British Expansion & Administrative Policies
High-Yield Fact Sheet
📊 High-Yield Data & Statistical Fact Sheet
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| List chronological anchors, named actors, treaties, sums and quantitative markers for 18th-century states, British conquest of Bengal, complete Anglo-Mysore (Seringapatam–1799–Wilks), Maratha rise/Panipat, three Anglo-Maratha Wars, and Sikh State–Anglo-Sikh Wars through annexation of Punjab (1849). | 18th-Century State System Anchors:
Murshid Quli–Alivardi–Siraj Anchors:
Plassey Arc Anchors:
Post-Plassey to Dual System Anchors:
Anglo-Mysore Anchors (Complete):
Maratha Rise & Confederacy Anchors:
Anglo-Maratha Wars Anchors:
Sikh Panth, Khalsa & Banda Bahadur Anchors:
Misls, Ranjit Singh & Anglo-Sikh Anchors:
|
Overview
Overview
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What is the central historical problem of British conquest of Bengal and the 18th-century state system for UPSC Mains in this note? | The first half of the eighteenth century saw the decline of the Mughals gain momentum after Aurangzeb, yet the symbolic authority of the emperor as a source of political legitimacy continued. New polities — successor states (Bengal, Hyderabad, Awadh), rebel states (Marathas, Sikhs, Jats, Afghans of Farukhabad and Rohilkhand), and independent kingdoms (Rajputs, Mysore, Travancore) — represented a transformation and decentralisation of power rather than collapse or chaos. Within that map, Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan (`1717`) fused *nazim* and *diwan*, and under Alivardi and Siraj the path to Plassey (23 June `1757`) and Buxar (23 October `1764`) transferred Diwani via the Treaty of Allahabad (`1765`) and Dual Government (`1765–72`). Parallel southern and western contests completed subcontinental hegemony: Haidar–Tipu Mysore ran through four Anglo-Mysore wars to the Treaty of Seringapatam (`1792`) and Tipu’s death at Seringapatam (4 May `1799`), with Colonel Mark Wilks framing “Haider was born to create an empire, Tipu to lose one.” The Marathas, rising from Tarabai–Shahu civil war through Balaji Vishwanath’s `1719` *sanad*, Baji Rao I (Palkhed `1728`, Bhopal `1739`) and the Confederacy, peaked under Balaji Baji Rao before Panipat III (`14 January 1761`) against Abdali; historiography (Habib’s zamindar revolt, Satish Chandra’s regional Deccan frame, Andre Wink’s *fitna*) explains why they could not replace the Mughals. Three Anglo-Maratha Wars — Surat–Purandhar–Wadgaon–Salbai (`1782`); Bassein (`1802`) Subsidiary Alliance and Devgaon–Surajianjangaon–Rajpurghat; Hastings paramountcy, Pindari war and `1817–19` dissolution of peshwaship with Bajirao at Bithur — ended with seven structural causes of Maratha defeat and Company mastery south of the Vindhyas. In the north-west, the Sikh Panth — from Guru Nanak (`1469`) through Khalsa (`1699`), Banda Bahadur (`1708–16`), the misls and Dal Khalsa, to Maharaja Ranjit Singh (`1780–1839`) of the Sukerchakia misl — built a centralised Sikh state recognised by the Treaty of Amritsar (`25 April 1809`) and constrained by the Tripartite Treaty (`June 1838`); post-`1839` court anarchy, the First Anglo-Sikh War (`1845–46`) (Lahore, Bhairowal, Kashmir sale to Gulab Singh), and the Second (`1848–49`) under Dalhousie ended independent Sikh sovereignty with annexation (`29 March`/`2 April 1849`) and a three-member Board of Administration — framed in Mains PYQs as imperial considerations (strategic frontier, Russophobia, neo-Victorian imperialism, commercial Indus route) and as a “sacred breach of trust” toward the minor Maharaja Duleep Singh. |
1. India on the Eve of British Conquest: 18th Century State System
1. India on the Eve of British Conquest: 18th Century State System
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why did Mughal decline after Aurangzeb not produce a simple power vacuum? | Decline with Continuing Symbolic Legitimacy: The first half of the eighteenth century saw the decline of the mighty Mughals. The decline gained momentum after the death of Aurangzeb due to wars of succession and weak rulers. Though Muhammad Shah ruled for a long spell of 29 years (`1719–48`), a revival of the imperial fortunes did not take place as he was an incompetent ruler. Muhammad Shah’s reign witnessed the establishment of the independent states of Hyderabad, Bengal, Awadh and Punjab. Several local chiefs began to assert their independence and the Marathas began to make their bid to inherit the imperial mantle. Yet the symbolic authority of the Mughal emperor continued, as he was still considered to be a source of political legitimacy. The new states did not directly challenge his authority and constantly sought his sanction to legitimise their rule. In many areas of governance these states continued the Mughal institutions and the administrative system. |
| What analytical formulation captures the nature of the new 18th-century polities? | Transformation, Not Collapse; Decentralisation, Not Chaos: The emergence of these states in the eighteenth century represented a transformation rather than collapse of the polity. It signified a decentralisation of power and not a power vacuum or political chaos. These new states were of various kinds with diverse histories. |
2. Three Types of 18th Century States
2. Three Types of 18th Century States
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the successor states and how were they related to the Mughal centre? | Successor States — Bengal, Hyderabad, Awadh: Some states were founded by Mughal provincial governors and are known as successor states — for example Bengal, Hyderabad and Awadh. They are also known as successor states in the sense that they were founded by Mughal provincial governors who never formally severed their links with the centre, but virtually exercised autonomy in matters of execution of power at the local level. |
| What were the rebel or new states? | Rebel / New States — Marathas, Sikhs, Jats, Afghans: Some states were set up by rebels against the Mughal state, and are therefore known as the rebel states or the new states. These included the Marathas, the Sikhs, the Jats and the Afghan kingdoms of Farukhabad and Rohilkhand. |
| What were the independent kingdoms that asserted autonomy from prior dependent polities? | Independent Kingdoms — Rajputs, Mysore, Travancore: A few states which asserted their independence were previously functioning as autonomous but dependent polities; these are known as independent kingdoms. The Rajput kingdoms, Mysore and Travancore fall in this category. |
| Type | Nature | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Successor states | Founded by Mughal provincial governors; formal links with centre retained; virtual local autonomy | Bengal, Hyderabad, Awadh |
| Rebel / new states | Set up by rebels against the Mughal state | Marathas, Sikhs, Jats; Afghan kingdoms of Farukhabad and Rohilkhand |
| Independent kingdoms | Previously autonomous but dependent polities that asserted independence | Rajput kingdoms, Mysore, Travancore |
3. Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan (1717–1727)
3. Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan (1717–1727)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Murshid Quli fuse nazim and diwan and what did that mean for Mughal checks? | Simultaneous Nazim and Diwan; Last Imperial Appointee: The province or the *subah* of Bengal gradually became independent of Mughal control after Murshid Quli Khan became the governor in `1717`. He was given the unprecedented privilege of holding the two offices of *nazim* and *diwan* simultaneously. The division of power, which was maintained throughout the Mughal period to keep both imperial officers under control through a system of checks and balances, was thus done away with. This helped Murshid Quli, who was already known for his efficient revenue administration, to consolidate his position further. He did not of course formally defy Mughal authority and regularly sent revenue to the imperial treasury. Indeed, the Bengal revenue was often the only regular income for the beleaguered Mughal emperors during periods of financial stringency and uncertainty. But behind the veneer of formal allegiance, Murshid Quli began to enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy within his own domain and initiated almost a dynastic rule. He was indeed the last governor of Bengal appointed by the Mughal emperor. |
| How did Murshid Quli restructure revenue, zamindaris and khalisa? | Revenue Up 20%; Fifteen Largest Zamindaris; Khalisa: The foundation of Murshid Quli’s power was his very successful revenue administration, which even in the days of political chaos elsewhere in the empire made Bengal a constant revenue-paying surplus area. Revenue collection had shot up by 20 per cent between `1700` and `1722`. A detailed survey was done and he compelled the zamindars to pay in full and on time. For this purpose, he encouraged the development of a few powerful zamindaris at the expense of smaller inefficiently managed zamindaris, while refractory zamindars were punished and their estates converted into *khalisa* or royal land. By the time of Murshid Quli’s death in `1727`, fifteen largest zamindaris were responsible for about half of the revenue of the province. |
| How did trade, merchants and the Jagat Seths reshape Bengal politics? | Oceanic Trade, Umi Chand, Khoja Wajid, Jagat Seths (`1730`): Along with the rise of the zamindars as a new powerful elite in the province, there was also the growing importance of merchants and bankers. Bengal always had a lucrative trade, and the political stability and increase in agricultural productivity during Murshid Quli’s period provided further impetus. In the 17th century, silk and cotton textile, sugar, oil and clarified butter from Bengal went through the overland route to Persia and Afghanistan via a number of north and west Indian distributing centres and on the oceanic route through the port of Hughli to the Southeast Asian, Persian Gulf and Red Sea ports. During the political turmoil of the 18th century, traffic through the overland route partially declined, but oceanic trade thrived with increasing investment from the European Companies — the Dutch, the French and the English. During the first half of the century, Europe became the major destination for goods from Bengal, with significant impact on the textile industry. Bengal always enjoyed a favourable balance of trade, with surplus bullion brought in by the European Companies to buy Bengal goods, absorbed smoothly into the cash economy and revenue remittance structure. On the Indian side this trade was dominated by a variety of merchants — Hindus, Muslims and Armenians. Some were magnates, like the Hindu merchant Umi Chand or the Armenian tycoon Khoja Wajid who controlled a fleet of ships. They enjoyed a very cordial relation with the state and bureaucracy. The Mughal state traditionally never tried to squeeze the merchants. The constant pressure on the zamindars to pay revenue in time and its regular remittance to the imperial treasury in Delhi brought powerful financiers and bankers into great demand. They provided securities at every stage of the transaction and enjoyed unprecedented patronage of the governor, thus providing the main supportive pillar of his power. The most significant story of such collaboration was the rise of the banking house of Jagat Seth, who eventually became the treasurer of the provincial government in `1730`, with strategic control over the mint. |
| What political form did the Bengal government take under these new forces? | Government by Cooperation of Dominant Forces; Relative Diminution of Nazim: In the prevailing scenario there was emergence of new forces of Bengal politics — the zamindars, merchants and the bankers. The government of Bengal began to look more like government by cooperation of the dominant forces in Bengal, rather than the imposition of rule from outside. However, this gradual rise in the power of the merchants, bankers and zamindars also meant a relative diminution of the authority of the *nazim*. |
4. Alivardi Khan (1740–1756) and the Maratha Ditch
4. Alivardi Khan (1740–1756) and the Maratha Ditch
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Alivardi come to power and break virtually with the Mughals? | Coup against Sarfaraz; Imperial Sanction; Autonomy of Bengal–Bihar–Orissa: This relative diminution of the *nazim* became quite evident in a coup in `1739–40`, in which Sarfaraz Khan, who had become the new *nazim*, was ousted by his army commander Alivardi Khan, with the help of the banking family of Jagat Seths and a few powerful zamindars. Sarfaraz had to go not just because he was an inefficient administrator, but because he had alienated the house of Jagat Seth, and had lost the support of a few powerful officials. Alivardi Khan became new *nazim*, who later obtained imperial sanctions for his government. It was Alivardi’s reign which marked a virtual break with the Mughals. All major appointments were now made without any reference to the emperor and finally, the regular flow of revenue to Delhi was stopped. Although there was never any formal defiance of the Mughal authority, for all practical purposes an autonomous administration, free of all sorts of imperial control, had now emerged in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. |
| What was Alivardi’s attitude to Europeans and what was the Maratha Ditch? | Strict Control; War Levies; Three-Mile Moat (`1742`): Alivardi’s attitude to the Europeans in Bengal was strict. During his wars with the Marathas, he allowed the strengthening of fortifications by the Europeans and the construction of the Maratha Ditch in Calcutta by the British. On the other hand, he collected large amounts of money from them for the upkeep of his war. The Maratha Ditch was a three-mile long moat excavated by the British around Calcutta in `1742`, as a protection against possible attacks by Marathas. The “natives” had to pay for the construction of the Maratha Ditch to protect the British seat of power, Fort William. The Marathas, however, never came to the city. Later, the ditch proved useless when Siraj ud Daulah ransacked the British settlement in `1756`. It was mostly filled up in `1799` to build the Circular Road. The area bound by the ditch was considered the original town of Calcutta. Alivardi was well-informed of the situation in southern India, where the British and the French had started a proxy war using local princes and rulers. He did not wish such a situation to transpire in his province and thus exercised caution. The outbreak of the Austrian Succession War in Europe in `1740` brought hostilities between the English and the French Companies to India; in Bengal Alivardi kept both under control and forbade them from getting involved in any open hostilities. But French victories in south India made the English apprehensive in Bengal as they had very little trust in the power of the nawab to protect them against any French onslaught. Moreover, English private trade suffered heavily in the 1750s as a result of French competition in collusion with Asian merchants. |
5. Siraj-ud-daula, Fall of Calcutta and the Black Hole
5. Siraj-ud-daula, Fall of Calcutta and the Black Hole
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did succession factionalism after Alivardi open the door to the Plassey conspiracy? | Shaukat Jung, Ghaseti Begum; Overmighty Zamindars and Commercial People: Alivardi died in `1756`, nominating his grandson Siraj-ud-daula (23 years old) his successor. But his succession was challenged by two other contenders for the throne, Shaukat Jung (Faujdar of Purnea) and Ghaseti Begum (Alivardi’s daughter). This resulted in intense court factionalism, as the overmighty zamindars and commercial people felt threatened by an extremely ambitious and assertive young nawab. This destabilised the administration of Bengal, and the advantage was taken by the English East India Company, which acquired a foothold in Bengal politics through what is popularly known as the Plassey conspiracy of `1757` that ended the rule of Siraj-ud-daula. Siraj’s personality was said to be a combination of a ferocious temper and a feeble understanding. He was particularly suspicious of the large profits made by the European companies in India. The British wanted to occupy the rich and prosperous region of Bengal by subjugating the power of the Nawab and the other European powers. |
| How had Company–Nawab conflict over farmans and dastaks developed since `1690`/`1717`? | 60% of Asian Imports; Aurangzeb and Farrukhsiyar Farmans; Murshid Quli’s Refusal: Conflict started in Bengal, which in the early eighteenth century had become very important in the structure of the Company’s trade at the expense of the west coast, particularly Bombay, Surat and Malabar, as Bengal goods came to comprise nearly 60 per cent of English imports from Asia. In `1690` Aurangzeb’s farman had granted them right to duty-free trade in Bengal in return for an annual payment of Rs. 3,000. The foundation of Calcutta in `1690` and its fortification in `1696` were followed by the grant of zamindari rights in three villages of Kolikata, Suranuri and Gobindapur two years later. The situation became unstable again at the death of Aurangzeb, but was formalised again by a farman from emperor Farrukhsiyar in `1717`, which granted the Company the right to carry on duty-free trade, to rent thirty-eight villages around Calcutta, and to use the royal mint. But this farman also became a new source of conflict between the Company and Murshid Quli Khan, the new autonomous ruler of Bengal, who refused to extend its duty-free provision to cover also the private trade of the Company officials. The latter therefore took to rampant misuse of *dastaks*, and the nawab resented the loss of revenue. Apart from this, Murshid Quli also denied permission to the Company to buy the thirty-eight villages and refused to offer the minting privileges. The conflict between the Bengal nawab and the English Company had thus started developing right from `1717`. In `1755` the English began renovating the fortifications in Calcutta without the nawab’s permission and in utter defiance of his authority began to offer protection to fugitives from his court. |
| Why did Siraj attack Fort William and how did Calcutta fall in June `1756`? | Krishna Ballabh; Unauthorised Fortification; Kasimbazar; Holwell and 146: The conflict assumed critical dimensions when Siraj-ud-daula became nawab in `1756` and threatened the lucrative English private trade by stopping all misuse of *dastaks*. The more immediate issues of discord were the grant of asylum to Krishna Ballabh who was charged with fraud by the nawab and the new fortifications at Calcutta — both of which posed a challenge to the authority of the nawab and were critical to the issue of sovereignty. Fort William was established to protect the East India Company’s trade in the city of Calcutta, the principal town of the Bengal Presidency. With the possibility of conflict with French forces, the British began building up the fort’s strengths and defences. Siraj ud-Daulah ordered them to stop such activities as they were doing it without permission. When the Company failed to listen to warnings, Siraj showed his strength by taking over the factory at Kasimbazar. Governor Drake believed that he could avenge this defeat by force and ignored the nawab’s overtures for a diplomatic reconciliation. This was followed by Siraj’s attack on Calcutta and its capture on 20 June (city occupation also dated 16 June in another layer). The defenses of Calcutta were weak especially against a force of nearly 50,000 infantry and cavalry. The garrison’s commander organised an escape, leaving behind 146 soldiers under the command of Holwell, a senior East India Company bureaucrat who had been a military surgeon. |
