. Other plants introduced by Portuguese: papaya (first cultivated in Mexico), cashew (native to Brazil), guava (native to Central and South America). The quality of mango and citrus fruits was greatly improved. Better plantation varieties of coconut were introduced besides planting large groves. Thus the Indian peasant was not allergic to accepting new products if it meant a profit for him. |
| What cultural role did Portuguese missionaries play? | Patrons of European Arts in India: The missionaries and the Church were also teachers and patrons in India of the arts of the painter, carver, and sculptor. As in music, they were the interpreters, not just of Portuguese, but of European art to India. |
9. Decline of the Portuguese
9. Decline of the Portuguese
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What political and military neighbourhood changes reduced Portuguese advantages? | Rising Neighbours and Loss of Local Edge: By the 18th century, the Portuguese in India lost their commercial influence, though some still carried on trade in individual capacity and many took to piracy and robbery. In fact, Hooghly was used by some Portuguese as a base for piracy in the Bay of Bengal. Local advantages gained by the Portuguese in India were reduced with the emergence of powerful dynasties in Egypt, Persia and North India and the rise of the turbulent Marathas as their immediate neighbours. (The Marathas captured Salsette and Bassein in `1739` from the Portuguese.) |
| How did religious policy, trade practices and reputation accelerate decline? | Conversion Politics, Dishonest Trade, Piracy, Arrogance: Religious policies of the Portuguese, such as activities of the Jesuits, gave rise to political fears. Their antagonism for Muslims apart, the Portuguese policy of conversion to Christianity made Hindus also resentful. Their dishonest trade practices also evoked a strong reaction. The Portuguese earned notoriety as sea pirates. Their arrogance and violence brought them the animosity of rulers of small states and the imperial Mughals as well. |
| How did Atlantic diversion, Iberian union and European rivals end Portuguese monopoly? | Brazil, Spain–Portugal Union, Dutch and English Competition: The discovery of Brazil diverted colonising activities of Portugal to the West. The union of the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal in `1580–81`, dragging the smaller kingdom into Spain’s wars with England and Holland, badly affected Portuguese monopoly of trade in India. The earlier monopoly of knowledge of the sea route to India held by the Portuguese could not remain a secret forever; soon enough the Dutch and the English, who were learning the skills of ocean navigation, also learnt of it. As new trading communities from Europe arrived in India, there began a fierce rivalry among them. In this struggle, the Portuguese had to give way to more powerful and enterprising competitors. The Dutch and the English had greater resources and more compulsions to expand overseas, and they overcame Portuguese resistance. Goa, which remained with the Portuguese, had lost its importance as a port after the fall of the Vijayanagara empire and soon it did not matter in whose possession it was. |
10. The Dutch in India
10. The Dutch in India
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How and with what powers was the Dutch East India Company formed? | Corporate Amalgamation of `1602`: Commercial enterprise led the Dutch to undertake voyages to the East. In `1602`, the States General of the Netherlands amalgamated many trading companies into the East India Company of the Netherlands. This company was also empowered to carry on war, to conclude treaties, to take possession of territory and to erect fortresses. |
| Where did the Dutch settle in India and what did they trade? | Factories, Nagapatam, and Commodity Map: After their arrival in India, the Dutch founded their first factory in Masulipatnam (in Andhra) in `1605`. They went on to establish trading centres at different parts of India and thus became a threat to the Portuguese. They captured Nagapatam near Madras (Chennai) from the Portuguese and made it their main stronghold in South India. They carried indigo manufactured in the Yamuna valley and Central India, textiles and silk from Bengal, Gujarat and the Coromandel, saltpetre from Bihar and opium and rice from the Ganga valley. |
| How did Anglo-Dutch rivalry peak at Amboyna and resolve in `1667`? | Amboyna (`1623`) and Territorial Compromise (`1667`): The English were also rising to prominence in Eastern trade, posing a serious challenge to Dutch commercial interests. Commercial rivalry soon turned into bloody warfare. The climax of enmity between Dutch and English in the East was reached at Amboyna (a place in present-day Indonesia, which the Dutch had captured from the Portuguese in `1605`) where they massacred ten Englishmen and nine Japanese in `1623`. This incident further intensified rivalry between the two European companies. After prolonged warfare, both parties came to a compromise in `1667` by which the British agreed to withdraw all claims on Indonesia, and the Dutch retired from India to concentrate on their more profitable trade in Indonesia. |
| Why did Dutch power in India decline, and what was Bedara? | Spice Islands Focus and Battle of Bedara (`1759`): The Dutch got drawn into the trade of the Malay Archipelago. The Battle of Bedara (November `1759`) was fought between the British Army and the Dutch Army. In this battle, the latter force was decisively defeated by the British forces. The Dutch were not much interested in empire building in India; their concerns were trade. In any case, their main commercial interest lay in the Spice Islands of Indonesia from where they earned a huge profit through business. |
11. English East India Company: Charter to Western and Southern Footholds
11. English East India Company: Charter to Western and Southern Footholds
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How was the English East India Company created and chartered? | From Merchant Adventurers to Royal Charter (`1600`/`1609`): Francis Drake’s voyage around the world in `1580` and the English victory over the Spanish Armada in `1588` generated a new sense of enterprise in the British, encouraging sailors to venture out to the East. As knowledge grew of the high profits earned by the Portuguese in Eastern trade, English traders too wanted a share. So in `1599`, a group of English merchants calling themselves the ‘Merchant Adventurers’ formed a company. On 31 December `1600`, Queen Elizabeth I issued a charter with rights of exclusive trading to the company named the ‘Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies’. Initially, a monopoly of fifteen years was granted, which in May `1609` was extended indefinitely by a fresh charter. As the Dutch were already concentrating more on the East Indies, the English turned to India in search of textiles and other commodities of trade. |
| How did Hawkins, Best and Roe secure the English foothold in the west and south? | Hawkins, Best, Surat Factory, Roe’s Privileges: Captain Hawkins arrived in the court of Jahangir in April `1609`. The mission to establish a factory at Surat did not succeed due to Portuguese opposition, and Hawkins left Agra in November `1611`. In `1611`, the English had started trading at Masulipatnam on the south-eastern coast and later established a factory there in `1616`. It was in `1612` that Captain Thomas Best defeated the Portuguese in the sea off Surat; an impressed Jahangir granted permission to the English in early `1613` to establish a factory at Surat. In `1615`, Sir Thomas Roe came as an accredited ambassador of James I to the court of Jahangir, staying till February `1619`. Though unsuccessful in concluding a commercial treaty with the Mughal emperor, he secured a number of privileges, including permission to set up factories at Agra, Ahmedabad and Broach. |
| How did Bombay, Anglo-Portuguese peace and Anglo-Dutch compromise clear the English path? | Bombay Dowry (`1662`/`1668`/`1687`) and Rival Accommodation: The English company did not have a smooth progress. It had to contend with the Portuguese and the Dutch in the beginning. But the changing situation helped them. Bombay had been gifted to King Charles II by the King of Portugal as dowry when Charles married the Portuguese princess Catherine in `1662`. Bombay was given over to the East India Company on an annual payment of ten pounds only in `1668`. Later Bombay was made the headquarters by shifting the seat of the Western Presidency from Surat to Bombay in `1687`. So there was tacit peace between the English and the Portuguese. There was also an Anglo-Dutch compromise by which the Dutch agreed not to interfere with the English Company’s trade in India. Thus the English were rid of two arch-rivals in India. |
| What did the Golden Farman and Fort St. George achieve in the south? | Golconda `1632` and Madras `1639`: The English Company’s position was improved by the ‘Golden Farman’ issued to them by the Sultan of Golconda in `1632`. On a payment of 500 pagodas a year, they earned the privilege of trading freely in the ports of Golconda. A member of the Masulipatnam council, the British merchant Francis Day, in `1639` received from the ruler of Chandragiri permission to build a fortified factory at Madras which later became Fort St. George and replaced Masulipatnam as the headquarters of the English settlements in south India. |
12. English East India Company: Bengal, Fort William and Farrukhsiyar’s Farmans
12. English East India Company: Bengal, Fort William and Farrukhsiyar’s Farmans
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why was Bengal attractive and how did the English first enter its trade? | Shah Shuja (`1651`) and Early Factories: Bengal was then a large and rich province in India, advanced in trade and commerce. Commercial and political control over Bengal naturally appeared an attractive proposition to profit-seeking English merchants. Bengal was also an important province of the Mughal empire. Shah Shuja, the subahdar of Bengal in `1651`, allowed the English to trade in Bengal in return for an annual payment of Rs 3,000, in lieu of all duties. Factories in Bengal were started at Hooghly (`1651`) and other places like Kasimbazar, Patna and Rajmahal. |
| How did local tolls, Hedges’ appeal and the `1686` war reshape English presence? | Customs Friction, Hostilities, and Eviction from Hooghly: Despite privileges of the farmans, the Company’s business was now and then obstructed by customs officers in local checkposts who asked for payment of tolls. In pursuance of its changed policy, the Company wanted a fortified settlement at Hooghly so that force could be used if necessary. William Hedges, the first agent and governor of the Company in Bengal, appealed to Shayista Khan, the Mughal governor of Bengal in August `1682`, for redressal of the grievance. As nothing came of the appeal, hostilities broke out between the English and the Mughals. Four years later, Hooghly was sacked by the imperial Mughals in October `1686`. The English retaliated by capturing the imperial forts at Thana (modern Garden Reach), raiding Hijli in east Midnapur and storming Mughal fortifications at Balasore. However, the English were forced to leave Hooghly and were sent to an unhealthy location at the mouth of the River Ganga. |