| What was the Black Hole of Calcutta according to Holwell, and what controversies surround it? | 123 of 146 Claim; 267 sq ft; No Independent Confirmation; 43 Missing: The Black Hole of Calcutta was a small dungeon in the old Fort William in Calcutta, where troops of the Nawab of Bengal held British prisoners of war after the capture of the fort on 20 June `1756`. One of the prisoners, Holwell, claimed that following the fall of the fort, British and Anglo-Indian soldiers and civilians were held overnight in conditions so cramped that 123 prisoners died out of 146 held from suffocation, heat exhaustion and crushing. However, the precise number of deaths, and the accuracy of Holwell’s claims, have been the subject of controversy. Holwell wrote that he met Siraj, who assured him “on the word of a soldier that no harm should come to us”; at 8 pm prisoners were locked in a prison 14 by 18 feet; next morning at 6 am only 23 were alive. Holwell believed responsibility lay with lower *Jemmaatdaars*, not with an order of Siraj. Controversies: some argue that because so many non-combatants were present the number who died cannot be stated with precision; J.H. Little (`1915`) challenged Holwell’s veracity; a floor area of 267 square feet could not contain 146 European adults; absence of any independent confirmation — apart from Holwell’s account no other source mentioned such an incident; only forty-three of the garrison were listed as missing from Fort William after the incident and therefore the maximum number of deaths could only be forty-three — though Holwell’s own account holds that not all prisoners would have been listed as members of the garrison. As a result of Holwell’s account, Robert Clive was sent in October to retaliate. |
6. British Response, Treaty of Alinagar and Sacking of Chandernagore
6. British Response, Treaty of Alinagar and Sacking of Chandernagore
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Madras respond and how was Calcutta recovered? | Clive and Watson; Budge Budge; 2 January `1757`: When news of the fall of Calcutta broke in Madras on 16 August `1756`, the Council immediately sent out an expeditionary force from Madras under Colonel Robert Clive and Admiral Watson. A letter from the Council of Fort St. George states that “the object of the expedition was not merely to re-establish the British settlements in Bengal, but also to obtain ample recognition of the Company’s privileges and reparation for its losses” without the risk of war, and that any signs of dissatisfaction and ambition among the Nawab’s subjects must be supported. Clive assumed command of the land forces (prior layer: 900 Europeans and 1500 sepoys) while Watson commanded a naval squadron. The force dislodged the enemy from the fort of Budge Budge. Clive and Watson then moved against Calcutta on 2 January `1757` and the garrison of 500 men surrendered after offering a scanty resistance. With Calcutta recaptured, the Council was reinstated and a plan of action against the Nawab was prepared. The fortifications of Fort William were strengthened and a defensive position was prepared in the north-east of the city. |
| What was the Bengal Campaign of January–February `1757` and the Treaty of Alinagar? | Hooghly Sack; Pre-emptive Attack; Four Treaty Terms: On 9 January `1757`, a force of 650 men under Captain Coote and Major Kilpatrick stormed and sacked the town of Hooghly, 37 km north of Calcutta. On learning of this attack, the Nawab raised his army and marched on Calcutta, encamping beyond the Maratha Ditch. Despite their successes, the British were cut off from trade and resupply while the war lasted. It was in the Nawab’s interest to prolong it. Instead, he made the strategic mistake of trying to finish off the war quickly. He brought his army — with 40,000 horses, 60,000 soldiers on foot and 50 elephants — up to Calcutta and began preparing to attack the city. Clive decided to launch a pre-emptive attack. It proved to be a winning decision. Nawab’s army broke up and many fled. The British lost 57 men, the Nawab 1,300. Faced with a surprising defeat, Siraj preferred a negotiated settlement. On 9 February a peace Treaty of Alinagar was signed. The treaty was named after the short-lived title ‘Alinagar’ given to Calcutta by Siraj after his capture of the city. Terms: (1) Nawab agreed to restore the Company’s factories; (2) Nawab would recognize all the `1717` provisions of Mughal Emperor Farrukh Siyar’s firman; (3) All British goods that passed through Bengal would be exempt from duties; (4) British would not be hindered from fortifying Calcutta, as well as mint coins in Calcutta. The Nawab withdrew his army back to his capital, Murshidabad. Clive had come to Bengal not just with the objective of retaking Calcutta. Even before setting sail for Bengal, he had written, “this expedition will not end with the retaking of Calcutta only – and that the Company’s estate in these parts will be settled in a better and more lasting conditions than ever.” |
| Why and how was Chandernagore attacked and how did that reopen conflict with Siraj? | Bussy Fear; Seven Years’ War; Destruction of Hughli; French Defeat: For the moment there was peace, but it was not to last. Concerned by the approach of Bussy to Bengal and the Seven Years’ War in Europe, the Company turned its attention to the French threat in Bengal. The English fear about Siraj’s friendship with the French and apprehension that their trading privileges would be cut down led to the destruction of Hughli and a French defeat at Chandernagore. Prior layer details: Clive commenced hostilities on Chandernagar on 14 March; governor of Hooghly Nand Kumar bribed to remain inactive; Watson’s squadron forced the channel blockade on 23 March; French flag of truce 24 March `1757`. The Nawab was infuriated on learning of the attack on Chandernagar. His former hatred of the British returned, but he now felt the need to strengthen himself by alliances against the British. Also apprehensive of an Afghan attack under Abdali, Siraj now preferred a negotiated settlement; but a confident Clive decided on a coup d’état. The Nawab was also plagued by fear of attack from the north by Afghans under Ahmad Shah Durrani and from the west by the Marathas, and could not deploy his entire force against the British. Siraj started secret negotiations with Jean Law, chief of the French factory at Cossimbazar, and Bussy, and moved a large division under Rai Durlabh to Plassey. |
7. Conspiracy and the Battle of Plassey (23 June 1757)
7. Conspiracy and the Battle of Plassey (23 June 1757)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Who colluded against Siraj and what was the structural basis of the conspiracy? | Court Faction, Dadani Merchants, Jagat Seths, Mir Jafar: The confident servants of the Company in Calcutta were not prepared to tolerate a young tyrannical nawab threatening to destroy their trading privileges and trying to squeeze out a source of fabulous fortunes. There was already a disaffected faction at the nawab’s court, consisting of merchants, bankers, financiers and powerful zamindars — like the Jagat Seth brothers Mahtab Rai and Swarup Chand, Raja Janki Ram, Rai Durlabh, Raja Ramnarain and Raja Manik Chand — who felt threatened by the assertion of independence by a young nawab enthusiastically trying to reorder the balance of power in his court. There was also a natural communion of interests between the Indian mercantile community and the European traders, as many of the Indian merchants were operating in collaboration with the English Company and private traders, acting as their *dadani* merchants supplying them textiles from the interior in exchange for advances or *dadan*. Many of the Indian merchant princes had been preferring English ships for carrying their cargo, and this in fact resulted in the gradual decline of the port of Hughli, giving its place of pride to Calcutta. So a collusion of the two groups was not unlikely and what followed was a conspiracy to replace Siraj with Mir Jafar, his commander-in-chief, who was the choice of the Jagat Seths, without whose support any coup d’état was virtually impossible. The question whether there was already a conspiracy in existence at the Murshidabad court and the English took advantage of that, or it was the English who hatched the conspiracy — a question over which historians have fought futile polemical battles — is less important. What is important is the fact that there was a collusion, which resulted in the Battle of Plassey (June `1757`), in which Siraj was finally defeated by Clive. Prior layer also names Yar Lutuf Khan and Omichund/Omichand; William Watts informed Clive; select committee resolution 1 May; two treaties — real on white paper, fake on red paper — to deceive Omichund after his demand for three million rupees. |
| How did the Battle of Plassey unfold on 23 June `1757`? | Forces 50,000/28,000 vs 3,000; Mir Madan Killed; Siraj Fled; Miran Killed Siraj: On 23 June `1757`, the Battle of Plassey was fought between the forces of Siraj Ud Daulah and the troops of the British East India Company, led by Robert Clive. It was hardly more than a skirmish. The arrival of a strong force under Clive at Calcutta from Madras strengthened the English position in Bengal. Clive forged a secret alliance with the traitors of the nawab — Mir Jafar, Rai Durlabh, Jagat Seth and Omichand. Under the deal, Mir Jafar was to be made the nawab who in turn would reward the Company for its services. So the English victory was decided before the battle was even fought. The Nawab’s army contained 50,000 infantry, 28,000 cavalry and Clive’s army consisted only of 3,000 men including English soldiers. Out of three divisions of the Nawab, one division (the largest) was commanded by Mir Jafar. From the beginning of the battle, Mir Jafar, Rai Durlabh and Yar Lutuf Khan assembled their troops near the battlefield but made no move to actually join the battle. Only two generals Mohan Lai and Mir Madan were fighting desperately on behalf of the Nawab. Mir Madan fell dead on the field and thus the Nawab lost courage. For hours the course of the war remained undecided and uncertain. Mir Jafar advised the Nawab to send order to Mohan Lai to stop war and return back. Siraj, who distrusted his generals and had already been warned of impending defeat by his astrologer (who had possibly been bribed), lost his nerve when Mir Jafar advised retreat. Siraj fled on a fast camel. His demoralized army followed suit. Siraj-ud-daula fled from the battlefield for life but was killed by Miran, the son of Mir Jafar. |
| Why is Plassey called “not a great battle but a great betrayal”? | Deserted Camp; Bankers and Mir Jafar Sold Out Nawab: This battle itself was not important from the military view-point. It was a mere conflict. No military superiority was shown by the English army. The Nawab’s camp was deserted that led to victory of Lord Clive. Lord Clive’s diplomacy excelled. He won the battle almost without fighting. According to some historians: it was a transaction in which the bankers of Bengal and Mir Jafar sold out the Nawab to the English. |
8. Aftermath of Plassey: Plunder, Significance and New Epoch
8. Aftermath of Plassey: Plunder, Significance and New Epoch
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What political and military significance did Plassey carry? | Beginning of Political Supremacy; French Ousted; Far-Reaching Consequences: The Battle of Plassey had political significance for it marked the beginning of political supremacy of the English East India Company in India. It laid the foundation of the British empire in India; it has been rightly regarded as the starting point of British rule in India. The battle led to establishment of the military supremacy of the English in Bengal. Their main rivals, the French, were ousted. They obtained a grant of territories for the maintenance of a properly equipped military force, and their prestige increased manifold. In `1759`, the British defeated a larger French garrison at Masulipatam, securing the Northern Circars. The Dutch was also defeated. From commerce the English managed to exert an exclusive control on the administration too. Plassey proved as a battle that had far-reaching consequences in the fate of India. The conflict at Plassey was also crucial to the East India Company’s triumph over its French rivals. The Battle of Plassey ushered in a new era in the history of India. It was a turning point not only in the history of Bengal but also in the history of whole of India. It has therefore been rightly remarked that the Battle of Plassey marked the end of one epoch and the beginning of another. |
| What was the “Plassey plunder” and how did it restructure Company trade? | £275,000 Each; Rs 22.5 Million; Clive’s Jagir £34,567; Bullion Export; IR Frame `1770`: What followed hereafter is often referred to as the “Plassey plunder”. The Battle of Plassey placed at the disposal of the English the vast resources of Bengal. After Plassey, the English virtually monopolised the trade and commerce of Bengal. Immediately after the war the English army and navy each received the hefty sums of £275,000 for distribution among their members. Apart from that, between `1757` and `1760`, the Company received Rs 22.5 million from Mir Jafar; Clive himself got in `1759` a personal jagir worth £34,567. Prior layer also records acquisition of all land within the Maratha Ditch and 600 yards beyond it and the Zamindari of 24 Parganas; restitution including donations of 22 million rupees; half paid immediately after a council on 29 June with Seths and Rai Durlabh (two-thirds coin, one-third jewels); Omichand received nothing and went insane. So far as the Company was concerned, it brought in a major change in the structure of its trade. Prior to `1757` the English trade in Bengal was largely financed through import of bullion from England; but after that year not only bullion import stopped, but bullion was exported from Bengal to China and other parts of India, which gave a competitive advantage to the English Company over its European rivals. On the other hand, for the Company officials Plassey opened the gates to make personal fortunes, not only through direct extortion, but also through rampant abuse of *dastaks* for their private trade. The Bengal plunder began to arrive in London and the effects appear to have been instantaneous, for all authorities agree that the ‘Industrial Revolution’ began with the year `1770` after Plassey was fought in `1757`. |
| How did Plassey affect common people, sepoys and wider Asian expansion? | Deterioration of Bengal; Sepoy Army; Buffer Colonies: The condition of the common of Bengal gradually deteriorated due to the weakness of the Nawab. Lawlessness and continuous economic exploitation of the servants of the company broke the backbone of Bengalis who once upon a time used to lead a prosperous life. British built and trained an army with native Indian Sepoys who then fulfilled the ambition of further colonization. The British East India Company also wanted to protect the rich colony of India for which it acquired buffer colonies in Singapore, Penang, Burma, Nepal, Malacca etc. The British advancement in Asia was also aided by superior military and modern artillery and Navy. The vast resources of Bengal helped the Britishers to conquer the Deccan and extend their influence over North India. Before Plassey the English Company was just one of the European Companies trading in Bengal and huge taxes were imposed by the Nawabs; after Plassey the English virtually monopolised Bengal’s trade and commerce and the tax and wealth earned from here helped the British to balance all of their trade liabilities. Clive wrote of sovereignty that “So large a sovereignty may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company.” |
9. Mir Jafar (1757–1760) and Battle of Bedara / Chinsura (1759)
9. Mir Jafar (1757–1760) and Battle of Bedara / Chinsura (1759)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was Mir Jafar’s position as Nawab after Plassey? | Name Only; 6,000 English Troops; Resident; Financial Extraction: The new nawab Mir Jafar (`1757–1760`) became a puppet in the hands of the English. He was entirely dependent on the Britishers so as to maintain his position in Bengal as well as protection against foreign invasions. He was an incompetent person. So throughout his reign real power remained in the hands of the English. An English army of 6,000 troops was maintained in Bengal to help the Nawab. The sovereignty of the English over Calcutta was recognised, and the English posted a Resident at the nawab’s court. He had to face great financial crisis, because the servants of the company began to extract money from him in various ways. He had also committed to pay a huge amount of money to Clive as a mark of gratitude. The English company also pressed him for payment of instalments. Thus, Mir Jafar became restless under the great financial pressure and growing supremacy of the English. |
| What happened at the Battle of Chinsura / Bedara (`1759`)? | Seven Dutch Ships, 1400 Men; Clive Victory 25 November; Amboyna Memory: In the meanwhile the Dutch hatched out a conspiracy with Mir Jafar against the English in `1759`. Mir Jafar felt that his position as a subordinate to the British could not be tolerated. He started encouraging the Dutch to advance against the British and eject them from Bengal. In late `1759`, the Dutch sent seven large ships and 1400 men from Java to Bengal under the pretext of reinforcing their Bengal settlement of Chinsura even though Britain and Holland were not officially at war. Clive, however, initiated immediate offensive operations and defeated the much larger Dutch force on 25 November `1759` in the Battle of Chinsura. Clive also avenged the memory of the massacre of Amboyna (the `1623` torture and execution on Ambon Island of twenty men, ten of whom were in the service of the English East India Company, by agents of the Dutch East India Company, on accusations of treason). |
| How did Ali Gohour’s revolt and Clive’s Jagir further weaken Mir Jafar? | Patna Siege; South Calcutta Revenue Right; Loss of Rs 30,000 per Annum: In the same year Ali Gohour, the eldest son of the Mughal Emperor, rose in revolt against his father. On his way to find out a shelter for himself he besieged Patna in Bihar with the help of Shuja-ud-daula, the Nawab of Oudh. Mir Jafar felt helpless to face Ali Gohour alone. He sought help from the English. With the help of the English Mir Jafar defeated the Mughal army. For the help Clive was given the right to realize revenue from South Calcutta, which was popularly known as Clive’s Jagir. By this arrangement Mir Jafar had to suffer further loss of rupees thirty thousand per annum. When Clive returned to England due to ill-health, he was rewarded with an Irish peerage, as Lord Clive, Baron of Plassey and also obtained a seat in the British House of Commons. After Clive’s departure the servants of the company became uncontrollable; collectively and individually they began to acquire wealth by corrupt means. Mir Jafar became tired of payment and his treasury became empty. He failed to meet further demands of the English with an empty treasury. As he was running short of fund his interest in the Government began to decline. The people of Bengal began to despise him for his inefficiency to maintain the administration smoothly. Under these circumstances the English planned to look for an alternative successor who was none but Mir Kasim, the son-in-law of Mir Jafar. |