| How did Job Charnock’s Sutanuti settlement become Fort William and Calcutta? | Charnock, Three Villages, and Eastern Presidency (`1690–1700`): After the Mughal raid on Hooghly, Job Charnock, a company agent, started negotiations with the Mughals so as to return to a place called Sutanuti. Charnock signed a treaty with the Mughals in February `1690`, and returned to Sutanuti in August `1690`. Thus an English factory was established on 10 February `1691`, the day an imperial farman was issued permitting the English to “continue contentedly their trade in Bengal” on payment of Rs 3000 a year in lieu of all dues. A zamindar in Bardhaman district, Sobha Singh, rebelled, subsequently giving the English the pretext they were looking for to fortify their settlement at Sutanuti in `1696`. In `1698`, the English succeeded in getting permission to buy the zamindari of the three villages of Sutanuti, Gobindapur and Kalikata (Kalighat) from their owners on payment of Rs 1,200. The fortified settlement was named Fort William in the year `1700` when it also became the seat of the eastern presidency (Calcutta) with Sir Charles Eyre as its first president. |
| What were the terms of Farrukhsiyar’s three farmans of `1717`? | John Surman Mission — Magna Carta of the Company: In `1717`, an English mission led by John Surman to the court of the Mughal emperor Farrukhsiyar secured three famous farmans, giving the Company many valuable privileges in Bengal, Gujarat and Hyderabad. The farmans thus obtained were regarded the Magna Carta of the Company. Their important terms were:
|
13. French East India Company: Foundation, Settlements and Reorganisation
13. French East India Company: Foundation, Settlements and Reorganisation
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How was the French East India Company founded and what was its early Indian foothold? | Colbert (`1664`), Monopoly Terms, Madagascar Failure, Caron at Surat (`1667`): The French were the last Europeans to come to India with the purpose of trade. During the reign of Louis XIV, the king’s famous minister Colbert laid the foundation of the Compagnie des Indes Orientales (French East India Company) in `1664`, in which the king also took a deep interest. The Company was granted a 50-year monopoly on French trade in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The French king also granted the company a concession in perpetuity for the island of Madagascar, as well as any other territories it could conquer. The Company spent a lot of its money and resources in trying to revive the colonies of Madagascar but without any success. Then in `1667`, Francois Caron headed an expedition to India, setting up a factory in Surat. |
| How did French factories expand along the Coromandel and Bengal coasts? | Masulipatnam (`1669`) and Chandernagore (`1673`):Mercara, a Persian who accompanied Caron, founded another French factory in Masulipatnam in `1669` after obtaining a patent from the Sultan of Golconda. In `1673`, the French obtained permission from Shaista Khan, the Mughal Subahdar of Bengal, to establish a township at Chandernagore near Calcutta. |
| Why was Pondicherry the nerve centre of French power in India? | Pondicherry (`1673`/`1674`) under Francois Martin: In `1673`, Sher Khan Lodi, the governor of Valikondapuram (under the Bijapur Sultan), granted the French a site for a settlement. Pondicherry was founded in `1674`. The French company also established factories in other coastal regions — Mahe, Karaikal, Balasore and Qasim Bazar were among the important trading centres. After taking charge of Pondicherry in `1674`, Francois Martin developed it as a place of importance; it became the stronghold of the French in India. In `1674`, ten years after the foundation of the French East India Company, the French bought from Bijapur the land on which Pondicherry stands. Three years afterwards, Pondicherry was threatened by a Maratha force under Sivaji, but was saved by the judicious measures of Francois Martin; the tact displayed gained the French the admiration and friendship of the ruler of Bijapur. Not many years after this, the kingdom of Bijapur was incorporated with the Mughal Empire and placed under the rule of the nawab of the Carnatic. |
| What early setbacks did the French suffer before the `1720` revival? | Dutch Capture, Spanish Succession, Martin’s Death, Reorganisation (`1720`): The French position was badly affected by war between the Dutch and the French. Bolstered by their alliance with the English since the Revolution of `1688`, the Dutch captured Pondicherry in `1693`. The Treaty of Ryswick (September `1697`) restored Pondicherry to the French. Under Francois Martin’s able guidance Pondicherry again flourished as the most important French settlement in India. Fortunes turned again with the War of Spanish Succession in Europe; the French had to abandon factories at Surat, Masulipatnam and Bantam in the early 18th century. Francois Martin died on 31 December `1706`. In `1720`, the French company was reorganised as the ‘Perpetual Company of the Indies’, which revived its strength. French India was further backed by French possession of Mauritius and Reunion in the southern Indian Ocean. |
14. Eve of the British–French Struggle: Geopolitics and Settlement Policies
14. Eve of the British–French Struggle: Geopolitics and Settlement Policies
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why do the Anglo-French struggles deserve special mention in modern Indian history? | Commercial–Political Rivalry and the European Turning-Point: Since the 15th century, when Europeans first arrived in India, fights for supremacy among rival factions became part of Indian history. The Anglo-French struggles deserve special mention because their role in shaping modern India was far more important than that of other contemporary struggles. The actual onset arose from Anglo-French commercial and political rivalry in India and political rivalry in Europe. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century the French stake in India was not great enough to warrant despatch of an English armament; the two companies therefore declared neutrality and went on trading. By the later period the stake of both countries was considerable. Between `1720` and `1740` the French Company’s trade increased ten times in value until it was nearly half that of the old-established English company. The British were deeply involved with indigo, saltpetre, cottons, silk, and spices, and had a growing trade with China. The value of the English trade was more than ten per cent of the public revenue of Great Britain at that time. The occasion for intervention arose with Frederick the Great of Prussia’s seizure of Silesia in `1740`. In the War of the Austrian Succession which followed (`1740–48`), Britain and France were on opposite sides in the rival coalitions. These wars, of wholly European origin, provided the political turning-point in the history of modern India. |
| Which European powers still held considerable Eastern power by `1740`? | Portuguese Decline, Dutch Failure, English Lead, French Rivalry: In `1740`, six years before the outbreak of war between English and French in India, of the four chief European nations that had embarked in Eastern enterprise only these two continued to hold any considerable power. The Portuguese — first on the scene — had for a century maintained a complete monopoly of Eastern trade, but their glory had long departed; the bigotry, intolerance and cruelty of the successors of d’Albuquerque met their just reward. The Dutch, who succeeded, failed to maintain the enormous power they had once gained; they brought about their own ruin by flagrant abuse of the monopoly wrested from the Portuguese. The English still kept the greater share of traffic between Europe and India. Some sixty years after the English came the French, whose commercial success, while not equalling the English, still made them formidable rivals. Up to this time English and French had existed side by side in India without serious collision for more than seventy years, although England and France had been at war with each other for a considerable portion of that period. The settlers of the two nations had hitherto pursued entirely independent courses; the policy of either side towards the rulers and inhabitants of the country was neither imitated from nor influenced by the other, and the result was an important difference between English and French power and policy in India which greatly influenced the character of the subsequent struggle. |
| What was the political situation of India on the eve of the struggle? | Marathas, Mughal Disintegration, Subahs and Carnatic Nawab: The Marathas, from small beginnings, had grown until on the eve of the French and English struggle they were feared more than any other power in India. They had more than once dictated terms to the Mughal Emperor of Delhi and were one of the chief causes of the disintegration of the once mighty Mughal Empire. Attacks such as the Persian invasion under Nadir Shah in `1739` affected central Mughal power and lessened its control over subordinate powers. Each of the chief subdivisions of the vast Mughal Empire — the “subahs” ruled by “subahdars” — constituted practically an independent power. Under the subahdars were various subordinate powers; when subahdars felt strong enough they threw off allegiance to the Emperor of Delhi, and nawabs and rajas, when opportunity presented, threw off allegiance to their subahdars. Of these minor subordinate powers, the one with whom the British–French struggle had most to do was the nawabs of the Carnatic, in whose dominions by far the greater part of the struggle was fought out. This nawab was practically independent, and the post — theoretically in the gift of the subahdars of the Deccan — had become hereditary. Thus at this period might was right. The various subordinate powers were divided one against the other and unanimous only in rebellion against the supreme power. Beyond this there was no common feeling of nationality, no common bond of religion. It was only the existence of such a state of things which rendered possible the mighty empire which Europeans established in India. |
| What was the legal and political nature of early French and British settlements? | Company Possessions under Native Princes, Not Crown Colonies: Up to this time neither French nor English had attained any political power. Their settlements were not political settlements in the proper sense. They were possessions not of the French or English crown but of the French or English East India Company. They held the land on which factories were built either as tenants of the native powers for annual rent, or as their own property by gift or purchase. In every case they were directly subject to the native prince in whose territory the land lay. They were tolerated solely because their commerce brought accession of wealth to the states in which they settled. There naturally existed a want of favour from the natives toward Europeans; Europeans might accept this want of sympathy as inevitable, or attempt better understanding by respecting native customs and prejudices. On the whole the English followed the former course and the French the latter. On the eve of the struggle the English still held aloof as far as possible from intercourse with native princes, while the French had gained not only the friendship of the royal family in whose territory their chief settlement, Pondicherry, stood, but also the respect of its foes. |
| How did English policy from Roe to the `1685–90` reverse shape their Indian posture? | Mercantile Monopoly, Roe’s Advice, Sivaji at Surat, Failed Ambition: The history of the English in India from the incorporation of the East India Company in `1600` until the outbreak of war with the French — nearly a century and a half — is little more than the history of a mercantile body attempting to gain and hold a monopoly. In this attempt they were brought into collision with both Portuguese and Dutch. With the notable exception of a short period (in `1664` and `1690`), they consistently followed the advice given by Sir Thomas Roe in `1615`: “to seek their profit at sea and in quiet trade, and not to affect garrisons and land wars in India.” The object which brought them to India was trade, and on this they concentrated all energies. For this reason they not only abstained from siding with native parties in their struggles, but even submitted to much unjust treatment. Their great wish was to be allowed to go their own way in peace, but they showed again and again that there were limits to endurance of unjust treatment. That they were prepared to hold their own was shown in `1664`, when the Maratha general Sivaji attacked Surat: the natives fled in despair, and the only opposition offered was by the English, who undertook to defend not only themselves but also the natives — bravery for which the Emperor Aurangzeb remitted the greater portion of the duties he claimed on English traffic. About `1685–90` a fit of ambition seized the directors; the English in India assumed an offensive attitude toward the native powers. The pretext was unjust and cruel conduct of native powers toward the English in Bengal, but the expedition was prompted by an ambitious project of establishing actual English power in Bengal itself. The expedition failed entirely. The wrath of Aurangzeb was fully kindled, and the English were expelled from every part of India; they were permitted to return only by making the most abject submissions. They had received a lesson they did not forget for very many years — how precarious their existence in India was — and they thought it necessary to possess some stronghold on the western coast to which they might escape if Madras were attacked by an overwhelming force. |
| How did French native-alliance policy under Martin, Lenoir, Dumas and Dupleix differ from the English path? | Unaggressive Alliance, Karikal (`1739`), Maratha Prestige, Dupleix’s Ambition: The first nawab of the Carnatic who assumed independent power was Sadat Alla Khan. With him the French established friendly relations, but it was with his nephew and successor Dost Ali, and with his son-in-law Chanda Saheb, that they established the firm alliance which so greatly affected their future. Chanda Saheb especially was an enthusiastic admirer of the French and showed by subsequent conduct that he both appreciated their good qualities and had detected their desire for power in India. This policy of making native alliance remained above all unaggressive in character until the time of Dupleix. Every fresh addition to French power under Martin, Lenoir, and Dumas was made without striking a blow, and, in the case of the first two, without making an enemy. During the time that M. Benoit Dumas held the office of governor-general of the French settlements, he maintained close friendship with Dost Ali and continued to extend this friendship to his family after his death. By means of this friendship he obtained from the Emperor of Delhi, Mohammed Shah, through Dost Ali’s mediation, permission to coin money at Pondicherry — an item of no small importance in the growth of French commerce in India. During the struggle in `1738` for the sovereignty of Tanjore, Sahuji sent to implore French assistance, offering the town of Karikal in return. Dumas aided him with money and arms, and he was successful; but Sahuji evaded fulfilment of his promise. Friendship with Dost Ali’s family saved the French from the necessity of force: Chanda Saheb, then raja of Trichinopoly, came forward and offered to make Sahuji fulfil his promise. Early in `1739`, Karikal became a French possession without the French having struck a single blow; Sahuji himself hastened to make friends with them. Soon after, Sahuji was driven from the throne by his brother Pratab Sing, who likewise bid for French favours by adding to the territory given them and even advising them to fortify towns in their new possessions. The affair of Karikal illustrates the French governors’ policy of this period: they saw that diplomacy was all that was needed, and were prudent enough not to let anger lead them to attack native powers; they clearly saw that it was their best policy to play a waiting game. The French had never of themselves attacked a native power, so they had hitherto remained free from actual attack by a native power. They gained their first experience of this, as the English had, at the hands of the Marathas. The Marathas made another incursion into the Carnatic and slew in battle the nawab and his second son. The eldest son, Safder Ali, and the son-in-law of the nawab, Chanda Sahib, sought refuge for their families and treasures; Pondicherry occurred to both. Dumas presented a bold front; the Marathas raised the siege and withdrew. This resistance of Dumas created prestige of no ordinary kind — the French had run an enormous risk against a most formidable foe, not from compulsion, but simply because they had determined to stand by their friends. Henceforth the French occupied a distinctly higher status and were recognized as powers of India. Valuable presents came from all the great native powers; the Emperor of Delhi himself conferred on the Governor of Pondicherry and his successors the rank and title of nawab, and the high dignity of the command of 4500 horse. Soon after this Dumas resigned and left all the honours he had gained for his successor, Joseph François Dupleix, the Governor of Chandernagor — a man who possessed equal knowledge of native affairs and joined to this an ambition even greater. His promptitude and boldness formed a contrast to the cautious policy of Dumas. The policy of Dumas had been essentially one of peace, of interference only when safe, and of resistance only when the honour of the French name called for it. Dupleix mingled more freely in the affairs of native princes and tended more to take up an independent position. The French had hitherto acted the role of humble allies of a native prince; these positions were shortly to be completely reversed. Dumas had laid the foundation of French power in India; it remained for Dupleix to raise the superstructure. |
| How did Dupleix and the social character of the French company prepare political ambition? | Dupleix’s Native Diplomacy, Wife’s Languages, Louis XIV and the Noblesse: Dupleix was strongly convinced of the importance of gaining the sympathy of the natives, and took pains to impress upon them that, in his capacity of nawab, he too was an officer of the Great Mughal. He adopted the Eastern mode of life and paid and received visits among the native princes. In this way he learnt the real weakness of every native state. By skillful and patient diplomacy he gained complete knowledge of every little move in the intricate game of intrigue going on all around, and saw that it would be possible to take advantage of such a state of things for founding a French empire in India. In this work Dupleix found an enthusiastic assistant in his wife, whose intimate acquaintance with the native languages proved of the greatest service. Hence the positions of English and French in India with reference to the native powers, though identical at first, had in course of time become as widely different as possible. Besides this, one fact in connection with the foundation of the French East India Company by Colbert in `1664` distinguished them from the English: the proclamation of Louis XIV that a man of noble birth suffered no degradation by engaging in the East Indian trade. The primary motive was to encourage the noblesse to subscribe to the Company. Given the state of the French nobility — its numbers, rigid exclusiveness, and the fact that many members lived lives of idleness and almost abject poverty — full advantage was taken of this outlet. Many young scions of the nobility, who had no career to look forward to in France, proceeded to India in the service of the Company; and these men, taught all their previous life to scorn the pursuits of commerce and to look upon the career of a statesman as the ideal of life, help to explain that the French had fully conceived the idea of political power at a very early period of their career in India. |