10. Mir Kasim / Mir Qasim (1761–1763) and Dastak Abuse
10. Mir Kasim / Mir Qasim (1761–1763) and Dastak Abuse
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How and why was Mir Kasim installed and what were the terms of the `1760` treaty? | Vansittart; Burdwan–Midnapur–Chittagong; Chunam; Rs Five Lakh: The treachery of Mir Jafar and his failure to make the payments due to the Company annoyed the English. Meanwhile, Miran, the son of Jafar, died and there started a fight for the nawabship of Bengal between Mir Kasim, the son-in-law of Mir Jafar, and Miran’s son. Vansittart, the new Governor of Calcutta, agreed to support Mir Kasim’s claim after a treaty between Mir Kasim and the Company was signed in `1760`. Important features of the treaty were: Mir Kasim agreed to cede to the Company the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong; the Company would get half of the share in *chunam* trade of Sylhet; Mir Kasim agreed to pay off the outstanding dues to the Company; Mir Kasim promised to pay a sum of rupees five lakh towards financing the Company’s war efforts in southern India; it was agreed that Mir Kasim’s enemies were the Company’s enemies, and his friends, the Company’s friends; it was agreed that tenants of the nawab’s territory would not be allowed to settle in the lands of the Company, and vice-versa. Under the pressure of the Company, Mir Jafar decided to resign in favour of Mir Kasim. A pension of Rs 1,500 per annum was fixed for Mir Jafar. Mir Kasim was the ablest nawab among the successors of Alivardi Khan. He was more talented, vigorous and ambitious than his father-in-law Mir Jafar. He ruled from `1761` to `1763`. He did not appreciate the idea of being a mere puppet in the hands of the British. Prior layer also notes presents totaling 29 lakhs to high English officials. |
| What reformist steps did Kasim take and how did dastak conflict lead to war? | Munger Capital; Western-Trained Army; Abolition of Internal Duties: After assuming power, Mir Kasim shifted the capital from Murshidabad to Munger in Bihar (also given as Monghyr). The move was taken to allow a safe distance from the Company at Calcutta. His other important steps were reorganising the bureaucracy with men of his own choice; reorganising his troops and setting up factories for the manufacture of arms; training his army in the western fashion and realizing the arrears of the state in order to replenish his empty coffer. Unable to stop the misuse of *dastaks*, the new nawab abolished internal duties altogether, so that the Indian merchants could also enjoy the same privilege. The British protested against this and insisted upon having preferential treatment as against other traders. All these measures of Mir Kasim gradually incurred displeasure of the English. The English did not like this display of independence and as a retaliatory measure, again replaced him with Mir Jafar. *Dastak* was the trade permit sanctioned to the East India Company by the Mughal government under Farrukh Siyar’s farman of `1717` for customs-free trade restricted to the company alone, not private traders — but in practice private traders and sale of *dastaks* to natives abused the right; Mir Qasim’s opposition and abolition of inland duties upset the British advantage; prior layer notes local merchants paid up to 40% tax and that Mir Qasim overran Company offices in Patna in `1763`, killing several Europeans including the Resident. In `1758` Warren Hastings as British Resident at Murshidabad investigated trading abuses, urged Calcutta to stop them, was rejected by a Council that had itself profited, and resigned in December `1764`. |
11. Battle of Buxar (22/23 October 1764)
11. Battle of Buxar (22/23 October 1764)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What causes led from Mir Qasim’s reforms to the triple alliance against the English? | Ram Narayan; Transit Duty Wars; Shah Alam II and Shuja’s Bargain: The seeds of the Battle of Buxar were sown after the Battle of Plassey, when Mir Kasim became the Nawab of Bengal. The primary cause was the conflict between the English and Mir Qasim. The Company had thought that Mir Kasim would prove to be an ideal puppet for them. However, Mir Kasim belied the expectations of the Company. Ram Narayan, the deputy governor of Bihar, was not responding to repeated requests by the nawab to submit the accounts of the revenues of Bihar. Mir Kasim could not tolerate this open defiance of his authority. But Ram Narayan was supported by the English officials of Patna. The Nawab–Company tussle over transit duty led to the outbreak of wars between the English and Mir Kasim in `1763`. The English gained successive victories, which eventually compelled Kasim to flee to Allahabad where he met Shuja-ud-Daulah. In Allahabad, Kasim tried to form a grand alliance with the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II and Shuja-ud-daula of Awadh. The emperor was in the region since `1758`, when as a crown prince he had fled from the nasty politics of the Delhi court and tried to carve out for himself an independent kingdom in the eastern provinces. In December `1759`, hearing about his father’s assassination, he proclaimed himself the emperor and appointed Shuja his *wazir*. When Mir Kasim fled to him for refuge, it was only after long and tortuous negotiations that the two agreed to proceed against the English; Shuja’s support was secured after he was promised Bihar and its treasury, along with a payment of Rs 30 million at the successful completion of the mission. |
| How was the Battle of Buxar fought and why did the allies lose? | Hector Munro; Katkauli; Segmentary Organisation vs Unitary Command: The Battle of Buxar was fought on 23 October `1764` (also given as 22 October `1764` in another source layer) at the battleground Katkauli, 6 kilometres from Buxar, then within the territory of Bengal, between the forces of the British East India Company led by Hector Munro and the combined army of Mir Qasim (the Nawab of Bengal), Shuja-ud-Daulah (the Nawab of Awadh) and the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II. But their combined army was routed and the British got a decisive victory. Eighteenth-century Indian army with its segmentary social organization was in serious disadvantage against a technically efficient English army with a unitary command. The lack of basic co-ordination among the three desperate allies was responsible for their decisive debacle. After the war, Mir Kasim fled to the North-West and died. Shah Alam II left Shuja-ud-Daulah and sought shelter in the British camp. Shuja-ud-Daulah tried to defeat the British till `1765` but was not successful. He later fled to Rohilkhand. Clive was in England when Battle of Buxar was fought and won by the British. In `1765`, Clive returned. |
12. Treaty of Allahabad (1765)
12. Treaty of Allahabad (1765)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the terms of the first Allahabad treaty with Shah Alam II? | Diwani of Bengal–Bihar–Orissa; 26 Lakh Tribute; Kora and Allahabad: The important outcome of the Battle of Buxar was the Treaty of Allahabad (`1765`). Two separate treaties were signed at Allahabad. First treaty was signed between East India Company (Lord Clive) and Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, who had submitted to the British in the battle. As per this treaty: Mughal Emperor granted Fiscal Rights (Diwani) or right to administer the territory and collect taxes to the East India Company at Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. These rights allowed the Company to collect revenue directly from the people of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Nizamat rights (police and judicial) were given to Nawab of Bengal. In lieu of this Right, the Company gave an annual tribute of 26 Lakh Rupees to the Mughals. The districts of Kora and Allahabad were returned to Mughal Emperor. |
| What were the terms of the second Allahabad treaty with Shuja-ud-Daulah? | Awadh Restored Minus Kora–Allahabad; 53 Lakh Indemnity; Banaras; Resident; Offensive-Defensive Treaty; Duty-Free Trade: Second treaty was signed between East India Company (Lord Clive) and Nawab of Awadh Shuja-ud-Daulah: Awadh was returned to Shuja-ud-Daulah but Allahabad and Kora was taken from him. The Nawab of Awadh paid 53 Lakhs rupees of war indemnity to the British. The Zamindari of Banaras region was given to Balwant Rai. An English Resident would be stationed at Lucknow; Nawab should bear all the expenses of this person. The Company would enjoy duty free trading rights in Awadh — a clause which in later years created fresh tensions and prepared the grounds for the annexation of Awadh itself. Further, the Nawab entered into an offensive and defensive treaty with the Company binding him to render gratuitous military help to the Company in time of need and the Company to help the Nawab with the troops for the defence of his frontier on the latter agreeing to pay the cost of its maintenance. |
| Why did Clive design Awadh as buffer and Shah Alam as rubber stamp? | Buffer against Afghan and Maratha; Farman Legalising Gains; Indirect Rule: Thus Clive, in person, settled the fate of almost half of Northern India. Clive did not want to annex Awadh because it would have placed the Company under an obligation to protect an extensive land frontier from the Afghan and the Maratha invasions. The treaty made the Nawab a firm friend of the Company, and turned Awadh into a buffer state. Similarly, Clive’s arrangement with Shah Alam II was inspired by practical considerations. It made the emperor a useful ‘rubber stamp’ of the Company. Besides, the emperor’s farman legalised the political gains of the Company in Bengal. The British Resident posted at the court of Murshidabad hereafter gradually by `1772` became the locus of real administrative power in the province and thus it was in Bengal that the system of indirect rule as a policy of the Company’s imperial governance was first initiated. The Company treated the defeated Mughal emperor with respect, because of his continuing symbolic significance in eighteenth-century Indian politics. Indeed, not before `1857` did the British ever formally repudiate the sovereignty of the Mughal emperor. |
13. Significance of Buxar and Plassey–Buxar Analytical Frame
13. Significance of Buxar and Plassey–Buxar Analytical Frame
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why is Buxar historically more important than Plassey in many assessments? | Seeds Sown at Plassey Flowered; Military Not Deceit; One-Eighth of India: The importance of this battle lay in the fact that not only the Nawab of Bengal but also the Mughal Emperor of India was defeated by the English. The victory made the English a great power in northern India and contenders for the supremacy over the whole country. The seeds of British imperialism sown at Plassey flowered after the Battle of Buxar, a fact that makes the latter battle historically more important. It finally consolidated British rule in Bengal, the Nawab was reduced to a mere figure-head, the Company started an unchecked plundering of the wealth of Bengal, the Nawab of Oudh turned to a submissive ally and the Mughal emperor was reduced to thriving on an allowance from the Company. The Battle of Buxar proved to be decisive resulting in the establishment of British sovereignty in Bengal. This battle brought out the political weaknesses and military shortcomings of the Indians and the hollowness of the Mughal Empire. Battle of Buxar proved the military superiority of the English and exposed the inherent weakness of the native force. It was more important than Battle of Plassey as Battle of Plassey was not won by military might but deceit. Also if Plassey saw defeat of the Nawab of Bengal, Buxar saw defeat of Mughal Emperor and powerful Oudh. The Treaty of Allahabad heralded the establishment of the rule of the East India Company in one-eighth of India with a single stroke. While the Battle of Plassey secured a foothold for the British East India Company in India, the Battle of Buxar made them the dominant force in India. Buxar war completed the work of Plassey. The East India Company, after the battle of Buxar, gained dominance over entire Bengal. The Mughal emperor came fully under the control of British. All duties and revenues from the most prosperous Indian province (Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) went to the company. It also gained administrative power by controlling the army, finances, and revenues. With the wealth of Bengal, the British could conquer other regions of India. The supremacy of the British was established in the Eastern parts of India. Buxar finally riveted the shackles of company’s rule upon Bengal. The verdict of Plassey was confirmed by the English victory at Buxar. |
| How should one critically examine the claim that without Buxar, Plassey would have remained a minor episode? | Q: “Plassey did not complete the British conquest… Had the English been convincingly defeated in any subsequent battle… Plassey would have remained as a minor episode.” Critically examine: The Battle of Plassey was a decisive victory of the British East India Company over the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-daulah on 23 June `1757`. Had the British been defeated in the battle of Buxar, Plassey would have remained as a minor episode because: (1) Plassey was not important from the military view-point — a mere skirmish; no military superiority was shown; the Nawab’s camp was deserted; Clive won almost without fighting; Plassey was won by deceit — “a transaction in which the bankers of Bengal and Mir Jafar sold out Nawab to the English.” (2) Buxar was important from the military point of view — won by sheer strength and skill in arms, whereas Plassey was won more by diplomatic skill than strength of arms. (3) Seeds of British imperialism sown at Plassey flowered after Buxar; Buxar consolidated British rule in Bengal, reduced the Nawab to a figure-head, enabled unchecked plundering, turned Oudh into a submissive ally and the Mughal emperor onto an allowance; proved military superiority of the English and exposed native weakness. (4) Plassey secured a foothold; Buxar made them the dominant force; Buxar completed the work of Plassey. (5) After Buxar the Company gained dominance over entire Bengal; Mughal emperor fully under British control; all duties and revenues from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa went to the company; administrative power via army, finances and revenues. On the other hand, some historians have attached greater importance to Plassey: it was more difficult to remove Shuja-ud-Daulah after Plassey than Mir Qasim after Buxar; Buxar was only an attempt by native powers to challenge the position already acquired by the English in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa; Plassey made the position of the company *de jure* in Bengal and was followed by the subsequent plunder of Bengal and monopolisation of trade that balanced British trade liabilities. Conclusion: both battles had important effects on the growth of British power, but the results of Buxar were more important; Buxar completed the work of Plassey and confirmed the power and position achieved by Plassey; any defeat at Buxar would have lessened the importance of Plassey. |
14. Dual System of Administration in Bengal (1765–1772)
14. Dual System of Administration in Bengal (1765–1772)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the Dual System divide Diwani and Nizamat while concentrating real power in the Company? | Raza Khan and Shitab Roy; Deputy Nazim; Power without Responsibility; Indirect Rule: Under this system, the administration was divided between the Company and the Nawab but the whole power was actually concentrated in the hands of the Company. This complex system remained in practice during the period from `1765` to `1772`. Under this system, after obtaining diwani rights from the Mughal Emperor, Clive gave the responsibility of collecting Diwani to the Indians and appointed two deputy diwans — Mohammad Raza Khan for Bengal and Raja Shitab Roy for Bihar. Nizamat function (police and judicial) was with the Nawab but it was also undertaken by the Company. For Nizamat functions the British gave the additional responsibility of deputy Nazim to Mohammad Raza Khan. The deputy Nazim could not be removed without the consent of the company. Thus, although the administration was theoretically divided between the company and the Nawab and the responsibility for administration — Diwani as well as Nizamat — was exercised through Indian agencies, the company acquired real power. Thus the system was very advantageous for the company: it had power without responsibility. The British Resident at Murshidabad gradually by `1772` became the locus of real administrative power — the first initiation of indirect rule as a policy of the Company’s imperial governance. In `1772`, Warren Hastings put an end to this Dual System. |
15. Bengal as ‘Sponsored State’ and ‘Plundered State’; 1770 Famine
15. Bengal as ‘Sponsored State’ and ‘Plundered State’; 1770 Famine
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How was post-`1757` Bengal a plundered state? | Nabin Chandra Sen; Gifts and Bribes; £5.7 Million Drain; Famine `1770`: The battle of Plassey (`1757`) was followed in the words of the Bengali poet Nabin Chandra Sen, by ‘a night of eternal gloom for India’. The English proclaimed Mir Jafar the Nawab of Bengal and set out to gather the reward. The Company was granted undisputed right to free trade in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. It also received the Zamindari of the 24 Parganas near Calcutta. Mir Jafar paid a sum of Rs. 17,700,000 as compensation for the attack on Calcutta to the company and the traders of the city. In addition, he paid large sums as ‘gifts’ or bribes to the high officials of the company. Even though Mir Jafar owed his position to the company, he soon repented the bargain he had struck. His treasury was soon emptied by the demands of the company’s officials for presents and bribes, the lead in the matter being given by Clive himself. Mir Jafar soon discovered that it was impossible to meet the full demands of the company and its officials, who on their part began to criticise the Nawab for his incapacity in fulfilling their expectations. And so, in October `1760`, they forced him to abdicate in favour of his son-in-law, Mir Qasim, who rewarded his benefactors by granting the company the Zamindari of the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, and giving handsome presents totaling 29 lakhs of rupees to the high English officials. Mir Qasim, however, belied English hopes, and soon emerged as a threat to their position and designs in Bengal. He was defeated in a series of battles in `1763` and fled to Awadh where he formed an alliance with Shuja-ud-Daulah and Shah Alam II. The three allies clashed with the company’s army at Buxar on 22 October `1764` and were thoroughly defeated. In `1763`, the British had restored Mir Jafar as Nawab and collected huge sums for the company and its high officials. On Mir Jafar’s death, they placed his second son Nizam-ud-Daulah on the throne and as a reward to themselves made him sign a new treaty on 20 February `1765`. By this treaty the Nawab was to disband most of his army and to administer Bengal through a Deputy Subahdar who was to be nominated by the company and who could not be dismissed without its approval. The company thus gained supreme control over the administration (or nizamat) of Bengal. The company’s authorities on their part set out to gather the rich harvest and drain Bengal of its wealth. In the years `1766`, `1767` and `1768` alone, nearly £5.7 million were drained from Bengal. The abuses of the Dual government and the drain of wealth led to the impoverishment and exhaustion of that unlucky province. In `1770` Bengal suffered from a famine which in its effects proved one of the most terrible famines known in human history. |