| What was the south Indian balance of power in `1740` and how did company rivalries frame the Carnatic Wars? | Nizam’s Weakness, Coromandel Vacuum, Monopoly Rivalry as Indirect Cause: In `1740`, the political situation in south India was uncertain and confused. Nizam Asaf Jah of Hyderabad was old and fully engaged in battling the Marathas in the western Deccan while his subordinates speculated upon the consequences of his death. To the south of his kingdom lay the Coromandel coast without any strong ruler to maintain a balance of power. The decline of Hyderabad was the signal for the end of Muslim expansionism and the English adventurers got their plans ready. Though the British and the French came to India for trading purposes, they were ultimately drawn into the politics of India; both had visions of establishing political power over the region. The Anglo-French rivalry in India reflected the traditional rivalry of England and France throughout their histories; it began with the outbreak of the Austrian War of Succession and ended with the conclusion of the Seven Years War. The Carnatic Wars were a series of military conflicts in the middle of the 18th century on the Indian subcontinent. The conflicts involved numerous nominally independent rulers and their vassals, struggles for succession and territory, and a diplomatic and military struggle between the French East India Company and the British East India Company. They were mainly fought on territories dominated by the Nizam of Hyderabad up to the Godavari delta. The scene of the first two wars is the Carnatic; during the second war French power in the Deccan must also be noticed; in the third war the scene shifts for a time to Bengal, then returns to the Carnatic. All this time English traders viewed with extreme alarm the ambitious projects of the French, and many were the complaints they made to their masters at home. Numbers of fortunes were made by members of the companies; but neither company itself was, at this period, a great success. Neither company had the insight to see that the remedy lay for the most part in its own hands. Each attributed its failure in commerce to inability to maintain a strict monopoly of traffic between Europe and India. The result was that, instead of reforming its own trade-system, each thought the great end to be obtained was the destruction of the commerce of its rival; each held out rewards to the servants of the other to desert; and both continually did their best to persuade native powers to harass their rivals by unjust laws or exorbitant taxes and so make their position on the continent of India unendurable. Such a state of feeling on the eve of the struggle no doubt increased the bitterness with which it was carried on, but was not in itself the direct cause of war between English and French in India. The direct cause was the outbreak of the Austrian war of succession, after the death of the Emperor Charles VI, in `1740`. |
15. First Carnatic War (1746–48)
15. First Carnatic War (1746–48)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the First Carnatic War and how was it linked to Europe? | Indian Theatre of the War of the Austrian Succession:Carnatic was the name given by the Europeans to the Coromandel coast and its hinterland. The First Carnatic War (`1746–1748`) was the Indian theatre of the War of the Austrian Succession (`1740–1748`) — in Europe fought between the Kingdom of Prussia, Spain, France, and Bavaria, Sweden etc. on one side and the Habsburg Monarchy, England, Dutch Republic, Russia on the other. The First Carnatic War was thus an extension of the Anglo-French War in Europe caused by the Austrian War of Succession. Such an event would be cordially welcomed by the English in India, who saw in it the opportunity to put a stop to what they considered French encroachment. The French had not taken into their calculations the possibility of war with the English; most of their possessions were inadequately defended. Their chief settlement, Pondicherry, remained ill fortified; although Dupleix, immediately on his appointment as governor, had set himself energetically to remedy this defect, it was two years after the outbreak of the war before the fortifications he had planned were completed. The French, moreover, had much to lose in case of defeat. They were in the course of raising an empire by other means. They had long dreamed of the possibility of driving the English out of India altogether, but had not proposed to effect this by actual conflict with them. Their grand idea was power by means of native alliance — making France a great power in India. The extension of the European war to India simply upset all their calculations for the time. |
| What was the immediate cause and how did Madras fall? | Barnet’s Seizures, La Bourdonnais, Capture of Madras (September `1746`): Although France, conscious of its relatively weaker position in India, did not favour an extension of hostilities to India, the English navy under Barnet seized some French ships to provoke France. The First Carnatic War in India began with the appearing of a British Fleet on the Coromandel Coast in `1745`. France retaliated by seizing Madras in `1746` with the help of the fleet from Mauritius, the Isle of France, under Admiral La Bourdonnais, the French governor of the Isle of France (Mauritius). The Judicious French Governor Dupleix induced the Nawab of Arcot for intervention but the Nawab opted for an impartial policy. After the British initially captured a few French ships, the French called for backup from Mauritius; in `1746` a French squadron arrived under Bourdonnais. In this conflict the British and French East India Companies vied with each other on land for control of their respective trading posts at Madras, Pondicherry, and Cuddalore, while naval forces of France and Britain engaged each other off the coast. The absence of the English fleet from the Coromandel Coast gave the French, now that they had a fleet of their own, the very opportunity for which they had been waiting to attack Madras. The town itself was almost entirely unprotected by fortifications, and the strength of Fort St. George, designed as a defence to Madras, was insignificant. In September `1746`, the French captured Madras almost without any opposition and the British were made prisoners of war. Robert Clive was also one of those prisoners. Later, French attack on Fort St. David failed. |
| Why did Dupleix and La Bourdonnais quarrel after Madras? | Ransom vs Retention — Departure of Bourdonnais: After the capture of Madras occurred a quarrel between Dupleix and de la Bourdonnais. M. de la Bourdonnais wished to allow the English to ransom the place (as Bourdonnais had accepted a bribe from the English East India Company); M. Dupleix vehemently opposed such a course. This quarrel caused an antagonism between the two great French leaders, both men of boundless energy and boundless ambition in the cause of French empire in India. It eventually was the cause of the departure of Bourdonnais from India. |
| What happened at the Battle of St. Thome / Adyar (4 November `1746`)? | Nawab’s Neutrality Broken; Paradis Defeats Mahfuz Khan: Madras and Pondicherry bases were in territory ruled by Anwar-ur-Din (Anwar-ud-din), the Nawab of the Carnatic, the Mughal governor in the area. When fighting broke out between the British and the French, the Nawab declared his territory neutral and forbade the French and British from attacking each other’s possessions. This enforced truce was broken by the French under Admiral La Bourdonnais, who in September `1746` besieged and captured Madras. The Nawab was placated by the French governor, Marquis Joseph-François Dupleix, who promised to hand Madras over to the Nawab once it had been captured — the first fruits of that policy of friendly alliance which previous French governors had established with the nawabs of the Carnatic. For some time de la Bourdonnais remained in India and in possession of Madras; meanwhile Anwar-ud-din began to think it was time that Madras should be given up to him as agreed. Dupleix fully intended to do this, but with its fortifications razed. To give over the place while de la Bourdonnais remained in possession was of course impossible; but Anwar-ud-din would not understand this, and surrounded the place soon after the departure of de la Bourdonnais and before Dupleix had had time to destroy the fortifications. To hand over the town with its fortifications complete was quite out of the question. Dupleix therefore decided to bear the brunt of Anwar-ud-din’s wrath; and the result was the celebrated victory of the French at St. Thome, on the banks of the Adyar (4 November `1746`). Small French armies defeated the larger army of the Nawab of the Carnatic. French force consisted of 250 Europeans and 700 Sepoys, recruited from the local populace, all under the command of a Swiss officer named Paradis. French force was outnumbered by ten-to-one. |
| What was the importance of St. Thome and how did the war end? | Weapon Discovery, Fort St. David, Aix-la-Chapelle (`1748`): In the short term Dupleix declared Madras to be French by right of conquest, and appointed Paradis to command the city. Madras remained in French hands until the end of the war, when it was returned to the British. It was the first direct collision between a native and a European force. The longer-term impact was to make British and French generals realise that they now had a weapon that could defeat the massive Indian armies that had intimidated them until this point. This discovery would soon help transform the balance of power in India. Dupleix then launched an assault on Fort St. David. Stung by his defeat at Adyar, Anwaruddin sent his son Muhammed Ali to assist the British in the defence of Cuddalore, and was instrumental in holding off a French attack in December `1746`. Over the next few months Anwaruddin and Dupleix made peace. The timely arrival of a British fleet from Bengal, however, turned the tables and prompted the French to withdraw to Pondicherry. With the arrival of reinforcements from Europe, the British besieged Pondicherry in late `1748`. The siege was lifted in October `1748` with the arrival of the monsoons, and the First Carnatic War came to a conclusion with the arrival in December of news of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in `1748`, which ended the Austrian war of succession. The articles in the treaty relating to India were a direct attempt to place the English and French settlers once more on the footing which they had occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. Under the terms of this treaty, Madras was handed back to the English, and the French, in turn, got their territories in North America. |
| What were the consequences of the First Carnatic War? | Disciplined Force Thesis, Naval Importance, Native Demand for European Allies: The First Carnatic War is remembered for the Battle of St. Thome (in Madras) fought between the French forces and the forces of Anwar-ud-din, the Nawab of Carnatic, to whom the English appealed for help. A small French army under Captain Paradise defeated the strong Indian army under Mahfuz Khan at St. Thome on the banks of the River Adyar. This was an eye-opener for the Europeans in India: it revealed that even a small disciplined army could easily defeat a much larger Indian army. The power of a small number of French troops over larger Indian formations made Joseph Dupleix capitalise on this advantage to greatly expand French influence in south India. In the Second Carnatic War (`1748–1754`) he took advantage of struggles for succession to the Nizam of Hyderabad and Nawab of the Carnatic to establish strong French influence over a number of states in south India. The British East India Company, in contrast, did little to expand its own influence and only weakly attempted to oppose Dupleix’s expansive activities. Robert Clive recognized that this threatened the entire livelihood of the Company in the area, and in `1751` engaged in a series of celebrated military exploits that cemented British control over Madras by the end of that conflict. Further, this war adequately brought out the importance of naval force in the Anglo-French conflict in the Deccan. During the late war, the native powers had had an opportunity of learning the vast superiority of European arms and of European discipline as compared with their own; and they now quite appreciated the advantages to be gained by an alliance with one or other of the European communities. They consequently left no means untried whereby they might attract Europeans to their side. They offered large sums of money, accession of territory, and everything else which could possibly tempt the settlers. |
| Why did British and French fight again despite pledging peaceful commerce? | Surplus Troops and Native Prestige as Inclination to Intervene: When once the English and French in India mixed in the disputes of different native princes, indirect collision with one another was certain to come sooner or later. The great reason which rendered it so difficult for them to refuse the prizes held out as the reward of their assistance was the great number of troops which had been gathered together in India in the late struggle. These were far more numerous than was necessary for their safety, and were, besides, the source of no inconsiderable expense. Two important factors: the accession of troops as supplying the power, and the prestige they had gained in the mind of native rulers as supplying the inclination, to take part in the complicated game which the native powers were playing. It resulted in further wars. |
16. Second Carnatic War (1749–54)
16. Second Carnatic War (1749–54)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What background and immediate cause opened the Second Carnatic War? | Rivalry in India; Death of Nizam-ul-Mulk and Release of Chanda Sahib (`1748`): The background for the Second Carnatic War was provided by rivalry in India. The inducements to interfere in the concerns of native powers were too strong to be resisted by either French or English. Dupleix, the French governor who had successfully led the French forces in the First Carnatic War, sought to increase his power and French political influence in southern India by interfering in local dynastic disputes to defeat the English. The opportunity was provided by the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk, the founder of the independent kingdom of Hyderabad, in `1748`, and the release of Chanda Sahib, the son-in-law of Dost Ali, the Nawab of Carnatic, by the Marathas in the same year. |
| How did the dual succession struggles in Hyderabad and the Carnatic structure the alliances? | Muzaffar vs Nasir; Chanda Sahib vs Anwar-ud-din; Two Triple Alliances: After the death of the Nizam-ul-Mulk (Subedar) in `1748` — the Nizam of Hyderabad (Deccan) Asaf Jah I — a civil war for succession broke out between Nasir Jung, the son of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, and Muzaffar Jung, the grandson of Nizam-ul-Mulk. The accession of Nasir Jang was opposed by Muzaffar Jang, who laid claim to the throne saying that the Mughal Emperor had appointed him as the governor of the Carnatic. At the time of the subahdar’s death, Muzaffar Jang was absent, while Nasir Jang possessed the great advantage of being on the spot. In the Carnatic, the appointment of Anwar-ud-din Khan as the Nawab was resented by Chanda Sahib. Earlier, when Chanda Sahib was made prisoner by the Marathas, the nawab of the Carnatic was his father-in-law, Safder Ali, who had since been assassinated; and at the present time another family under Anwar-ud-din Khan was ruling over the Carnatic. The French supported the claims of Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib in the Deccan and Carnatic respectively. But soon the British intervened and, to offset French influence, began supporting Nasir Jung and Muhammad Ali Khan Walajah (son of the deposed Nawab Anwar-ud-din of Arcot). The combined armies of Muzaffar Jang, Chanda Sahib and the French defeated and killed Anwar-ud-din at the Battle of Ambur (near Vellore) in `1749`. Son of Anwaruddin, Mohammed Ali, saved himself by flight and shut himself up in Trichinopoly. Chanda Sahib was freed from all rivals; and at Arcot, soon after the battle, Muzaffar Jang proclaimed himself Nizam (subahdar) of the Deccan (Hyderabad), and confirmed Chanda Saheb, as his subordinate, in the office of nawab of the Carnatic. Hence initially the French succeeded in both states in defeating their opponents and placing their supporters on thrones in `1749`. But amidst all this plotting and counter-plotting it was impossible that French and English could remain long without coming into indirect conflict. The difference between them was that Dupleix, who professed to be no soldier himself, had at hand no generals who were competent to carry out his designs; while, on the other side, Saunders, the English Governor of Madras, could entrust his plans to great soldiers like Lawrence and Robert Clive, with the certainty that they would be fully carried out. British allied with Muhammed Ali and by allying themselves with Mohammed Ali the English had also allied themselves with Nasir Jang, the claimant to the subah of the Deccan, with whom Mohammed Ali had naturally made common cause. There were thus two triple alliances: Muzaffar Jang, Chanda Sahib, and the French on the one side, against Nasir Jang, Mohammed Ali, and the English on the other. The most formidable member of this latter alliance was Nasir Jang. |
| How did Dupleix’s diplomacy and Bussy’s Deccan role restore French advantage after Nasir Jang’s advance? | Patan Nawab Revolt, Muzaffar then Salabat Jang, Grant South of Kistna: The very news of the approach of Nasir Jang’s vast army had caused a panic among the French allies and they had to retreat. This event had consequences more important than a mere retreat of the French contingent. Muzaffar Jang, in despair, decided to trust himself to the clemency of his uncle Nasir Jang, and surrendered himself on condition that his life should be spared. Chanda Saheb, on the contrary, decided to trust still in the French. The recent retreat of the French had certainly inflicted considerable disaster on their plans; but Dupleix was too skillful a diplomatist. He led a plot with the Patan nawabs, who commanded an important portion of forces of the subahdar. These Patan nawabs now revolted; and, in the revolt, Nasir Jang was killed. Muzaffar Jang was taken from captivity and proclaimed subahdar. The great French general, M. Bussy, accompanied the new subahdar to his capital, Golconda (Hyderabad). Thus the diplomacy of Dupleix had once more made the French party triumphant. Muzaffar Jang appointed Dupleix the governor over all the country south of the river Kistna as far as Cape Comorin. Dupleix was one of the most consummate masters of intrigue. Knowing every little feeling of disaffection among the followers of the subahdar, he knew both how to repress and how to use such to his own ends. After Muzaffar Jang was slain in another revolt of the Patan nawabs, M. Bussy released from captivity Salabat Jang, a brother of Nasir Jang, and made him subahdar. All this time, the English held in the Carnatic only Madras, Fort St. David, and Davicottah; and their ally, Mohammed Ali, was determined to hold out to the last in Trichinopoly. British listened to Mohammed Ali and dispatched forces to aid Trichinopoly. And now comes the great achievement of Robert Clive, which made his name famous at once and for ever — the capture and subsequent defence of Arcot. The allies of Mohammed Ali, in addition to the English, had been the rajas of Tanjore and Mysore. |
| What was Clive’s Siege of Arcot (`1751`) and how did it reverse French fortunes in the Carnatic? | Arcot, Seringam, Trichinopoly, Leadership Contrast: In `1751`, Robert Clive and Major Lawrence led British troops to capture Arcot from Chanda Saheb. Whole French forces under General Law were trapped in the island of Seringam, and Chanda Saheb surrendered. By the successful resistance of Trichinopoly, and by the successful military operations of the English and their allies, the aspect of affairs in the Carnatic was completely changed once more. The French, before the siege, had been all-powerful. Now the claimant whose cause they had advanced was no more; and they themselves, after suffering defeat after defeat, were at last most seriously weakened by the capture of a great portion of their army by the enemy. The Siege of Arcot (`1751`) was a heroic feat. The blame lies with the leaders of the French forces at this time. They had not one really first-class leader except Bussy, who was at the court of the subahdar, while the English had at least two, Lawrence and Clive. The French had at their head in India (Dupleix) one of the most far-seeing statesmen, and one of the most skillful diplomatists, that ever lived, but he did not combine, like Clive, the qualities which make a good soldier with these. The result of the raising of the siege of Trichinopoly was of the utmost importance to the English. Clive’s success led to additional victories for the British and their Nizam and Arcot allies. |
| What did the Treaty of Pondicherry (`1754`) and the recall of Dupleix mean? | Muhammad Ali Recognised; Non-Interference; Godeheu; Commercial Retreat: The war ended with the Treaty of Pondicherry, signed in `1754`. Muhammad Ali Khan Walajah was recognized as the Nawab of Arcot. The English and the French agreed not to interfere in the quarrels of native princes. The treaty, by its very nature, entailed a vastly greater sacrifice on the French than on the English. Also, each party was left in possession of the territories actually occupied by them at the time of the treaty. According to historians, the fear of serious repercussions in America prompted the French to suspend hostilities in India. The French lost too much by this article to bear it patiently. The position of the French at the court of the subahdar (Hyderabad) remained unaltered. Had M. Bussy been suddenly withdrawn at this time, the result must have been most disastrous; the French power alone at the court of the subahdar prevented a general conflagration. The French leader Dupleix was asked to return to France in `1754`. The directors of the French East India Company were dissatisfied with Dupleix’s political ambitions, which had led to immense financial loss. Godeheu succeeded Dupleix as the French Governor-General in India in `1754`. Godeheu adopted a policy of negotiations with the English and concluded a treaty with them. The French had hoped for great things from Dupleix, and for a great accession of wealth to the Company. At this period (during Dupleix), France was disgraced at home and all the world over except in India. As long as they saw any prospect of this, they aided him. They became impatient; and at length decided to abandon all such designs, and make an effort to return to a purely commercial status, uninterrupted by any further interference in native affairs. The treaty of Pondicherry, and the recall to France of M. Dupleix — who was doomed to suffer not only disappointment but insult from the masters he had attempted to serve only too well — mark the end of a war. |