| How was Bengal a sponsored state for British subcontinental expansion? | Resources for Wars; Jewel in the Crown within 100 Years: East India Company utilised the money and resources received from Bengal to sponsor all the wars and control complete Sub Continent within 100 yrs. Thus making India the Jewel in the Crown of British Empire. |
16. Anglo-Mysore Expansion: Haidar Ali, Tipu and Wars 1–3
16. Anglo-Mysore Expansion: Haidar Ali, Tipu and Wars 1–3
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Mysore rise from Wodeyar foundations to Haidar Ali’s de facto rule? | Post-Talikota; Nanjaraj–Devaraj Puppetry; Haidar `1761`; French Military Modernisation: After the battle of Talikota (`1565`) gave a deadly blow to the great kingdom of Vijayanagara, many small kingdoms emerged from its remnants. In `1612` a Hindu kingdom under the Wodeyars dynasty emerged in the region of Mysore. Its centralised military power began to increase from the late seventeenth century under Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar (`1672–1704`), but it reached its real period of glory under Haidar Ali. In the early 18th century two brothers, Nanjaraj (the *sarvadhikari*) and Devaraj (the *Dulwai*) had reduced Chikka Krishnaraja Wodeyar (`1734–1766`) to a mere puppet. During the second half of the 18th century, Mysore emerged as a formidable power under the leadership of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. A man of humble origin, Haidar had started his career as a junior officer in the Mysore army and gradually rose to prominence. Though uneducated, he possessed a keen intellect and was a man of great energy and determination. By `1761` he took over political power in Mysore by ousting the corrupt Nanjraj (prime minister), who had usurped real power by reducing the Wodeyar king into a mere titular head. Repeated incursions of the Marathas and of the Nizam’s troops into the territories of Mysore resulted in heavy financial demands; Mysore became financially and politically weak. The need of the hour was a leader with high degree of military powers and diplomatic skill. Haidar Ali fulfilled that need and usurped the royal authority by becoming the de facto ruler of Mysore in `1761`. Haidar modernised his army with French experts, who trained an efficient infantry and artillery and infused European discipline into the Mysore army. He realised that the exceedingly mobile Marathas could be contained only by a swift cavalry, that the cannons of the French-trained Nizami army could be silenced only by an effective artillery, and that the superior arms from the West could only be matched by arms brought from the same place or manufactured with the same know-how. Haidar Ali took the help of the French to set up an arms factory at Dindigul (now in Tamil Nadu), and also introduced Western methods of training for his army. It was organised on a European model through the system of *risalas*, with a clear chain of command going up to the ruler. Each *risala* had a fixed number of soldiers, with provision for weaponry and modes of transport and a commander appointed directly by Haidar himself. His power was further consolidated by the subjugation of the local warrior chiefs or hereditary overlords like *deshmukhs* and *palegars* (poligars). Recovering from their defeat at Panipat, the Marathas under Madhavrao attacked Mysore, and defeated Haidar Ali in `1764`, `1766`, and `1771`. To buy peace, Haidar Ali had to give them large sums of money, but after Madhavrao’s death in `1772`, Haidar Ali raided the Marathas a number of times during `1774–76`, and recovered all the territories he had previously lost, besides capturing new areas. He also started to use his considerable diplomatic skill to outmanoeuvre his opponents. Haidar, and later his son Tipu Sultan, introduced the system of imposing land taxes directly on the peasants and collecting them through salaried officials and in cash, thus enhancing enormously the resource base of the state. This land revenue system was based on detailed survey and classification of land; sometimes fixed rents and sometimes a share of the produce were collected from different categories of land, such as wet or dry lands, the rate of rent varying according to the productivity of soil. It did not completely dispense with the Mughal institution of jagir, but restricted it to a very small proportion of the available land. |
| What was Tipu’s military fiscalism, economy, navy, state trade and Mughal stance? | Burton Stein; Sericulture; State Commercial Corporation `1793`; Coins without Emperor: Burton Stein has called Tipu’s revenue system a form of “military fiscalism”, where taxes were collected from a wide base directly by state officials in order to mobilise resources to build up and maintain a large army. This was therefore part of a political project to establish centralised military hegemony by eliminating the intermediaries who were co-sharers of power in a previous segmentary state under the Vijayanagara empire. Tipu provided encouragement for the development of agriculture, such as tax remission for reclamation of wasteland, and tried to protect the peasants from the rapacity of tax collectors. Even his arch enemies had to concede that “his country was the best cultivated and its population the most flourishing in India”. Tipu was also interested in modernising the agricultural economy, by repairing old irrigation systems and constructing new ones, by promoting agricultural manufacturing and introducing sericulture in Mysore. He sent ambassadors to France to bring in European technology, went on to build a navy, with ambition to participate in oceanic trade. He launched in `1793` what can be described as a “state commercial corporation”, with plans to set up factories outside Mysore. In course of time Mysore state began to participate in a lucrative trade in valuable goods like sandalwood, rice, silk, coconut, sulphur etc. and established thirty trading centres in and outside Mysore in other parts of western India and overseas like Muscat. But his plans of modernisation went far beyond his resources and therefore, Mysore remained, as Irfan Habib argues, “far away from a real opening to modern civilization”. The state of Mysore under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan was involved in establishing a centralised military hegemony. Its territorial ambitions and trading interests got it engaged in a state of constant warfare, which overshadowed all other aspects of its history during this period. Haidar Ali had invaded and annexed Malabar and Calicut in `1766`, thus expanding the frontiers of Mysore significantly. On the other hand, the boundaries of the Maratha kingdom extended over the coastal areas of Konkan and Malabar, which made conflict with Mysore inevitable. There was also conflict with the other powers in the region, like Hyderabad and then the English, on whom Haidar Ali inflicted a heavy defeat near Madras in `1769`. After his death in `1782`, his son Tipu Sultan followed his father’s policies. His rule came to an end with a defeat at the hands of the English in `1799` — he died defending his capital Srirangapatnam. In a significant way Tipu’s reign represented a discontinuity in eighteenth century Indian politics, as his kingship was rooted firmly in a strong regional tradition. Unlike other eighteenth century states which did not challenge the political legitimacy of the Mughal emperor, in a symbolic gesture to proclaim his independence, Tipu issued coins without any reference to the Mughal emperor; instead of Emperor Shah Alam’s name he inserted his own name in the *khutba* (Friday sermons at the mosques); finally, he sought a *sanad* from the Ottoman Khalif to legitimise his rule. But he too “did not completely sever links” with the Mughal monarch, who still commanded respect in the subcontinent. Being a “realist” as he was, Tipu recognised Mughal authority when it suited him and defied it when it did not. |
| Why did the English regard Mysore as a threat? | French Proximity; Malabar Trade; Mercantilist State; Embargoes `1785`/`1788`: The English felt their political and commercial interests in south India were threatened because of Mysore’s proximity with the French and Haidar Ali and Tipu’s control over the rich trade of the Malabar coast. Mysore’s power was also seen as a threat to the control of the English over Madras. Mysore’s boundaries had stretched from the Krishna in the north to the Malabar coast in the west, which inevitably brought it into conflict with its Indian neighbours, notably Hyderabad and the Marathas. And the two were often in collusion with the English, who suspected Mysore’s friendship with the French. But this threat perception was more an “illusion” than real, as there was now very little chance of a possible French revival (after Carnatic wars) in India or a French attack from outside. Mysore’s control over the rich trade of the Malabar coast was also seen as a threat to English trade in pepper and cardamom. In `1785` Tipu declared an embargo on export of pepper, sandalwood and cardamom through the ports within his kingdom; in `1788` he explicitly forbade dealings with English traders. The interests of the private Company merchants now inevitably dictated a policy of direct political intervention to protect their commercial interests. But most significantly, Tipu Sultan was trying to build in Mysore a strong centralised and militarised state, with ambitious territorial designs and a political aspiration to control south Indian politics. This made him the most potent danger to the as yet vulnerable Company state in the south. Young army officers like Thomas Munro and Alexander Read could see that the “mercantilist state” of Mysore represented the same kind of hegemonic ambition as those of the Company state in the south and therefore could never be relied upon in any arrangement of indirect rule based on the principle of balance of power among the Indian states. Hence, although the civilian administration in Madras vacillated, they concurred with Governor Generals Lord Cornwallis and later Lord Wellesley that Mysore needed to be eliminated. At the end of this war the Company annexed Dindigul, Baramahal and Malabar. A few years later, the spectre of a French resurgence and Tipu’s secret negotiations with them gave a pretext to Lord Wellesley to move decisively for the final round of colonial aggression. Mysore, then once again placed under the former Wodeyar dynasty, was brought under the ‘Subsidiary Alliance’ system of Lord Wellesley. This meant an end to the independent state of Mysore. |
| What were the course and outcomes of the First and Second Anglo-Mysore Wars? | Treaty of Madras (`1769`); Treaty of Mangalore (`1784`):First Anglo-Mysore War (`1767–69`): After their easy success in Bengal, the English were confident of their military strength. They concluded a treaty with the Nizam of Hyderabad (`1766`) persuading him to give them the Northern Circars in lieu of which they said they would protect the Nizam from Haidar Ali. Haidar already had territorial disputes with the Nawab of Arcot and differences with the Marathas. The Nizam, the Marathas, and the English allied together against Haidar Ali. Haidar acted with considerable tact and diplomatic skill. He paid the Marathas to turn them neutral and, promising to share conquered territories with the Nizam, converted the Nizam into his ally. He then joined the Nizam to attack the Nawab of Arcot. The war continued for a year-and-a-half without any conclusion. Haidar changed his strategy and suddenly appeared before the gates of Madras. There was complete chaos and panic at Madras forcing the English to conclude a very humiliating treaty with Haidar on April 4, `1769` — Treaty of Madras. The treaty provided for the exchange of prisoners and mutual restitution of conquests. Haidar Ali was promised the help of the English in case he was attacked by any other power. Second Anglo-Mysore War (`1780–84`): Haidar Ali accused the English of breach of faith and non-observance of the Treaty of Madras when in `1771` he was attacked by the Marathas, and the English failed to come to his aid. Also, he found that the French were much more helpful than the English in meeting his army’s requirement of guns, saltpetre and lead. Consequently, through Mahe, a French possession on the Malabar coast, some French war material was brought to Mysore. Meanwhile, the American war of independence had broken out in which the French were on the side of the rebels against the English. Under the circumstances, Haidar Ali’s friendship with the French caused even more concern to the English. They therefore tried to capture Mahe, which Haidar regarded to be under his protection. Haidar considered the English attempt to capture Mahe a direct challenge to his authority. Haidar forged an anti-English alliance with the Marathas and the Nizam. He followed it up by an attack in the Carnatic, capturing Arcot, and defeating the English army under Colonel Baillie in `1781`. In the meantime, the English (under Sir Eyre Coote) detached both the Marathas and the Nizam from Haidar’s side, but the undeterred Haidar faced the English boldly only to suffer a defeat at Porto Novo in November `1781`. However, he regrouped his forces and defeated the English and captured their commander, Braithwaite. Haidar Ali died of cancer on December 7, `1782`. Now his son, Tipu Sultan, carried on the war for one year without any positive outcome. Fed up with an inconclusive war, both sides opted for peace, negotiating the Treaty of Mangalore (March, `1784`) under which each party gave back the territories it had taken from the other. |
| What opened the Third Anglo-Mysore War and how did it run to the Treaty of Seringapatam? | Triple Alliance `1790`; Travancore Attack April `1790`; Cornwallis; Heavy Peace Terms: Anti-Tipu alliance by Cornwallis: Governor General Lord Cornwallis worked on the anti-Tipu suspicions of the Nizam and the Marathas and arranged a Triple Alliance (in `1790`) with them against Tipu. Convinced of the inevitability of a war with the English, Tipu sought the help of Turks by sending an embassy to Constantinople in `1784` and `1785` and on to the French King in `1787`. The kingdom of Travancore had been a target of Tipu for conquest. Indirect attempts to take over the kingdom had failed in `1788`, and Archibald Campbell, the Madras president at the time, had warned Tipu that an attack on Travancore would be treated as a declaration of war on the company. Later Cornwallis also reiterated the same. The King of Travancore angered Tipu by extending fortifications along the border with Cochin into territory claimed by Mysore as belonging to its vassal state, and by purchasing from the Dutch East India Company two forts in the Kingdom of Cochin. Tipu considered Cochin state as his tributary state and thus considered the act of the Travancore Raja as violation of his sovereign rights. Tipu attacked Travancore in April `1790`. The English sided with Travancore and thus started the Third Anglo-Mysore War. The English, siding with Travancore, attacked Tipu. In `1790`, Tipu defeated the English under General Meadows. In `1791`, Cornwallis took the leadership. The Marathas and the Nizam also supported British. Tipu offered serious opposition, but the odds were against him. Consequently, he had to pay heavily under the Treaty of Seringapatam. |
17. Treaty of Seringapatam (1792) and Whether Cornwallis Could Avoid the Third Mysore War
17. Treaty of Seringapatam (1792) and Whether Cornwallis Could Avoid the Third Mysore War
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the territorial and indemnity terms of the Treaty of Seringapatam (`1792`)? | Half Territory Lost; Baramahal–Dindigul–Malabar; Three Crore; Two Sons as Hostages: Under the Treaty of Seringapatam of `1792`, nearly half of the Mysorean territory was taken over by the victors. Baramahal, Dindigul and Malabar went to the English, while the Marathas got the regions surrounding the Tungabhadra and its tributaries and the Nizam acquired the areas from the Krishna to beyond the Pennar. Besides, a war damage of three crore rupees was also taken from Tipu. Half of the war indemnity was to be paid immediately while the rest was to be given in instalments, for which Tipu’s two sons were taken as hostages by the English. |
| Could Cornwallis have avoided the Third Mysore War? | Mangalore Breach; Anti-Tipu Alliance; Imperial Design; Mutual Expectation of War: Cornwallis could have avoided the war as Tipu did not attack the British and the matter was between Travancore and Mysore. The English involvement was clearly against the peace Treaty of Mangalore (signed in `1784` after the Second Anglo-Mysore War). Asking for help from France by Tipu was only a reaction against the formation of anti-Tipu alliance by Cornwallis. Anti-Tipu alliance by Cornwallis had violated terms of the Treaty of Mangalore. The real motive of war was the fulfilment of British imperial design for which the British were itching for war against Tipu. But avoiding war did not mean no war in future, as Tipu was also preparing for the war. Tipu had deep hatred of the British, and declared not long after signing the `1784` Mangalore treaty that he intended to continue battle with the British given the opportunity. Since the British had already warned that attack on Travancore would be considered as attack on the Company, the war with the British was expected when Tipu attacked Travancore. |
18. Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1799)
18. Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1799)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the background between `1792` and `1799` and what charges did Wellesley frame against Tipu? | Recoup Period; Wodeyar Refusal `1796`; Wellesley `1798`; French Fears; Emissaries: The English as well as Tipu Sultan used the period `1792` to `1799` to recoup their losses. Tipu fulfilled all the terms of the Treaty of Seringapatam and got his sons released. In `1796`, when the Hindu ruler of the Wodeyar dynasty died, Tipu refused to place Wodeyar’s minor son on the throne and declared himself sultan. He also decided to avenge his humiliating defeat and the terms put by the Treaty of Seringapatam. In `1798`, Lord Wellesley succeeded Sir John Shore as the new Governor General. An imperialist to the core, Wellesley was concerned about Tipu’s growing friendship with the French and aimed at annihilating Tipu’s independent existence or force him to submission through the system of Subsidiary Alliance. So the chargesheet against Tipu mentioned that he was plotting against the English with the Nizam and the Marathas and that he had sent emissaries to Arabia, Afghanistan, Kabul and Zaman Shah, as also to Isle of France (Mauritius) and Versailles, with treasonable intent. Tipu’s explanation did not satisfy Wellesley. |