| What were the implications of the Second Carnatic War? | French Discomfiture; English Growth; Indian Authority Dependent on Europeans: It marks the almost complete success, followed by the complete discomfiture, of the designs which the French had persistently attempted to carry out for so many years. On the other hand, it marks a distinct growth in the policy of the English. It became evident that the countenance of Indian authority was no longer necessary for European success; rather Indian authority itself was becoming dependent on European support. |
17. Third Carnatic War (1758–63)
17. Third Carnatic War (1758–63)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What background and European trigger opened the Third Carnatic War? | De Leyrit, Seven Years War, Financial Weakness, Lally’s Dispatch: After the return of Godeheu to Europe, there came out to India as French governor M. de Leyrit, who was by no means so eager to carry on pacifist policy. With the English openly disregarding the treaty of Pondicherry, he determined that the sacrifice which the treaty demanded of French interests was impossible. In Europe, when Austria wanted to recover Silesia in `1756`, the Seven Years War (`1756–63`) started. Britain and France were once again on opposite sides. The outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in Europe led to open conflict between French and British forces in India. The French position by now had been significantly weakened by financial difficulties, as even the soldiers remained unpaid for months. The apathy of the French government was shaken at the outbreak of European hostilities and a strong force was dispatched under Count de Lally. |
| How did the war spread to Bengal and the Northern Circars? | Chandernagore (`1757`), Lally’s Advance, Forde’s Campaign, Recall of Bussy: The Third Carnatic War spread beyond southern India and into Bengal where British forces captured the French settlement of Chandernagore (now Chandannagar) in `1757` just before the Battle of Plassey. By capture of Chandernagore, French power in Bengal was destroyed. Circumstances had prevented Bussy from marching from the Deccan to its assistance. A very short time after this, at the battle of Plassey, a little band of Frenchmen had taken service with Suraj-ud-Dowlah but French power was no more. In `1758`, the French army under Count de Lally captured the English forts of St. David and Vizianagaram. The proceeding of French General Lally was, for a time, like a triumphal procession. Fort St. David fell, and province after province became the property of the French. The English were quite reduced to the possession of Madras; and, had the French succeeded in their attack on this place, English power in the Carnatic would have been a thing of the past. The English forces were, however, concentrated here; and the conduct of the siege by the French was, for various reasons, feeble. All this time Clive remained in Bengal. He, however, created a diversion by sending one of his best generals, Colonel Forde, to attack the French possessions in the Northern Circars. This proved itself a grand success. Forde made a midnight attack upon Masulipatam, which fell, and with it 3000 Frenchmen as prisoners of war. English had also inflicted heavy losses on the French fleet under Admiral D’Ache at Masulipatnam. On his arrival at Pondicherry, Count Lally had thought fit to withdraw Bussy from the court of the subahdar of the Deccan (which was a mistake); and now the subahdar, Salabat Jang, deserting the French, made an agreement with Forde to expel the French altogether from the Deccan, and to grant certain districts which had been in the possession of the French to the English. The French lost their positions in India one after another: first fell Chandernagore in Bengal; then when Bussy was recalled to help Lally in the Carnatic, the Northern Sarkars were exposed to an attack from Bengal. The fall of the Sarkars together with that of two other old settlements of Masulipatam and Yanam ended French influence in the Deccan. No treaty, such as the treaty of Pondicherry, by which the one side gains everything and the other side loses everything, can ever hold for a great length of time, unless the gaining side possesses power sufficient to keep the losers in absolute subjection. |
| What was the decisive Battle of Wandiwash and the fall of Pondicherry? | Eyre Coote vs Lally (22 January `1760`); Pondicherry (16 January `1761`); Jinji and Mahe: The decisive battle of the Third Carnatic War was won by the English on 22 January `1760` at Wandiwash (or Vandavasi) in Tamil Nadu. British commander Sir Eyre Coote decisively defeated the French under the Comte de Lally at the Battle of Wandiwash in `1760` and took Bussy as prisoner. After Wandiwash, the French capital of Pondicherry fell to the British in `1761`. Pondicherry was gallantly defended by Lally for eight months before he surrendered on 16 January `1761`. With the loss of Jinji and Mahe, the French power in India was reduced to its lowest. The great battle of Wandewash, in comparison with which all the previous battles in India appear insignificant, from the fact that so great a number of Europeans on each side here met in conflict, resulted in a complete English victory. Lally, after being taken as prisoner of war at London, returned to France where he was imprisoned and executed in `1766`. |
| What did the Treaty of Paris (`1763`) provide regarding French India? | Factories Restored; Political Administration Forbidden; British Client Governments: The war along with the Seven Years War concluded with the signing of the `1763` Treaty of Paris, which returned Chandernagore and Pondicherry to France, and allowed the French to have “factories” (trading posts) in India but forbade French traders from administering them. The French agreed to support British client governments, thus ending French ambitions of an Indian empire and making the British the dominant foreign power in India. |
| What was the result and significance of the Third Carnatic War? | French Political Influence Ends; Wandiwash as Turning Point; Crown Troops and Balance of Power: The Third Carnatic War proved decisive. Although the Treaty of Peace of Paris (`1763`) restored to the French their factories in India, the French political influence disappeared after the war. Thereafter, the French, like their Portuguese and Dutch counterparts in India, confined themselves to their small enclaves and to commerce. The French East India Company was finally wound up in `1769` and thus was eliminated English main European rival in India. The English became the supreme European power in the Indian subcontinent, since the Dutch had already been defeated in the Battle of Bidara in `1759`. The Battle of Plassey, in `1757`, is usually regarded by historians as the decisive event that brought about ultimate British rule over India. However, one cannot quite ignore the view that the true turning point for control of the subcontinent was the victory of British forces over the French forces at Wandiwash in `1760`. The victory at Wandiwash left the English East India Company with no European rival in India. Thus they were ready to take over the rule of the entire country. Significantly, in the Battle of Wandiwash, natives served in both the armies as sepoys. It makes one think: irrespective of which side won, there was an inevitability about the fall of India to European invaders. There was a lack of sensitivity to geopolitics of the day as well as a lack of foresight on the part of native rulers. English was now also the de facto master of Carnatic, although the Treaty of Paris had assured the nawab his entire possessions. Nawab’s nominal sovereignty was respected till `1801`; then, after the death of the incumbent nawab, his territories were annexed and his heir was pensioned off. Hyderabad too virtually became dependent on the English and the nizam in `1766` gave them the Northern Sarkars in return for military support against his overmighty neighbours. The Anglo-French rivalry by bringing in Crown troops to India in significant numbers considerably enhanced the military power of the English East India Company vis-a-vis the other Indian states. The balance of power in India had now begun to tilt decisively in English favour. |
18. Causes of British Success over the French: Structural Factors
18. Causes of British Success over the French: Structural Factors
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did naval supremacy and control of the sea route decide the Anglo-French contest in India? | Sea Route Control, Man-Money-Provisions, Cut French Link: The British had full control over the sea route to India, which facilitated their swift movement to and from India. This enabled the British to receive man, money and provisions from Bengal and Britain, enabled transport and cover the operations of their forces, deprived the French from their supplies, and helped them to continue their trade. The English navy helped to cut off the vital sea link between the French possessions in India and France. As against this the French fleet was very weak and it was always a tedious process to bring a naval fleet from France. |
| How did European politics and home-government attitudes favour England over France? | Superior European Position, Secure Geography, Home Approval vs Neglect: The impact of European politics was quite obvious on the Anglo-French relations in India. In Europe the position of England was much more superior to France and they were achieving success everywhere. The geographical position of England was too comparatively secured while France had to pay much more attention to its borders while at war. The English had complete approval and confidence of their Home government whereas the French Home government never took any interest in Indian affairs. Therefore, the French Company in India had to repeatedly look up to the Home government for all kinds of support including financial and military assistance. French Company was department of State while English Company was independent commercial corporation with sound finance and less interference from British Government. |
| How did private joint-stock enterprise vs state department shape decision-making and morale? | Enthusiasm, Instant Decisions vs Government Delays: The English company was a private enterprise — this created a sense of enthusiasm and self confidence among the people. With less governmental control over it, this company could take instant decisions when needed without waiting for the approval of the government. The French company, on the other hand, was a State concern. It was controlled and regulated by the French government and was hemmed in by government policies and delays in decision-making. |
| How did financial strength and the commerce-versus-territory priority diverge? | British Commercial Funds vs French Frailty and Short Funds: The financial position of the British was stronger. In spite of their imperialistic motives, the British never neglected their commercial interests. So they always had the funds and the consequent sound financial condition to help them significantly in the wars against their rivals. As opposed to this, the economic position of the French government in India was very frail. At times, they were not able to complete several plans because of lack of funds. The French subordinated their commercial interest to territorial ambition, which made the French company short of funds. |
| Why was the conquest of Bengal (`1757`) decisive as a base against the French? | Wealth, Fertile Land, Harbour, Ganges Approach, Madras Supply Line: The position of the British was strengthened by their conquest of Bengal in `1757`. Bengal was one of the richest and most prosperous regions in those days. The English occupation of Bengal in `1757` enabled them to use the inexhaustible source of wealth and material resources of Bengal for fighting against the French. Bengal was rich due to fertile land and trade. Bengal was also strategically important. It gave the English a firm base of operation on the mainland. Bengal had an excellent harbour which was useful in trade and military supply. Ganges and its tributary in Bengal offered opportunity to the British to approach its remote parts by means of boats without any hazard. They collected Bengal gold and sent its men continuously to fight their battle in Madras. Apart from Bengal, the British also controlled important areas of Bombay and Madras, which were useful not only from the point of view of inland and foreign trade but also from the strategic angle. The French on the other hand, only had small settlements at Pondicherry, Mahe and Chandarnagore. French were facing great financial difficulties. The resources that French could get from the Deccan and Carnatic with Pondicherry as a base, were quite inadequate. Deccan was less fertile than Bengal. It could finance neither wild political ambition of Dupleix nor the reckless military schemes of Lally. French had a harbour and sea base at Mauritius, but it was distant and ill-equipped. Both for commercial purposes and for purposes of war the French seat of power was less advantageous compared to that of the English. V.A. Smith said: “Neither Alexander the Great nor Napoleon could have won the empire of India by starting from Pondicherry as a base and contending with a power which held Bengal and command of the Sea.” |
| What policy dissonance and personal responsibilities damaged the French cause? | Dupleix–Home Coordination Gap; Lally Recalls Bussy; English Generals: There was no coordination between the policy of Dupleix and the French Government. Dupleix wanted to establish a French state in India, but the French Government was apparently not aware of it. Above all it was not proper on the part of the French government to recall Dupleix all of a sudden. Responsibility of Dupleix: His complete absorption in political intrigues caused indifference towards trading and finance. He lacked coordination with the French Government. Lally committed the gravest blunder by recalling Bussy from Hyderabad. This reduced the influence of the French government in the South. Better English generals, greater cooperation amongst the English officials and minimum interference of the English government in the affairs of Company were also responsible for the success of the British. A major factor in the success of the English in India was the superiority of the commanders in the British camp. In comparison to the long list of leaders on the English side — Sir Eyre Coote, Major Stringer Lawrence, Robert Clive and many others — there was only Dupleix on the French side. |
| How were French foes “those of their own household”? | Aix-la-Chapelle Restitution; Contumely to Dupleix; Louis XV’s Debased Government: But, much as British owe to such men, it is impossible to conceal the fact that, to a very great extent indeed, the success of the English was due to the misfortunes of the French. The foes of the French were, in very truth, those of their own household: they were the French government and the Directors of the French East India Company. When every English place on the Coromandel Coast, with the exception of Fort St. David, was under French — the French government agreed to the terms of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which directed that a mutual restitution of all persons and places taken in the war should be made. French influence in India was so great, that one Frenchman guided the counsels of subahdars and nawabs, and even influenced those of the Great Mogul himself but the French Company, sighing because of a diminished revenue, and the French government, abjectly cringing before the wrath of England, were ready to give up all their influence, and to recall and treat with contumely the Great Governor, Dupleix, who had spent life and wealth for the glory of France. Against odds like these not even a Dupleix, a Bussy, or a Lally, could succeed. They had conceived a project too vast for the comprehension of either the debased government of Louis XV, or the Directors of the East India Company. The most disastrous blow was therefore struck at French power at the conclusion of the second Carnatic war. Previous to the Treaty of Pondichery, the chances of ultimate French success were overwhelming. The grand outline was already sketched. The master-mind of Dupleix had every plan in mind. At a critical moment the master-mind was removed; the policy which had achieved such triumphs was abandoned. For France it was unfortunate that a misfortune like that of the capture of Law’s army and the death of Chanda Saheb should have resulted in their abandonment. The disaster, though severe, need not have been more than temporary. It most certainly had not proved the destruction of French hopes. The English were still in a most perilous position. From a French point of view, the great difficulty was still the status of Mohammed Ali; and Dupleix would have found some mode of settling this question. The whole state of India was, in fact, ripe for the exercise of that power in which he excelled; and it can scarcely be doubted that he would have taken advantage of Maratha and Mysorean affairs to establish French power more securely than ever. The great victories of Dupleix were due to moral rather than to physical force; but it was precisely this fact that his masters at home were incapable of understanding. The third period of the war was one, in which France possessed no advantage even in the Carnatic; and, even if Lally had proved completely victorious here, even if French power in the Deccan had been allowed to remain and to become consolidated, the English now possessed a stronghold in Bengal, (which generated a lot of revenue and trade in contrast to Deccan) from which it would have been difficult to expel them. |
| Why were the Carnatic Wars a boon for the British and a curse for the French? | Three Forces, Sepoy Training, Artillery Lessons, Crown Troops, `1769` Wind-Up: It may be said that the three Anglo-French Wars set the direction of the relationship of the three major forces present in the country: The Native Indian states, the British and the French. During the course of these wars, the mutual rifts and military incapability of the south Indian kings and Nawabs came into open. These wars proved to be boon for the British, who felt that the Indian soldiers were basically competent and only lacked training and knowledge of European arms and ammunitions. During their battles in India, they also came to understand the importance of artillery and new methods of warfare. The British made use of this experience to encourage the selfish interests of the Indian princes on the one hand and on the other hand trained the Indian soldiers in the European style and used them for their own political expansion in India. But, at the same time care was taken not to appoint Indian soldiers on important military positions. These wars proved to be curse for the French. The balance of power in India had by now decisively changed with the steady expansion of power of the English East India Company. The French East India Company was finally wound up in `1769` and thus was eliminated British’s main European rival in India. It was now also de facto master of Carnatic, although the Treaty of Paris had assured the nawab his entire possessions. His nominal sovereignty was respected till `1801`; then, after the death of the incumbent nawab, his territories were annexed, and his heir was pensioned off. Hyderabad too virtually became dependent on the English and the Nizam in `1766` gave them to the Northern Sarkars in return for military support against neighbours. The Anglo-French rivalry by bringing in Crown troops to India in significant numbers considerably enhanced the military power of the English East India Company vis-à-vis the other Indian states. The balance of power had now begun to tilt decisively in its favour. The rivalry, in the form of three Carnatic wars, decided once for all that the English and not the French were to become masters of India. |
19. Why the English Succeeded against Other European Powers
19. Why the English Succeeded against Other European Powers
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did structure and nature of the trading companies differ? | Elected Board and Share Votes vs State Ownership and Feudal Character: The English East India Company, formed through amalgamation of several rival companies at home, was controlled by a board of directors whose members were elected annually. The shareholders of the company exercised considerable influence, as the votes could be bought and sold through purchase of shares. The trading companies of France and Portugal were largely owned by the State and their nature was in many ways feudalistic. In the French company, the monarch had more than 60 per cent share and, its directors were nominated by the monarch from the shareholders who were supposed to carry on the decisions of two high commissioners appointed by the government. The shareholders took very little interest in promoting the prosperity of the company, because the State guaranteed a dividend to the shareholders. The lack of public interest could be inferred from the fact that between `1725` and `1765`, there was no meeting of the shareholders and the company was simply managed as a department of the State. |
| What role did naval superiority play against Portuguese and French rivals? | Largest and Most Advanced Royal Navy; Portuguese Naval Lesson: The Royal Navy of Britain was not only the largest; it was most advanced of its times. The British were able to defeat the Portuguese and the French due to strong and fast movement of the naval ships. The English learnt from the Portuguese the importance of an efficient navy and improved their own fleet technologically. |
| How did the Industrial Revolution reinforce English hegemony? | Early 18th Century Machines; Late Diffusion to Rivals: The Industrial Revolution started in England in the early 18th century, with the invention of new machines like the spinning Jenny, steam engine, the power loom and several others. These machines greatly improved production in the fields of textile, metallurgy, steam power and agriculture. The industrial revolution reached other European nations late and this helped England to maintain its hegemony. |