| What was the course and outcome of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War? | 17 April – 4 May `1799`; Fall of Seringapatam; Wodeyar Boy under Subsidiary Alliance: The war began on 17 April `1799` and ended on 4 May `1799` with the fall of Seringapatam. The English were again helped by the Marathas and the Nizam. The Marathas had been promised half of the territory of Tipu and the Nizam had already signed the Subsidiary Alliance. Tipu laid down his life fighting bravely; his family members were interned at Vellore, and his treasures were confiscated by the English. The English chose a boy from the earlier Hindu royal family (Wodeyars) of Mysore as the maharaja and also imposed on him the subsidiary alliance system. |
19. Wilks Thesis: “Haider was born to create an empire, Tipu to lose one”
19. Wilks Thesis: “Haider was born to create an empire, Tipu to lose one”
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was Colonel Mark Wilks’s comparative judgment of Haidar and Tipu? | Wilks Rating; Allies vs Isolation; Offensive vs Defensive; Innovation without Improvement: Colonel Mark Wilks of the East India Company, who had written a history of Mysore, rated Haidar higher than Tipu when he made the comment that “Haider was born to create an empire, Tipu to lose one”. While Haidar was never without allies in his wars against the English, Tipu had to confront the English alone. Tipu has been criticised for his rigid anti-English policy and for his failure to win the Marathas and the Nizam over to his side. On the other hand, Haidar had played the diplomatic game by buying the Marathas and alluring the Nizam with territorial gains during the Anglo-Mysore Wars. While Haidar’s strategy had been offensive, Tipu’s had been defensive. Tipu neglected his cavalry which was a ‘terror to Madras’. He fought ‘a campaign of walls and ditches’. He placed too much reliance on the defences of the fort of Seringapatam. Tipu’s operations in his last war were not characterised by the same dash and brilliance which he had shown in his previous wars. Tipu was handicapped by his poor organisation. Tipu placed too much reliance on the French at the time when their power had almost subsided in India. Tipu was intolerant towards other religions which upset many. Unlike Haidar, Tipu had little capacity of taking a broader view of a thing. With his restless spirit of innovation, he was not successful as an administrator. ‘Haidar was an improving monarch and exhibited few innovations. Tipu was an innovating monarch and made no improvements.’ Tipu’s boldness and spirit of innovations have been described as great negative points. While Haidar had cleverly maintained the fiction of the sovereignty of the Wodeyar dynasty till he lived, Tipu assumed the title of *Padshah* in `1787`, issued coins in his name, had Arabic names substituted for Hindu ones in the cyclic years and months and issued a new calendar. Though Tipu’s innovations were not merely changes but improvements introduced by a mentally alert monarch, these innovations were not matched with improvement. |
| What counter-arguments limit the justice of Wilks’s remark? | Heavy Odds; Munro Subversion Order; Treachery; Superior English Resources: Wilks’s remark that “Haider was born to create an empire, Tipu to lose one” seems correct in retrospect of history but does scant justice to the capabilities of Tipu and does not take into full account the heavy odds he faced. It should not be forgotten that the English were hostile towards him. As Munro wrote on 18 September `1798`: ‘Our first care ought to be directed to the total subversion of Tipu’. Tipu was also handicapped by the treachery of his officers, while the resources of the English were much superior. |
20. Rise of the Marathas: Tarabai, Shahu and the Post-Shivaji Crisis
20. Rise of the Marathas: Tarabai, Shahu and the Post-Shivaji Crisis
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Maratha power expand as the Mughal Empire declined? | Large Control; Tributes; Lahore Ambition; Kingmakers; Unrealised Pan-Indian Potential: As the Mughal Empire declined, one of the staunchest and hardiest of the empire’s adversaries, the Marathas, got a chance to rise in power. They controlled a large portion of the country; besides, they also received tributes from areas not directly under their control. By the middle of the eighteenth century, they were in Lahore thinking of becoming rulers of the north Indian empire and in the court of the Mughals playing the role of kingmakers. The Maratha state had the potential to develop into a new pan-Indian empire replacing the Mughals; but that potential was never fully realised because of the nature of the Maratha polity itself. |
| What crises followed Shivaji’s death (`1680`) through Tarabai–Shahu civil war? | Shambhaji–Rajaram; Tarabai for Shivaji II; Aurangzeb `1707`; Shahu Released; Eight-Year Civil War: After death of Shivaji in `1680`, the kingdom was troubled by dynastic factionalism and the constant pressure of the Mughal policy of conquest in the Deccan. Local *deshmukhs* (revenue officers) and zamindars took advantage of the situation by sometimes aligning with the Mughals and sometimes joining hands with the Marathas. Two of Shivaji’s sons, first Shambhaji and then Rajaram, ruled briefly and battled incessantly with the Mughal army. When Rajaram died in `1699`, one of his queens, Tarabai, began to rule in the name of her infant son Shivaji II. Aurangzeb died in `1707` after forty years of futile warfare in the Deccan; the Marathas still remained to be subjugated. The Maratha kingdom was, however, certainly weakened and the process was further exacerbated after the release of Shahu, Shivaji’s grandson, from the Mughal prison in `1707`. There were now two rival contenders for the throne and during the next eight years, Maharashtra was immersed in a full-scale civil war between the forces of Shahu and those of Tarabai, who intended to rule in the name of Shivaji II. |
21. Balaji Vishwanath (1713–1720) and the 1719 Sanad
21. Balaji Vishwanath (1713–1720) and the 1719 Sanad
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Balaji Vishwanath secure Shahu’s victory and what did the `1719` *sanad* grant? | Sardars and Banking Families; Sayyid Brothers; Chauth and Sardeshmukhi; Warna `1731`: The situation of anarchy was becoming all-pervasive by `1712–13`. But, helped by a group of new independent *sardars*, as well as a number of Brahman banking families, and an able Chitpavan Brahman *peshwa* (prime minister), Balaji Vishwanath, Shahu ultimately emerged victorious from this contest and by `1718–19` he consolidated his position firmly. In `1719`, by helping the Sayyid brothers establish a puppet emperor in Delhi, Balaji Vishwanath secured for his master a Mughal *sanad* (imperial order) recognising Shahu’s right to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the six Mughal provinces of Deccan, *chauth* of Malwa and Gujarat and an independent status in Maharashtra. The contest with the Tarabai faction was settled later in the Treaty of Warna in `1731`, which gave the state of Kolapur to Shivaji II. The control of the state gradually passed to the Peshwas. Since the time of Balaji Vishwanath, the office of the *peshwa* became rapidly powerful and the fountainhead of authority and the source of all patronage in the entire Maratha kingdom. He died in `1720` and was succeeded by his son Baji Rao. |
22. Baji Rao I (1720–40): Palkhed, Bhopal and the Maratha Confederacy
22. Baji Rao I (1720–40): Palkhed, Bhopal and the Maratha Confederacy
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why is Baji Rao I considered the greatest of all the Peshwas and what were his military gains? | Palkhed March `1728`; Malwa–Rajasthan; Gujarat 60%; Konkan; Delhi `1737`; Bhopal January `1739`: Baji Rao I (`1720–40`) is considered greatest of all the Peshwas. He was in power till `1740`. By then the Maratha state had acquired control over large territories of the Mughal empire, and their only major adversary was the Nizam of Hyderabad, as both vied for control over Karnataka, Khandesh and Gujarat. After victory of Maratha at Palkhed (March `1728`), the nizam was forced to recognise Shahu as the sole Maratha monarch with rights to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan. He led military campaigns and acquired the fertile lands of Malwa, reaching Rajasthan by `1729`. Meanwhile in Gujarat, Maratha bands collected taxes in the countryside, while the Mughals controlled only the cities and the once lucrative trade in the port of Surat now declined rapidly under this political pressure. Later the governor of Gujarat in a treaty in effect ceded 60% of the revenues of Gujarat to Shahu and Peshwa. He moved towards the coastal plain of Konkan and gained control over the territories of the Sidis (Abyssinian Muslims) and drove the Portuguese out of Salsette, Bassein and Chaul. In `1737` he attacked Delhi and held the emperor captive for some time. The following year, he defeated a huge Mughal army under the generalship of the nizam and the Treaty of Bhopal that followed in January `1739` ceded to the *peshwa* the *subah* of Malwa and sovereignty over all lands between the rivers Narmada and Chambal. In these territories, however, the Marathas did not try to overturn the local power structure and quickly entered into negotiations with the local zamindars for the payment of yearly tributes. A civilian system of revenue administration took time to emerge in this newly conquered region and this was a feature typical of all Maratha conquests. |
| How did the Maratha Confederacy work under Baji Rao I and which houses emerged? | Spheres of Influence; Gaekwad–Bhonsle–Holkar–Sindhia–Peshwa; Cordial till Panipat: Baji Rao had started a confederacy of prominent Maratha chiefs to manage the rapidly expanding Maratha power, and to some extent appease the kshatriya section of the Marathas (Peshwas were brahmins) led by the *senapati* Dabodi. Under the arrangement of the Maratha confederacy, each prominent family under a chief was assigned a sphere of influence which he was supposed to conquer and rule, but in the name of the then Maratha king, Shahu. The Maratha families which emerged prominent were: the Gaekwad of Baroda, the Bhonsle of Nagpur, the Holkars of Indore, the Sindhias of Gwalior, and the Peshwa of Poona. The confederacy, under Baji Rao I to Madhavrao I, worked cordially but the Third Battle of Panipat (`1761`) changed everything. The defeat at Panipat and later the death of the young Peshwa, Madhavrao I, in `1772`, weakened the control of the Peshwas over the confederacy. Though the chiefs of the confederacy united on occasion, as against the British (`1775–82`), more often they quarrelled among themselves. |
| Phase / Event | Date | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Balaji Vishwanath sanad | 1719 | Chauth/sardeshmukhi in six Deccan provinces; chauth of Malwa and Gujarat; independent status in Maharashtra |
| Treaty of Warna | 1731 | Kolapur to Shivaji II; Tarabai contest settled |
| Palkhed | March 1728 | Nizam recognises Shahu; Deccan chauth/sardeshmukhi |
| Delhi attack | 1737 | Emperor held captive for some time |
| Treaty of Bhopal | January 1739 | Malwa subah; sovereignty Narmada–Chambal |
| Baji Rao I dies; Balaji Baji Rao | 1740 | Nana Saheb as Peshwa |
23. Balaji Baji Rao / Nana Saheb (1740–61) and Third Battle of Panipat (1761)
23. Balaji Baji Rao / Nana Saheb (1740–61) and Third Battle of Panipat (1761)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Nana Saheb take Maratha power to its peak across India? | Supreme after Shahu `1749`; Orissa `1751`; Bhalke; Mughal Protection `1752`; Plunder not Empire: After the death of Baji Rao in `1740`, Shahu appointed his son Balaji Baji Rao, better known as Nana Saheb (`1740–61`), in his place. More experienced in administration than in military campaigns, he was, however, the most successful among the *peshwas*. Nana Saheb became the supreme authority in the Maratha polity after the death of Shahu in `1749`. This was indeed the peak period of Maratha glory when all parts of India had to face Maratha depredations. In the east, from `1745` onwards Maratha bands under Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur regularly raided Orissa, Bengal and Bihar. A treaty in `1751` stopped these raids, as Alivardi surrendered Orissa and agreed to pay Rs. 120,000 as annual *chauth* payment for the three provinces. Near at home, the Maratha forces regularly raided the nizam’s territories in Konkan, exacted tributes, but never succeeded in completely subduing them. In the north, by the treaty of Bhalke in `1751`, Salabutjung, the new nizam, practically ceded the entire control of Khandesh. Further north, the Maratha bands regularly raided the Rajput kingdoms of Jaipur, Bundi, Kotah and Udaipur and the Gond kingdom of Deogarh. They intervened in their wars of succession, exacted annual tributes from their rulers, but never tried to have any permanent conquest in the region. In the face of an Afghan invasion overrunning Lahore and Multan, a treaty in `1752` brought the Mughal emperor under the protection of the Marathas; and a succession dispute in `1753` gave them the opportunity to install their own chosen candidate on the Mughal throne. The Maratha expedition to Punjab was, however, short-lived and soon a Sikh rebellion put an end to Maratha authority in this region. In any case, the Marathas by then had gained mastery over large parts of north India; but there was never any attempt to establish an empire. It was only in Khandesh, Malwa and Gujarat that they tried to put in place some kind of an administration; their conquest elsewhere would seldom go beyond plunder and levying of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. As a result, it was difficult to maintain this mastery. |
| What happened at the Third Battle of Panipat and what followed for the polity? | 14 January `1761`; Abdali–Rohillas–Shuja; ~50,000 Casualties; Madhav Rao; Raghunath Rao: Soon an Afghan invasion under Ahmad Shah Abdali dealt a deadly blow to Maratha glory. Abdali was supported by a number of other indigenous forces, like the Rohillas and Shuja-ud-daula of Awadh. In the crucial Third Battle of Panipat fought on 14 January `1761`, the Maratha forces under Sadasiv Rao Bhao (general and nephew of the *peshwa*) were routed by Abdali, causing about fifty thousand casualties. This marked the beginning of the decline of Maratha power. The *peshwa* died within weeks and as the young *peshwa* Madhav Rao tried to gain control of the polity, factionalism among the Maratha *sardars* raised its ugly head. This faction fighting increased further after Madhav Rao’s death in `1772`. His uncle Raghunath Rao seized power, but was opposed by a number of important Maratha chiefs. To consolidate his position, he found a new ally in the English. |
24. Maratha State as Alternative to the Mughal Empire; Historiography (Habib, Chandra, Wink)
24. Maratha State as Alternative to the Mughal Empire; Historiography (Habib, Chandra, Wink)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why could the Maratha state not become an alternative to the Mughal empire? | Confederacy Structure; Vatan Rights; Saranjam vs Brotherhood; Bundle of Rights: The Maratha state could not become an alternative to the Mughal empire because of its own structure. Its nature was that of a confederacy where power was shared among the chiefs or *sardars*, like the Bhonsles of Nagpur, Gaikwad of Baroda, Holkar of Indore or Sindhia of Gwalior, all of whom had made their fortunes as military leaders since the days of Shahu. Parts of the Maratha state had been alienated to these military commanders and it was difficult to control the chiefs, who did not like the *peshwa* regulating their activities. This resulted in increasing factional rivalry among the Maratha *sardars* and although there was always a strong centre, the composition of the inner circle of power changed from generation to generation. At the lower level there was the existence of heritable *vatan* rights, like those of the village headmen, *mirasidars* and *deshmukhs*, which could not be taken away by kings. The regional assemblies of *vatandars* exercised political power and resolved disputes at a local level, thus representing local loyalties as opposed to any centralised concept of kingship. The Maratha state, in order to establish its control over the territory, tried to replace the horizontal ethos of “brotherhood” of the *vatandars* with the vertical relationship of service by generously distributing among its clients temporary and transferable land rights or *saranjam* that resembled Mughal *jagir*. But the old system could not be displaced. So the same locally powerful Brahman or Maratha individuals now enjoyed a “bundle” of different kinds of rights. Local loyalties and centralised kingship thus continued to exist. |
| How do Habib, Satish Chandra and Andre Wink interpret the Maratha–Mughal relationship? | Zamindar Revolt; Regional Deccan; Fitna/Fitva; Mughal Continuity with Civilian Brahmans: Some historians emphasize the Maratha state’s rebel nature. Irfan Habib (`1963`) thinks that it was the outcome of a zamindar revolt against an oppressive Mughal bureaucracy. Satish Chandra (`1993`) has argued about its regional nature; although Baji Rao made a move towards north India, his major aim was only to establish supremacy in the Deccan. In other words, the Maratha state is often seen as a departure from the Mughal tradition. But some other historians like Andre Wink have argued that the Marathas were also very much within the Mughal tradition, as they had built their power on the notion of sedition or *fitva* (the Deccani corruption of the word *fitna*), which the Mughal state always provided a space for. Even in the 1770s the Marathas acknowledged the symbolic authority of the Mughal emperor and in Malwa, Khandesh and parts of Gujarat, where they established some sort of administration, it looked very much like the Mughal system. The old terminology was retained and even the differential urban tax rates continued to favour the Muslims. The only difference was that in the Maratha territories there were many civilian revenue collectors, mainly Brahmans, who did not move on to military command, as was the custom in the Mughal system where there was only one unified civilian/military bureaucracy. Mughal tradition remained central to social and political life of the Maratha state system, although it had to contend continually with local loyalties. The Maratha state ultimately declined not so much because of factionalism, but because of the increasing power of the English in the Deccan. It was difficult for the Marathas to resist this efficient army. |
25. Causes of the Anglo-Maratha Wars
25. Causes of the Anglo-Maratha Wars
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What caused the three Anglo-Maratha clashes between the last quarter of the 18th and first quarter of the 19th century? | English Ambition; Cotton–China Trade via Bombay; Divided House; Clive Model for Bombay: The years between the last quarter of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th century witnessed the Marathas and the English clashing thrice for political supremacy, with the English emerging victorious in the end. The causes of these conflicts were: the inordinate ambition of the English; the sudden growth of the Company’s cotton trade with China through Bombay from Gujarat, which made them concerned about the security of Deccan, then under the control of the Maratha confederacy; and the divided house of the Marathas that encouraged the English to hope for success in their venture. The English in Bombay wanted to establish a government on the lines of the arrangement made by Clive in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. So it was a longed-for opportunity for the English when dissensions over a succession divided the Marathas. |