| What military skill and discipline advantages did the British possess? | Disciplined Soldiers, Strategic Commanders, Technology: The British soldiers were a disciplined lot and well trained. The British commanders were strategists who tried new tactics in warfare. Technological developments equipped the military well. All this combined to enable smaller groups of English fighters defeat larger armies. |
| How did relative political stability at home matter? | Glorious Revolution Exception; French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars; Dutch–Spain Eighty Years: With the exception of the Glorious Revolution of `1688`, Britain witnessed stable government with efficient monarchs. Other European nations like France witnessed violent revolution in `1789` and afterwards the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon’s defeat in `1815`, significantly weakened France’s position and from then on it was forced to side with Britain. The Dutch and Spain were also involved in the 80-years war in the 17th century which weakened Portuguese imperialism. |
| How did lesser zeal for religion affect colonial acceptability? | Less Interest in Spreading Christianity than Spain, Portugal or Dutch: Britain was less zealous about religion and less interested in spreading Christianity, as compared to Spain, Portugal or Dutch. Thus, its rule was far more acceptable to the subjects than that of other colonial powers. |
| How did use of the debt market and Bank of England fund British wars? | World’s First Central Bank; Sell Government Debt against Rival Defeat: One of the major and innovative reasons why Britain succeeded between the mid eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, while other European nations fell, was that it used the debt markets to fund its wars. The world’s first central bank — the Bank of England — was established to sell government debt to the money markets on the promise of a decent return on Britain’s defeating rival countries like France and Spain. Britain was thus enabled to spend much more on its military than its rivals. |
| What additional Indian-theatre factors favoured the English Company? | Better-Fed Regularly Paid Soldiers; Bankers’ Hundis; Revenue Control: The soldiers fighting at the frontline for the Company’s army were better fed and regularly paid in contrast to those servicing the Mughal successor states. The Indian bankers who controlled and transferred large sums of money through *hundis*, seemed to have been preferring the English Company as a more trustworthy creditor than the unstable Indian princes. The English Company gradually reduced this dependence and turned it upside down by establishing control over the revenue resources, which became vital for financing trade as well as further conquests. |
20. Critical Evaluations: French Discretion, Monarchy Policy and Dupleix
20. Critical Evaluations: French Discretion, Monarchy Policy and Dupleix
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did nature of the two companies differ on autonomy and political economy? | State Department vs Independent Joint-Stock; Liability vs Asset: French Company was like a department of the State as the major share of the French East India Company was held by French monarch. Naturally, the Company did not enjoy autonomy. The English East India Company was independent commercial corporation with sound finance and less interference from the British Government. It was a joint-stock company in whose fortune or misfortune a large section of the English nation was directly interested unlike French Company where major share was held by the monarch. The English Company had complete approval and confidence of their Home government. The British Government interfered in the affairs of the Company only when it was necessary to secure the interest of its shareholders. The French East India company had to repeatedly look up to the Home government for all kinds of support including financial and military assistance. While the English East India Company was an asset to the British Government, for the Government even received loans from it, the French East India Company was a liability to the home government. |
| How does limited discretionary power partly explain French failure in India? | Neglect after Louis XIV/Colbert; Politics over Commerce; Officers’ Territorial Focus: The French Company was guided more by the whims of the French ruler than by the exigency of the situation of India. During Louis XIV’s life time, his finance minister Colbert had created a great enthusiasm in trade, commerce and industry and the French Company profited by the general enthusiasm. But from the latter part of Louis XIV’s rule this enthusiasm was on the wane, enthusiasm was replaced by general neglect. Since the French government decided everything, decisions were taken in view of politics and not commerce. This led to dwindling commercial profit forcing it to borrow or selling trading rights or begging the French government for grant. Officers of the French Company focused more on territorial expansion instead of commerce. When their home government was not in position to subsidise them, they should have concentrated on consolidating their finances before entering into expensive political ventures. This they did not do. The Governor of Pondicherry, who controlled the main French treasury was unable to finance operation. The French troops suffered from the lack of provisions and there was no money to pay the soldiers and workmen. The French Government at home or the Company, was not in a position to come out with the necessary financial help even at a time when Dupleix had succeeded in acquiring territories in India. Dupleix spent his own fortunes to meet financial needs of the French Government in India, but this was too small in comparison to the task he had undertaken. Poverty dogged the French in India even when they were at the zenith of their power in India. But these factors were only partially responsible for the failure of French as several other factors were also responsible for it, such as: Naval superiority of English, capture of Bengal by English, strategic blunders by French officers, lack of appreciation by French government for the excellent service by its officers etc. |
| Was India lost by France mainly because Dupleix, Bussy or La Bourdonnais failed personally? | Short-Sighted Ill-Managed European Policy of French Monarchy — Thesis: French were the first one to conceive the idea of empire building in India. However French failed to carve out an empire in India while British achieved it. Dupleix was the governor general of French East India company. He fought the first and second Anglo-French war on Indian soil. Although in the first Carnatic war the French emerged victorious but they did not oust the British completely from India. In second and third Carnatic wars the French got defeated. During the first Carnatic War, La Bourdonnais, the French Governor of Mauritius, was requested for help by Dupleix who helped in capturing Madras. La Bourdonnais was bribed by the British and he restored Madras to the British. But still in the first Carnatic War, French were victorious. Lally had committed the greatest blunder by recalling Bussy from Hyderabad. This reduced the influence of the French government in the south. It was said to be one of the reasons of French defeat in the third Carnatic War. Dupleix’s recall proved ruinous for the cause of the French in India at a time when Dupleix, with his diplomatic skills, had detached from the English side all their allies, i.e., Marathas, Raja of Tanjore, rulers of Mysore. But blaming the recall of Bussy or Dupleix for French defeat is not correct. Even how the French government handled the state of affairs in India at that time needs an examination. |
| What was the role of the French monarchical government in losing Indian settlements? | Whims of Monarch; Continental War Priority; Mistresses and Incompetent Ministers; No Company Autonomy: French government in 18th century was monarchical. The policy of the Government was mainly determined by the whims of the monarch. The French government did not give importance to its colonies overseas mainly America and India, instead got her involved in the Continental War near her home which precluded her from sending adequate help to her colonies abroad. Louis XV did not have competent ministers to rely upon. Policy of Louis XV, misguided by his mistresses and by incompetent ministers, that France lost her Indian Settlements in the Seven Years’ War. French government failed diplomatically to forge strong alliances to fight British while the latter succeeded in doing so. England fought the war in the Continent with the help of Prussia, a strong military power and employed much of her strength and energy to fight the French in America, India and on the Seas. French government never gave autonomy to the French East India Company vis-à-vis India. The moment there was no assistance to French EIC from the government, it became incapable of standing on its own. But the English East India Company was a joint-stock company in whose fortune or misfortune a large section of the English nation was directly interested. English EIC had more opportunity to take its own initiatives as British government interfered only when necessary. However, there were host of other factors as well behind the French failure in India. |
| How should Dupleix’s own failure in establishing a French empire be examined? | Costly Expansion without Support; La Bourdonnais Rift; Pondicherry Base; Weak Navy; Selective Reporting: Dupleix failure was due to various factors. Lack of support from French government: Dupleix expansionist policy was proving to be very costly for France. Further the domestic conditions were volatile. Thus Dupleix was not given extra resources for the fight against British. Dupleix further did not have cordial relationship with his counterparts. For e.g. La Bourdonnais. During the second Carnatic war the French naval commander La Bourdonnais left Saint David fort of Madras after Dupleix highhanded attitude. Robert Clive was quick to grab opportunity to defeat Dupleix. Dupleix had resource scarce Pondicherry as his base while English had resource rich Bengal as their base. His complete absorption in political intrigues caused indifference towards trading and finance causing financial problem of the French company. Further Dupleix had weak navy at his command as compared to the British who were the masters of the sea. He kept the French government and directors of the French East India Company uninformed of the actual state of affairs in India, giving them only the news of his success but not of failures. |
UPSC Relevance
UPSC Relevance
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What Mains angles does this note support under Modern Indian History? | Key Angles UPSC Targets:
|