26. First Anglo-Maratha War (1775–82): Surat, Purandhar, Wadgaon, Salbai
26. First Anglo-Maratha War (1775–82): Surat, Purandhar, Wadgaon, Salbai
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What succession crisis opened the First Anglo-Maratha War? | Narayanrao Assassinated; Raghunathrao; Sawai Madhavrao; Barabhai under Nana Phadnavis: After the death of Madhavrao in `1772`, his brother Narayanrao succeeded him as the fifth *peshwa*. However, Narayanrao’s uncle, Raghunathrao, had his nephew assassinated and named himself as the next *peshwa*, although he was not a legal heir. Narayanrao’s widow, Gangabai, gave birth to a son after her husband’s death. The newborn infant was named ‘Sawai’ (One and a Quarter) Madhavrao and he was legally the next *peshwa*. Twelve Maratha chiefs (Barabhai), led by Nana Phadnavis, made an effort to name the infant as the new *peshwa* and rule for him as regents. A succession dispute provided the first opportunity for intervention, as Raghunath Rao, who had his nephew Peshwa Narayan Rao killed in a conspiracy, now faced combined opposition of the Maratha *sardars* and began to look at the British in Bombay as a possible new ally. |
| What were the Treaties of Surat (`1775`) and Purandhar (`1776`) and how did Wadgaon (`1779`) reverse Bombay? | Salsette–Bassein Cession; Upton Mission; Scorched Earth; Nana Fadnis–Sindhia–Holkar: Raghunathrao, unwilling to give up his position in power, sought help from the English at Bombay and signed the Treaty of Surat in `1775`. Under the treaty, Raghunathrao ceded the territories of Salsette and Bassein to the English along with a portion of the revenues from Surat and Bharuch districts. In return, the English were to provide Raghunathrao with 2,500 soldiers. The British Calcutta Council, on the other side of India, condemned the Treaty of Surat (`1775`) and sent Colonel Upton to Pune to annul it and make a new treaty (Treaty of Purandhar, `1776`) with the regency renouncing Raghunath and promising him a pension. In return the Company was offered a number of concessions. The Bombay government rejected this and gave refuge to Raghunath. The treaty of Purandar was inconclusive and was not ratified by the authorities at Bengal. In `1777`, Nana Phadnavis violated his treaty with the Calcutta Council by granting the French a port on the west coast. The English retaliated by sending a force towards Pune. By now the Maratha forces had regrouped under Nana Fadnis, Sindhia and Holkar and inflicted a crushing defeat on the British at Wadgaon (`1779`). During war, the Marathas also utilised a scorched earth policy, burning farmland and poisoning wells. The Treaty of Wadgaon forced the Bombay government to relinquish all territories acquired by the English since `1775`. This was the period that witnessed the rise of Nana Fadnis to the political centre stage of the Maratha polity. By `1781` he and the Bhonsle family had formed a grand alliance with the nizam and Haidar Ali against the British. |
| What were the main provisions and political meaning of the Treaty of Salbai (`1782`)? | Hastings Rejects Wadgaon; Goddard–Popham–Camac; Twenty Years Peace; Friendship and Mysore Confrontation:Warren Hastings, the Governor-General in Bengal, rejected the Treaty of Wadgaon and sent a large force of soldiers under Colonel Goddard who captured Ahmedabad in February `1779`, and Bassein in December `1780`. Another Bengal detachment led by Captain Popham captured Gwalior in August `1780`. In February `1781` the English, under General Camac, finally defeated Sindhia at Sipri. Sindhia proposed a new treaty between the Peshwa and the English; the inconclusive First Anglo-Maratha War came to an end in `1782` through the Treaty of Salbai. It was ratified by Hastings and Phadnavis. The treaty guaranteed peace between the two sides for twenty years. The main provisions of the Treaty of Salbai were: Salsette should continue in the possession of the English; the whole of the territory conquered since the Treaty of Purandhar (`1776`) including Bassein should be restored to the Marathas; the English should not offer any further support to Raghunathrao and the Peshwa should grant him a maintenance allowance; Haidar Ali should return all the territory taken from the English and the Nawab of Arcot; the English should enjoy the privileges of trade as before; the Peshwa should not support any other European nation; the Peshwa and the English should undertake that their several allies should remain at peace with one another; Mahadji Sindhia should be the mutual guarantor for the proper observance of the terms of the treaty. Thus, the treaty committed the Marathas once again to friendship with the Company and also to a confrontation with Mysore. |
| Treaty | Year | Core terms |
|---|---|---|
| Surat | 1775 | Raghunathrao cedes Salsette and Bassein + portion of Surat/Bharuch revenues; English provide 2,500 soldiers |
| Purandhar | 1776 | Calcutta Council via Colonel Upton; renounce Raghunath (pension); Company concessions; not ratified by Bengal / rejected by Bombay |
| Wadgaon | 1779 | Bombay relinquishes all territories acquired since 1775 after crushing British defeat |
| Salbai | 1782 | 20 years peace; Salsette to English; restore post-Purandhar conquests incl. Bassein; drop Raghunathrao (maintenance); no European rivals; Mahadji Sindhia guarantor |
27. Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–05): Hadapsar, Bassein and Subsidiary Treaties
27. Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–05): Hadapsar, Bassein and Subsidiary Treaties
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What background of Maratha disintegration and Wellesley’s policy led to the Second War? | Nana Fadnis Ascendancy; Madhavrao Narayan Suicide `1795`; Bajirao II; Hyderabad–Mysore Already Broken: The Second Anglo-Maratha war started in circumstances similar to those of the first. The Maratha state was in a deplorable condition by now, due to the bitter internal rivalry between the *sardars*. Nana Fadnis had made the *peshwa* virtually powerless. In `1795` the frustrated *peshwa* Madhavrao Narayan committed suicide and the succession dispute that followed put the entire Maratha polity into utter confusion. After the Peshwa’s suicide, Bajirao II, the worthless son of Raghunathrao, became the Peshwa. Nana Phadnavis, a bitter foe of Bajirao II, became the chief minister. The dissensions among the Marathas provided the English with an opportunity to intervene in Maratha affairs. The death of Nana Phadnavis in `1800` gave the British an added advantage. In the meanwhile, with the arrival of Wellesley, there had also been a remarkable change in British attitudes towards the Indian states: Hyderabad had accepted a ‘Subsidiary Alliance’ and Mysore was crushed in `1799`. So this brought the Company face to face with the Marathas, the only remaining significant indigenous power in the subcontinent. |
| What happened at Hadapsar (`1802`) and what were the terms of the Treaty of Bassein? | Vithuji Murder; Jaswant Victory 25 October; Subsidiary Alliance 31 December `1802`: On 1 April `1801` the Peshwa brutally murdered the brother of Jaswantrao Holkar, Vithuji. A furious Jaswant arrayed his forces against the combined armies of Sindhia and Bajirao II. The turmoil continued and on 25 October `1802`, Jaswant defeated the armies of the Peshwa and Sindhia decisively at Hadaspar near Poona and placed Vinayakrao, son of Amritrao, on the Peshwa’s seat. A terrified Bajirao II fled to Bassein where, on 31 December `1802`, he signed a treaty with the English. The Treaty of Bassein (`1802`) was a treaty of ‘Subsidiary Alliance’. Under the treaty, the Peshwa agreed: to receive from the Company a native infantry (consisting of not less than 6,000 troops), with the usual proportion of field artillery and European artillerymen attached, to be permanently stationed in his territories; to cede to the Company territories yielding an income of Rs 26 lakh; to surrender the city of Surat; to give up all claims for *chauth* on the Nizam’s dominions; to accept the Company’s arbitration in all differences between him and the Nizam or the Gaekwad; not to keep in his employment Europeans of any nation at war with the English; and to subject his relations with other states to the control of the English. Hereafter, Baji Rao was escorted to Poona and installed in office; but this did not mean an immediate end to independent Maratha power. This in fact marked the beginning of the Second Anglo-Maratha War (`1803–5`), as Holkar soon put up a rival candidate for *peshwaship* and looked for allies. For the next two years battle continued at different fronts across the Maratha territories. |
| How were Bhonsle, Sindhia and Holkar reduced to vassalage and what followed Wellesley’s recall? | Devgaon 17 Dec `1803`; Surajianjangaon 30 Dec `1803`; Rajpurghat `1806`; Pindaris; Non-Intervention: After the Peshwa accepted the subsidiary alliance, Sindhia and Bhonsle attempted to save Maratha independence. But the well prepared and organised army of the English under Arthur Wellesley defeated the combined armies of Sindhia and Bhonsle and forced them to conclude separate subsidiary treaties with the English. In `1804`, Yashwantrao Holkar made an attempt to form a coalition of Indian rulers to fight against the English. But his attempt proved unsuccessful. The Marathas were defeated, reduced to British vassalage and isolated from one another. Defeat of Bhonsle: 17 December `1803`, Treaty of Devgaon. Defeat of Sindhia: 30 December `1803`, Treaty of Surajianjangaon — the treaty with the Sindhia secured the British all his territories north of Jamuna including Delhi and Agra, all his possessions in Gujarat and claims over the other Maratha houses. Defeat of Holkar: `1806`, Treaty of Rajpurghat. In the end, treaties of subordination were imposed on a number of tributaries of the Marathas, like the Rajput states, the Jats, the Rohillas and the Bundellas in northern Malwa. The treaty also forbade other Europeans from accepting service in any Maratha army and made the British arbiters in any dispute between the Maratha houses. But even this did not mean the final demise of the Maratha Power. The wars, on the other hand, meant huge expenses for the Company, and the Court of Directors, already dissatisfied with the forward policy of Lord Wellesley, recalled him in `1805`. Lord Cornwallis was reappointed as the governor general in India with specific instructions to follow a policy of non-intervention. This allowed the Maratha *sardars*, like Holkar and Sindhia, to regain some of their power, while their irregular soldiers, known as the Pindaris, plundered the countryside in Malwa and Rajasthan. |
| What was the significance of the Treaty of Bassein for British expansion? | Strategical Spread of Troops; “Key to India” Observation; Major Step not Instant Empire: Admittedly, the treaty was signed by a Peshwa who lacked political authority, but the gains made by the English were immense. The provision of keeping English troops permanently in Maratha territory was of great strategical benefit. The Company already had troops in Mysore, Hyderabad and Lucknow. The addition of Poona on the list meant that the Company’s troops were now more evenly spread and could be rushed to any place without much delay in times of need. Though the Treaty of Bassein did not hand over India to the Company on a platter, it was a major development in that direction; the Company was now well placed to expand its areas of influence. In the circumstances, the observation that the treaty “gave the English the key to India” may be exaggerated, but appears understandable. |
| Settlement | Date | Party / Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Battle of Hadaspar (Hadapsar) | 25 Oct 1802 | Jaswant Holkar defeats Peshwa + Sindhia; Vinayakrao placed on seat |
| Treaty of Bassein | 31 Dec 1802 | Bajirao II — Subsidiary Alliance; ≥6,000 infantry; Rs 26 lakh territories; Surat; drop Nizam chauth; English control of foreign relations |
| Treaty of Devgaon | 17 Dec 1803 | Bhonsle subsidiary defeat |
| Treaty of Surajianjangaon | 30 Dec 1803 | Sindhia — north of Jamuna incl. Delhi & Agra; Gujarat; claims over Maratha houses |
| Treaty of Rajpurghat | 1806 | Holkar |
28. Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–19): Hastings, Pindaris and End of Peshwaship
28. Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–19): Hastings, Pindaris and End of Peshwaship
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Hastings’s paramountcy and the Pindari question reopen Maratha unity against the Company? | Charter Act `1813`; Paramountcy; Amir Khan–Karim Khan–Chitu Khan; Attack on Poona Residency: The situation continued for some time till the arrival of Lord Hastings as the governor general in `1813`. Lord Hastings had the imperialistic design of imposing British paramountcy. By the Charter Act of `1813`, the East India Company’s monopoly of trade in China (except tea) ended and hence the company needed more markets. Hastings initiated the new policy of “paramountcy”, which privileged the interests of the Company as a paramount power over those of other powers in India and to protect such interests the Company could legitimately annex or threaten to annex the territories of any Indian state. The Pindaris, made up of many castes and classes, were attached to Maratha armies as mercenaries. When the Marathas became weak, the Pindaris could not get regular employment. As a consequence, they started plundering neighbouring territories, including those of the Company. The English charged the Marathas with giving shelter to the Pindaris. Pindari leaders like Amir Khan and Karim Khan surrendered while Chitu Khan fled into the jungles. The Treaty of Bassein, described as “a treaty with a cipher (the Peshwa)”, wounded the feelings of the other Maratha leaders. They saw the treaty as an absolute surrender of independence. Lord Hastings’ actions taken against the Pindaris were seen as a transgression of the sovereignty of the Marathas; they served to once again unite the Maratha confederacy. A repentant Bajirao II made a last bid in `1817` by rallying together the Maratha chiefs against the English in course of the Third Anglo-Maratha War. The war started with attack on the British Residency at Poona by the Peshwa. |
| What were the results and treaties of the Third Anglo-Maratha War? | Peshwa Surrenders June `1818`; Bithur Exile; Poona–Gwalior–Mandasor; Satara; South of Vindhyas: In June `1818`, the Peshwa finally surrendered and the Maratha confederacy was dissolved. The *peshwaship* was abolished. The British took complete control over the Peshwa’s dominion. Peshwa Bajirao became a British retainer at Bithur near Kanpur. The Maratha army and the Pindaris were thoroughly crushed. Some important treaties were signed. These were: Treaty of Poona, with Peshwa; Treaty of Gwalior, with Sindhia; Treaty of Mandasor, with Holkar. Pratap Singh, a lineal descendant of Shivaji, was made ruler of a small principality, Satara, formed out of the Peshwa’s dominions. The English East India Company had now complete mastery over all the territories south of the Vindhyas. |
29. Why the Marathas Lost: Seven Causes
29. Why the Marathas Lost: Seven Causes
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the seven structural causes of Maratha defeat? | Inept Leadership; Defective State; Loose Set-up; Inferior Military; Unstable Economy; English Diplomacy–Espionage; Progressive Outlook:(1) Inept Leadership: The Maratha state was despotic in character. The personality and character of the head of the state had a great bearing on the affairs of the state. But, unfortunately, the later Maratha leaders Bajirao II, Daulatrao Sindhia and Jaswantrao Holkar were worthless and selfish leaders. They were no match for the English officials such as Elphinstone, John Malcolm and Arthur Wellesley (who later led the English to conquer Napoleon). (2) Defective Nature of Maratha State: The cohesion of the people of the Maratha state was not organic but artificial and accidental, and hence precarious. There was no effort, right from the days of Shivaji, for a well thought out organised communal improvement, spread of education or unification of the people. The rise of the Maratha state was based on the religio-national movement. This defect of the Maratha state became glaring when they had to contend with a European power organised on the best pattern of the West. (3) Loose Political Set-up: The Maratha empire was a loose confederation under the leadership of the Chhatrapati and later the Peshwa. Powerful chiefs such as the Gaikwad, the Holkar, the Sindhia and the Bhonsle carved out semi-independent kingdoms for themselves and paid lip service to the authority of the Peshwa. Further, there existed irreconcilable hostility between different units of the confederacy. The Maratha chiefs often took sides with one or the other. The lack of a cooperative spirit among the Maratha chiefs proved detrimental to the Maratha state. (4) Inferior Military System: Though full of personal prowess and valour, the Marathas were inferior to the English in organisation of the forces, in war weapons, in disciplined action and in effective leadership. The centrifugal tendencies of divided command accounted for much of the Maratha failures. Treachery in the ranks was instrumental in weakening the Maratha forces. The adoption of the modern techniques of warfare by the Marathas was inadequate. The Marathas neglected the paramount importance of artillery. Though the Poona government set up an artillery department, it hardly functioned effectively. (5) Unstable Economic Policy: The Maratha leadership failed to evolve a stable economic policy to suit the changing needs of time. There were no industries or foreign trade openings. So, the economy of the Maratha was not conducive to a stable political set-up. (6) Superior English Diplomacy and Espionage: The English had better diplomatic skill to win allies and isolate the enemy. The disunity among the Maratha chiefs simplified the task of the English. Diplomatic superiority enabled the English to take a quick offensive against the target. Unlike the Marathas’ ignorance and lack of information about their enemy, the English maintained a well-knit spy system to gather knowledge of the potentialities, strengths, weaknesses and military methods of their foes. (7) Progressive English Outlook: The English were rejuvenated by the forces of Renaissance, emancipating them from the shackles of the Church. They were devoting their energies to scientific inventions, extensive ocean voyages and acquisition of colonies. Indians, on the other hand, were still steeped in medievalism marked by old dogmas and notions. The Maratha leaders paid very little attention to mundane matters of the state. Insistence on maintenance of traditional social hierarchy based on the dominance of the priestly class made the union of an empire difficult. In the end, it can be concluded that the English attacked a ‘divided house’ which started crumbling after a few pushes. |
| # | Cause | Core analytical point |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Inept Leadership | Bajirao II, Daulatrao Sindhia, Jaswantrao Holkar vs Elphinstone, Malcolm, Arthur Wellesley |
| 2 | Defective Nature of State | Artificial cohesion; no organised communal improvement/education/unification; religio-national base |
| 3 | Loose Political Set-up | Loose confederation; semi-independent chiefs; irreconcilable hostility |
| 4 | Inferior Military System | Weak organisation, weapons, discipline, leadership; divided command; neglect of artillery |
| 5 | Unstable Economic Policy | No stable policy; no industries or foreign trade openings |
| 6 | Superior English Diplomacy & Espionage | Isolate enemy; well-knit spy system |
| 7 | Progressive English Outlook | Renaissance science/colonies vs medieval dogmas; priestly hierarchy obstruction |
30. Mains PYQ Analyses: First Maratha War at Lowest Ebb; Salbai (1782); Bassein (1802)
30. Mains PYQ Analyses: First Maratha War at Lowest Ebb; Salbai (1782); Bassein (1802)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Q: The British “fought the First Maratha War in a period when their fortunes were at the lowest ebb”. Comment. | Raghunath Rao Ambition; Premature Bid; Salsette Only Gain; Six Low-Ebb Factors; Hastings Credit: The First Anglo-Maratha War (`1775–1782`) between the Marathas and the British was the result of the ambitions of Raghunath Rao, the uncle of the fourth and fifth Peshwas, Madhav Rao and Narayan Rao. Madhav Rao died of a wasting disease and Narayan Rao was done to death because of jealousies and palace intrigues. Raghunath Rao claimed the *gaddi*. But the birth of a posthumous son to Narayan Rao deprived him of the coveted prize. So he signed away Maratha independence by the treaty of Surat, in `1775`, in order to become the puppet Peshwa. The British were only too eager to avail of such an opportunity of acquiring power. However, the attempt proved premature and the war ended with the Treaty of Salbai with the sole British gain being the island of Salsette. Fortunes of British were at the lowest ebb during the first Maratha War because: (1) The Maratha confederacy had not yet lost its coherence and capability and moderate counsellors like Mahadji Sindhia could still exercise influence; thus the British suffered ignominies. (2) Combined to the confederacy of Marathas was the force of Mysore and Hyderabad; the southern Indian powers had long been resenting the presence of the British among them and Haidar Ali and the Nizam chose this moment to declare war against the company. (3) Abroad they were waging a losing war in their colonies in America where the people had rebelled in `1776`. (4) They also had to counter the determined design of the French to exploit the difficulties of their old rival. (5) In India the company’s affairs were not running smoothly. The governors of the Presidencies wanted to follow their own policies irrespective of the wishes of the central authority in Calcutta. In Calcutta, the Regulating Act had created a difficult situation, and the members of the council thwarted the policies of the Governor General. (6) Nor were the finances in a satisfactory condition. It is to the credit of Warren Hastings that he overcame all dangers and safeguarded British interests in the most critical situation. This was the lowest ebb; never afterwards did a menace of such proportions threaten them in India. |
| Q: “The Treaty of Salbai (`1782`) was neither honorable to the English nor advantageous to their interests.” Comment. | Short-Run Dishonour and Negligible Gains vs Long-Run Isolation of Mysore and Twenty Years Peace: The First Anglo-Maratha War (`1775–1782`) had happened when the British interfered in the matters of Marathas backing Raghunath Rao for Peshwaship against Madhavrao II who was supported by Nana Phadnavis. The Treaty of Salbai was signed in `1782` between the British and the Maratha after the First Anglo-Maratha War. Both sides had tasted each other’s strength which ensured mutual respect and peace for the next 20 years. The English restored to the Peshwa all places captured by them during the war except island of Shashti (Sashti/Salsette) and small islands near Bombay. The Company retained control of Salsette and Broach. The Marathas also guaranteed that the French would be prohibited from establishing settlements on their territories. In return, the British acknowledged Madhavrao II as *peshwa* of the Maratha Empire. Marathas agreed to pay Raghunathrav an allowance. Both sides decided not to molest each other’s allies. The British would enjoy trade privilege as before. Peshwa was not to support any other European nation. The Treaty of Salbai was neither honorable to the English nor advantageous to their interests because: (1) The British had to denounce support for Raghunath Rao — thus British failed in their war aim. (2) The British had to return territories won back to the Marathas and Maratha supremacy was proved; this reduced the British possessions in the north Konkan, Bombay and Gujarat. (3) The Treaty on the face proved dishonorable to British considering that their prestige in India had increased and they were in the process of becoming a paramount power in the country. (4) The material gain for British was negligible in comparison to the expenditure on the war. Counter views: (1) Though Marathas gained almost all the territories lost to the British, they permanently lost the island of Sashti and its dependencies. The loss of Sashti meant loss of the revenue of 6 lakhs, loss of trade to some extent as well as loss of prestige to the Marathas. (2) For the British point of view, there was no loss of territory; whatever territories were exchanged were Maratha territories which the British had conquered during the war. (3) The British used the peace treaty with Marathas to defeat Mysore, as British were fighting the Second Anglo-Mysore War at the time of the Treaty of Salbai. The British saved their position from the then powerful Marathas under Nana Fadnavis and received their help in isolating the rulers of Mysore. (4) The treaty proved much advantageous to the expansionist interest of British as it gave them peace with Marathas for nearly 20 years. They used this time to fight their enemies such as rulers of Mysore (Haidar Ali and Tipu) and French and to consolidate their position in Hyderabad and Awadh. Hence, the Treaty of Salbai was somewhat disadvantageous to the British in the short run and did not result in much immediate gain. But the English used it to their advantage in the long run towards British supremacy in India. |
| Q: “The treaty of Bassein, by its direct and indirect operations, gave the Company the Empire of India.” Comment. | Sidney Owen Thesis; Seven Supporting Reasons; Castlereagh Criticism; Not Foregone in `1803`: The Treaty of Bassein was concluded in `1802` between the British East India Company and the Peshwa Baji Rao II, when Peshwa Baji Rao II fled to British protection after having been defeated by Holkar. The treaty was not acceptable to leading Maratha chiefs and hence was followed by the 2nd Anglo-Maratha war (`1803–1806`). Sidney Owen holds that “the Treaty by its direct and indirect operations gave the Company the Empire of India”. The reasons: (1) The treaty was an important landmark in the history of British paramountcy in India. It put an end to the Maratha independence and gave the Company unquestionable supremacy over Maratha state and western India. (2) As per the treaty, Peshwa had to surrender territories yielding 26 lakhs of rupees apart from surrendering Surat. Apart from expansion in the British territory, this article provided British much needed resource which helped in further expansion of the Company’s territory in India. (3) By camping the company’s subsidiary troops at Poona the Company got a very advantageous position in case of war with the Marathas or any other rivals. This increased British Army offensive capability and increased the strength of British in western India. (4) The Peshwa had to accept the company’s arbitration in all differences between him and the other states. This increased the Company’s influence. (5) By providing for company’s mediation in all cases of disputes between the Peshwa and the Nizam, the state of Hyderabad almost completely passed under the company’s protection as Nizam was already under the subsidiary alliance with the British. (6) Maratha confederacy was amongst most powerful Empires in India. After the treaty of Bassein, the confederacy weakened and the Company’s position strengthened. This cleared way for the English Empire in India. (7) The Second Anglo-Maratha War, which followed the Treaty of Bassein, almost destroyed Maratha power and practice. The defeat of Maratha was also due to the strength obtained by the British by the Treaty of Bassein. Opposite views: In spite of all the far-reaching effects of the treaty of Bassein, there has been a tendency among some of the British writers to over-estimate the importance of the treaty of Bassein. In `1803` the British suzerainty over India was not a foregone conclusion and much had to be achieved before such position was attained by the British. Lord Castlereagh, the President of the Board of Control, had criticized the treaty of Bassein by saying that it appeared “hopeless to govern the Maratha Empire through a feeble and perhaps disaffected Peshwa”. He further criticized the treaty article which provided for the Peshwa’s acceptance of the British arbitrations in his disputes with other powers. This was fraught with the danger of involving the English in the endless and complicated Maratha turbulence. |
31. Diplomatic Annexation Policies
31. Diplomatic Annexation Policies
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the Policy of Ring-Fence (`1765–1813`)? | Formulated by Warren Hastings to create buffer zones around EIC territory (e.g., Awadh treated as buffer against Marathas and Afghans) — consistent with Clive’s post-Allahabad design of Awadh as buffer against Afghan and Maratha invasions. |
| What was the Subsidiary Alliance (`1798` onwards)? | Designed by Lord Wellesley. Princely state accepted British troop detachment, maintained at state's cost, posted a British Resident, and relinquished foreign affairs.
|
| What were the Doctrine of Lapse and Doctrine of Misgovernance? | Introduced by Lord Dalhousie.
|
| How do the three Anglo-Maratha Wars fit the annexation sequence? |
|
32. Sikh Panth Origins: Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh and the Khalsa (1699)
32. Sikh Panth Origins: Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh and the Khalsa (1699)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Sikhism originate in parallel with the Mughal empire, and how did Mughal hostility deepen? | Guru Nanak (`1469`); Bhakti–Sant Tradition; Tegbahadur Execution (`1675`): The history of the Sikh Panth in Punjab was as old as that of the Mughal empire. When Guru Nanak, born in `1469`, began to preach his message of inner devotion and equality among all human beings, Babur was founding the Mughal empire. Within the bhakti and sant tradition of medieval India, this was the beginning of Sikhism, which gradually began to attract millions of devotees and started acquiring its shape and definition under the leadership of the subsequent gurus. Aurangzeb was initially not very hostile to the Sikhs; but as the community grew in size and challenged the central authority of the Mughals, the emperor turned against them and Guru Tegbahadur, the ninth in line, was executed in Delhi in `1675`. |
| What was the origin and significance of the Khalsa under Guru Gobind Singh in `1699`? | Brotherhood of Khalsa; Guru’s Own Initiation; Five Insignia (5 Ks): The tenth guru, Guru Gobind Singh, took an important step in `1699`; he transformed the Sikhs into a military organisation by establishing the brotherhood of Khalsa. It was a ceremony in which the guru himself (and not his deputies or *masands*) initiated the disciples, who were obliged to maintain five distinctive insignia: Kesh — uncut hair; Kangha — a wooden comb; Kara — an iron or steel bracelet worn on the wrist; Kirpan — a sword or dagger; Kacchera — short breeches. |
| Why did Guru Gobind Singh found the Khalsa, and what social–political identity did it construct? | Armed Resistance; Jat Peasantry; Termination of Personal Guruship; Panth and Granth: Why he did it is a matter of conjecture. One reason possibly was the continuing conflict with the Mughals, which had convinced the gurus, first Guru Hargobind and then Guru Gobind Singh, about the necessity of armed resistance for the defence of the Panth. It was also probably because of the rise of the jat peasantry among the Sikhs, as carrying arms and resolving disputes through the use of arms were already part of jat cultural tradition and to which the other components of the Sikh community, the Khatri traders, were not perhaps very averse. The founding of the Khalsa projected the Sikh community as a militant outfit, although all Sikhs were not necessarily its members. The Jat peasants continued to dominate the Khalsa at the expense of the older Khatri leadership. Their aspiration for equality was further fulfilled when Guru Gobind Singh decided to terminate the position of guru after his death; the power of the guru henceforth was to be vested in the Panth and the Granth (sacred texts). Thus, by invoking cultural resources, such as the sacred texts, and prescribing initiation and other life-cycle rituals the Khalsa sought to provide order in the life of the Sikhs in otherwise uncertain days of the eighteenth century, and in this way tried to construct a distinctive Sikh social and political identity. |
| What was the complex trajectory of Guru Gobind’s open quarrel with the Mughals up to his murder in `1708`? | Anandpur (`1696`–`1704`); Bahadur Shah at Agra (`1707`); Murder 7 October `1708`: Guru Gobind’s open quarrel with the Mughals followed a complex trajectory. From about `1696` he tried to carve out an autonomous domain in and around Anandpur, which brought the hostility of the hill chiefs of Himachal Pradesh, who approached the Mughal *faujdar* for protection. The siege of Anandpur by a combined force in `1704` compelled Guru Gobind to leave; but Aurangzeb, then busy in Deccan, soon reversed the stand and sought to conciliate the guru. After Aurangzeb’s death, Guru Gobind met Bahadur Shah at Agra in `1707` and he promised to return Anandpur. However, the new emperor had to appease the hill chiefs as well, and therefore continued to postpone his final decision. In the meanwhile, on 7 October `1708`, Guru Gobind was murdered in a conspiracy. After him Banda Bahadur continued the Sikh revolt. |
| # | Five Ks (Kakars) | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Kesh | Uncut hair |
| 2 | Kangha | Wooden comb |
| 3 | Kara | Iron or steel bracelet worn on the wrist |
| 4 | Kirpan | Sword or dagger |
| 5 | Kacchera | Short breeches |
33. Banda Bahadur Revolt (1708–1716) and Execution
33. Banda Bahadur Revolt (1708–1716) and Execution
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Where did Banda Bahadur shift the Sikh contest, and what administration did he establish? | Majha and Doab; Jamuna–Ravi Sphere; Own Coin, Seal and Officers: The stage of the contest now shifted to Majha (between the rivers Beas and Ravi) and Doab (between rivers Beas and Sutlej/Sudej) regions, where lived mainly the Jat peasants. Mughal oppression around this time put tremendous pressure on the small zamindars and peasants. Not all of them, it is true, supported Banda Bahadur, whose main supporters were the small *mulguzari* zamindars of the jat community. Within a year a large area between the rivers Jamuna and Ravi came under his influence and here he promptly established his own administration, appointed his own *faujdars*, *diwan* and *kardars*, minted a new coin and used his own seal for issuing orders. |
| How did Bahadur Shah and Farruksiyar respond, and what internal dissensions weakened Banda? | Abdus Samad Khan; Jat–Khatri Split; Ijaradari; Guru Gobind’s Widow: In `1710`, Bahadur Shah proceeded to Punjab, but failed to crush the Sikh revolt. When Farruksiyar ascended the throne in `1713`, he appointed Abdus Samad Khan the *faujdar* of Lahore and gave him special orders to put an end to the Sikh upsurge. The position of Banda Bahadur had also weakened by then to some extent, because of internal dissension within the Sikh community. Although in general the jat peasants supported him, some of the Jat zamindars went to the Mughal side, Churaman Jat of Agra being a major example. The Khatri business class from around `1710` also went against the Sikh movement, as political stability and security of trade routes were essential to the smooth running of their business. At the same time, when the Mughals introduced the *ijaradari* system in Punjab for collecting land revenue, many of the Khatri traders became revenue farmers and this naturally linked their interests to those of the Mughal state. The emperors also tried to take advantage of this internal dissension within the Punjab society. During the time of Jahandar Shah and Farruksiyar, many Khatris were given high positions within the Mughal nobility. Farruksiyar tried to use Guru Gobind’s widow to drive a wedge between Banda and his Sikh followers. But this did not necessarily weaken Banda’s movement, as oppressive Khatri *ijaradars* often drove desperate Jat peasants into the rebel’s camp. |
| How did Banda’s revolt end, and what followed his execution in March `1716`? | Surrender `1715`; Execution March `1716`; Roving Bands; Abdali’s Failure: But ultimately in `1715` Banda had to surrender to Abdus Samad Khan. He was taken to Delhi along with some of his close followers; in March `1716` all of them were executed. The execution of Banda did not mean the end of Sikh power in Punjab, although there was no one immediately available to take up the leadership. But even in spite of the absence of a centralised leadership, roving bands of Sikh rebels took advantage of the breakdown of imperial control in north India to assert their independence. Even the Afghan invader Ahmad Shah Abdali failed to bring Punjab under his command; his governors were soon thrown out. |
34. The Misls and Dal Khalsa
34. The Misls and Dal Khalsa
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the misls, and how was power structured in the 18th-century Sikh Confederacy? | Sovereign Confederacy Units; Horizontal Kinship Power; *Patti*; More than Sixty Misls in `1770`; Dal Khalsa: The misls refer to the sovereign states of the Sikh Confederacy that rose during the 18th century in the Punjab region. At this stage, power in the Sikh polity became more horizontally structured, as misls, or combinations based on kinship ties, now held territories as units. Whenever a misl conquered new territory, it was distributed among its members according to the nature of contribution made by each member towards the conquest. The highest share obviously went to the chief, but even the lowest soldier got his own *patti* or a portion of land, which he could enjoy as a co-sharer with absolute freedom. The number of misls thus holding territories in `1770` was more than sixty. Above them was the Dal Khalsa with a chosen leader. |
| How did Mughal weakness and Abdali’s invasions shape misl politics until Ranjit Singh? | Anarchy as Opportunity; Unity of `1765`; Decentralisation until Sukerchakia Centralisation: The weakness of the Mughals and invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali created a general confusion and anarchy in Punjab. These political conditions helped the organised Dal Khalsa to consolidate further. The misls did unite on occasions, as they did in `1765` against the Afghans. But on the whole, political authority in Punjab remained decentralised and more horizontally dispersed during this whole period until Ranjit Singh, the chief of the Sukerchakia (Sukarchakiya) misl, tried to raise a more centralised Sikh state at the end of the eighteenth century. |
35. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839): Rise, Administration and Treaties with the English
35. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839): Rise, Administration and Treaties with the English
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Ranjit Singh rise from the Sukerchakia misl to conquer Lahore and central Punjab? | Birth 2 November `1780`; Mahan Singh; Zaman Shah `1798–99`; Twelve Misls; ‘Blood and Iron’: After repelling the third Afghan invasion under Abdali’s successor Zaman Shah in `1798–99`, Ranjit Singh emerged as one of the outstanding Sikh chiefs and conquered Lahore. At the time of the birth of Ranjit Singh (2 November `1780`), there were 12 important misls. Ranjit Singh was the son of Mahan Singh, the leader of the Sukarchakiya misl. Mahan Singh died when Ranjit Singh was only 12 years old. Towards the close of the 18th century, all the important misls (except Sukarchakiya) were in a state of disintegration. Afghanistan was also engulfed in a civil war due to a power struggle which went on for the next three decades. These events in the neighbouring regions were fully exploited by Ranjit Singh who followed a ruthless policy of ‘blood and iron’ and carved out for himself a kingdom in the central Punjab. Leading an army with improved artillery and infantry trained by European officers, by `1809` he had brought under his control large areas in the five doabs of Punjab. By the Treaty of Amritsar in that year the English recognised him as the sole sovereign ruler of Punjab. This gave him the opportunity to round his conquests off by ousting the Afghans from Multan and Kashmir and subduing most of the other Sikh chiefs, many of whom were reduced to the status of tribute-paying vassals. By the time of his death, his authority was recognised in territories between the river Sutlej and the mountain ranges of Ladakh, Karakoram, Hindukush and Sulaiman. |
| What was the character of Ranjit Singh’s administration and cultural incorporation? | Mughal Continuity; 40% Jagir; Kardars vs Clan Power; National–Local Dualism; Sahajdharis; Dogra Balance: Like the Marathas, the new administration introduced was a careful mix between the Mughal system and local traditions. Continuity of Mughal institutions was remarkable in the organisation of administrative divisions, in the nomenclature of officials, as well as in the tax collection system. Trade and commerce flourished in Punjab because a powerful state under Ranjit Singh provided safe passage to traders and their caravans; but still land revenue remained the main source of income for the state. And although the amount of land revenue collection increased, about 40 per cent of it was alienated as jagir. While in the rest of the territories land revenue was directly collected through *kardars*, this penetration of the state stopped at the village level and did not infringe upon the power of the clans and their chiefs. Local traditional hierarchies and the concept of a centralised monarchical state thus existed in a delicately balanced relationship, or in other words, in the dualism between ‘national’ and ‘local’ systems of governance. This process of incorporation and adjustment as a part of the construction of a monarchical state could be seen at the cultural level as well, where the Khalsa attempt to construct an exclusive Sikh identity gradually incorporated the non-Khalsa Sikhs or the *sahajdharis* as well. At the central level of durbar politics also Ranjit Singh maintained a careful balance between the powerful Sikh chiefs on the one hand and on the other freshly recruited military commanders from among the peasants of central Punjab and the non-Punjabi nobles, such as the Dogra Rajputs from Jammu. This delicate balancing game functioned well until Ranjit Singh’s death in `1839`. Within a decade of his death independent Sikh rule disappeared from Punjab, as struggle for power among the mighty Sikh chiefs and the royal family feuds helped the English to take over without much difficulty. |
| How did Ranjit Singh’s relations with the English evolve from Metcalfe (`1807`) through Amritsar (`1809`) to the Tripartite Treaty (`1838`)? | Franco-Russian Alarm; Failed Metcalfe Terms; Sutlej Boundary; Multan–Kashmir–Peshawar; Great Game: The prospects of a joint Franco-Russian invasion of India through the land-route had alarmed the English. In `1807`, Lord Minto sent Charles Metcalfe to Lahore. Ranjit Singh offered to accept Metcalfe’s proposal of an offensive and defensive alliance on the condition that the English would remain neutral in case of a Sikh–Afghan war and would consider Ranjit Singh the sovereign of the entire Punjab including the Malwa (cis-Sutlej) territories. However, the negotiations failed. In the changed political scenario in which the Napoleonic danger receded and the English became more assertive, Ranjit Singh agreed to sign the Treaty of Amritsar (25 April `1809`) with the Company. The Treaty of Amritsar was significant for its immediate as well as potential effects. The English recognised him as the sole sovereign ruler of Punjab. But it checked one of the most cherished ambitions of Ranjit Singh to extend his rule over the entire Sikh nation by accepting the river Sutlej as the boundary line for his dominions and the Company’s. Now he directed his energies towards the west and captured Multan (`1818`), Kashmir (`1819`) and Peshawar (`1834`). In June `1838`, Ranjit Singh was compelled by political compulsions to sign the Tripartite Treaty (between Ranjit Singh, Shah Shuja and Lord Auckland); however he refused to give passage to the British army through his territories to attack Dost Mohammad, the Afghan Amir. The Great Game involved Britain’s repeated attempts to impose a puppet government in Kabul. The British wanted Dost Mohammad to break all contact with the Iranians and Russians. This puppet was Shuja Shah. In `1838` Shuja Shah gained the support of the British and Maharaja Ranjit Singh for wresting power from Dost Mohammad Khan. This was the Tripartite Treaty which was signed in June `1838`. The relations of Raja Ranjit Singh with the Company, from `1809` to `1839`, clearly indicate the former’s weak position. Although he was conscious of his weak position, he took no step to organise a coalition of other Indian princes or maintain a balance of power. During his lifetime there was no major tension with the British; but after his death Punjab became politically unstable. He died in June `1839` and with his death the process of the decline of his empire began. |
| Year | Event under / with Ranjit Singh |
|---|---|
2 Nov 1780 | Birth; 12 important misls; son of Mahan Singh (Sukarchakiya) |
1798–99 | Repels Zaman Shah; conquers Lahore |
1807 | Charles Metcalfe mission (Lord Minto); negotiations fail |
25 Apr 1809 | Treaty of Amritsar — sole sovereign; Sutlej boundary |
1818 | Multan captured |
1819 | Kashmir captured |
1834 | Peshawar captured |
June 1838 | Tripartite Treaty (Ranjit–Shah Shuja–Auckland); refuses British army passage |
June 1839 | Death of Ranjit Singh; decline process begins |
36. Punjab After Ranjit Singh: Court Anarchy and Preconditions of Anglo-Sikh Confrontation
36. Punjab After Ranjit Singh: Court Anarchy and Preconditions of Anglo-Sikh Confrontation
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What succession battles and court conspiracies followed Ranjit Singh’s death in `1839`? | Kharak Singh; Nav Nihal Singh; Sher Singh vs Chand Kaur; Dhian Singh; Daleep Singh and Rani Jindan: A number of people ascended the throne in quick succession and the whole region was plunged into prolonged and bloody succession battles. Ranjit Singh’s only legitimate son and successor, Kharak Singh, was not efficient, and during the brief period of his reign, court factions became active. Kharak Singh’s sudden death in `1839` and the accidental death of his son, Prince Nav Nihal Singh (when he was returning from his father’s funeral), led to an anarchic situation in Punjab — e.g. the contest for throne between Sher Singh (another son of Ranjit Singh) and Maharani Chand Kaur, the widow of Kharak Singh. Sher Singh ultimately became the maharaja through a bizarre conspiracy hatched by the Dogras, and once again became dependent on the overmighty Dogra wazir, Raja Dhian Singh. But Sher Singh was murdered in late `1843`. Soon afterwards, Daleep Singh, a minor son of Ranjit Singh, was proclaimed the Maharaja with Rani Jindan as regent. Plans and counter plans of various groups to capture the throne of Lahore provided an opportunity for decisive action by the English. But what contributed to these family feuds and court conspiracies was the breakdown of the delicate balance of power that Ranjit Singh had carefully maintained between the hereditary Sikh chieftains and the upstarts, and between the Punjabi and Dogra nobles from Jammu in the royal court. |
| How did economic breakdown, army decay and British strategic rethink prepare the ground for war? | Corruption; Rising Revenue Demands; Kardar Extortion; Dead Generals; Buffer Scheme Abandoned (`1843`): Corruption in the bureaucracy and the internecine strife among the sardars put the Punjab economy into shambles. In the countryside, revenue demands increased after `1839` due to the rise in the cost of the army, resulting in zamindar resistance to revenue collection. On the other hand, the *kardars* increased their extortion of the landed zamindars and continued to defraud the central treasury. The developments only encouraged centrifugal tendencies within the Punjabi society. The commercial classes were disenchanted by political disruptions and the whole situation offered opportunities to the British to intervene. The army — the pillar of the Sikh state — was far less strong than it appeared to be. Ranjit Singh’s able generals — Mohkam Chand, Dewan Chand, Hari Singh Nalwa, and Ram Dayal — were already dead. Already discontent was growing among the troops as a result of irregularity of payment. The appointment of unworthy officers led to indiscipline. The Lahore government, continuing the policy of friendship with the English company, permitted the British troops to pass through its territory — once, when they were fleeing from Afghanistan, and again, when they were marching back to Afghanistan to avenge their defeat. These marches resulted in commotion and economic dislocation in Punjab. The prospect of there being no stable government in Lahore made the British concerned about Punjab. In the early nineteenth century the Company wanted to maintain the Sikh state as a buffer between its north Indian possessions on the one end and the Muslim powers in Persia and Afghanistan on the other. But continuous political instability made that scheme unworkable and so many in the early 1840s began to think of the inevitability of an Anglo-Sikh confrontation. Preparations for this on the British side began in `1843`. |
37. First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–46): Treaties of Lahore and Bhairowal
37. First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–46): Treaties of Lahore and Bhairowal
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the causes of the First Anglo-Sikh War, and how did treachery produce Sikh defeat? | Sutlej Crossing 11 December `1845`; Anarchy; Gwalior–Sindh–Afghanistan Suspicions; Lal Singh and Teja Singh: The immediate cause for the outbreak of the first of the Anglo-Sikh wars has been attributed to the action of the Sikh army crossing the River Sutlej on 11 December `1845`. This was seen as an aggressive manoeuvre that provided the English with the justification to declare war. Broader causes included: the anarchy in the Lahore kingdom following the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh resulting in a power struggle for domination between the court at Lahore and the ever powerful and increasingly local army; suspicions amongst the Sikh army arising from English military campaigns to achieve the annexation of Gwalior and Sindh in `1841` and the campaign in Afghanistan in `1842`; and the increase in the number of English troops being stationed near the border with the Lahore kingdom. The war began in December `1845` with 20,000 to 30,000 troops on the British side, while the Sikhs had about 50,000 men under the overall command of Lal Singh. But the treachery of Lal Singh and Teja Singh caused five successive defeats to the Sikhs. Lahore fell to the British forces on 20 February `1846` without a fight. Failure of leadership and treachery of some of the sardars led to the defeat of the formidable Sikh army. |
| What were the main features of the Treaty of Lahore (8 March `1846`) and the Kashmir sale to Gulab Singh? | Indemnity >1 Crore; Jalandhar Doab; Henry Lawrence; Army Reduction; Gulab Singh Pays Rs 75 Lakh: The end of the first Anglo-Sikh War forced the Sikhs to sign a humiliating treaty on 8 March `1846`. The main features of the Treaty of Lahore were as follows: war indemnity of more than 1 crore of rupees was to be given to the English; the Jalandhar Doab (between the Beas and the Sutlej) was annexed to the Company’s dominions; a British resident was to be established at Lahore under Henry Lawrence; the strength of the Sikh army was reduced; Daleep Singh was recognised as the ruler under Rani Jindan as regent and Lal Singh as wazir. Since the Sikhs were not able to pay the entire war indemnity, Kashmir including Jammu was sold to Gulab Singh and he was required to pay Rupees 75 lakh to the Company as the price. The transfer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh was formalised by a separate treaty on 16 March `1846`. |
| What did the Treaty of Bhairowal (December `1846`) change in Punjab’s political structure? | Rani Jindan Removed; Council of Eight under Henry Lawrence; Virtual Protectorate: The Sikhs were not satisfied with the Treaty of Lahore over the issue of Kashmir, so they rebelled. In December `1846`, the Treaty of Bhairowal was signed. According to the provisions of this treaty, Rani Jindan was removed as regent and a council of regency for Punjab was set up. The council consisted of 8 Sikh sardars presided over by the English Resident, Henry Lawrence. In the PYQ analytical layer, when on 16 December `1846` the Lahore Darbar was forced to sign the treaty of Bhyrowal (Bharoval), the kingdom of the Punjab was made a virtual British protectorate; another PYQ passage dates the treaty of Bhyrowal as 22 December `1846` and states that ever since then the Resident was the internal ruler of the Punjab and exercised all civil and administrative powers in the name of the Maharaja. The British assumed the guardianship of the young Maharaja Duleep Singh during his minority, and a British Resident was appointed to direct and control the entire civil and military administration of the State of Lahore with a council of ministers nominated by himself. For political, financial and military reasons, Lord Hardinge, the then Governor General of India, had avoided annexation of the territory. |
| Treaty / step | Date | Core terms |
|---|---|---|
| Treaty of Lahore | 8 March 1846 | Indemnity >1 crore; Jalandhar Doab annexed; Resident Henry Lawrence; Sikh army reduced; Daleep Singh + Rani Jindan + Lal Singh |
| Kashmir–Jammu sale | 16 March 1846 | Sold to Gulab Singh for Rs 75 lakh |
| Treaty of Bhairowal | Dec 1846 (also 16/22 Dec in PYQ layers) | Rani Jindan removed; 8-sardar council under Resident; virtual protectorate |
38. Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–49): Annexation and Board of Administration
38. Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–49): Annexation and Board of Administration
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What caused the Second Anglo-Sikh War and who provided the immediate pretext? | Humiliation of `1845–46`; Treatment of Rani Jindan; Mul Raj; Chattar Singh and Sher Singh; Dalhousie: The defeat in the first Anglo-Sikh War and the provisions of the treaties of Lahore and Bhairowal were highly humiliating for the Sikhs. Inhuman treatment meted out to Rani Jindan, who was sent to Benares as a pensioner, added to the resentment of the Sikhs. The immediate pretext for aggression was the rebellion of two Sikh governors, Diwan Mul Raj of Multan and Sardar Chartar/Chattar Singh Atariwala and his son Raja Sher Singh of Haripur. The then Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie, a hardcore expansionist, got the pretext to annex Punjab completely. He himself proceeded to Punjab. Three important battles were fought before the final annexation of Punjab. |
| What were the results of the Second Anglo-Sikh War and how was Punjab administered after annexation? | Surrender `1849`; Document 29 March `1849`; Board of Three; Chief Commissioner `1853`; Mutual Respect and `1857` Loyalty: Results included: surrender of the Sikh army and Sher Singh in `1849`; annexation of Punjab. On 29 March `1849` Maharaja Dalip Singh signed the document of annexation; Punjab hereafter became a province of the East India Company’s empire in India. A three-member board was set up to govern Punjab, comprising the Lawrence brothers (Henry and John) and Charles Mansel. For his services the Earl of Dalhousie was given the thanks of the British Parliament and a promotion in the peerage, as Marquess. In `1853` the board was nullified and Punjab was placed under a chief commissioner. John Lawrence became the first chief commissioner. The Anglo-Sikh wars gave the two sides a mutual respect for each other’s fighting prowess. The Sikhs were to fight loyally on the British side in the Revolt of `1857` and in many other campaigns and wars uptil the Indian independence in `1947`. |
| Outcome | Detail |
|---|---|
| Surrender | Sikh army and Sher Singh, 1849 |
| Annexation document | 29 March 1849 (Dalip Singh) — also given as annexation 2 April 1849 in PYQ layer |
| Board of Administration | Henry Lawrence, John Lawrence, Charles Mansel |
1853 | Board nullified; John Lawrence first chief commissioner |
| Later loyalty | Sikhs fight on British side in 1857 and up to 1947 |
39. Mains PYQ Analyses: Annexation of Punjab — Considerations and “Sacred Breach of Trust”
39. Mains PYQ Analyses: Annexation of Punjab — Considerations and “Sacred Breach of Trust”
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Q: Underline the major considerations of the British imperial power that led to the annexation of Punjab. | End of Sikh Sovereignty ~10 Years after Ranjit; Immediate Pretext; Dalhousie’s Imperialism; Strategic Frontier; Russophobia; Prestige after Afghan Debacle; Commercial Indus Route: The annexation of Punjab to British dominions in India on 2 April `1849` after defeating the Sikh army in the Second Anglo-Sikh War by Lord Dalhousie, the British governor general, put an end to the sovereignty of the Sikhs over northwestern India about 10 years after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Internal dissensions and treachery had caused the defeat of the Sikh army at the hands of the British in the first Anglo-Sikh war (`1845–46`). When on 16 December `1846` the Lahore Darbar was forced to sign the treaty of Bhyrowal (Bharoval), the kingdom of the Punjab was made a virtual British protectorate. Immediate pretext: The immediate pretext for aggression was the rebellion of two Sikh governors, Diwan Mul Raj of Multan and Sardar Chattar Singh Atariwala and his son Raja Sher Singh of Haripur. After defeat, Maharaja Dalip Singh signed the document of annexation; Punjab hereafter became a province of East India Company’s Empire in India. Imperialist policy of Lord Dalhousie: Lord Dalhousie was a great imperialist and if there occurred any possibility of annexing an Indian state, he did not miss it; to have an All India Empire were other major considerations. It is said that ‘Punjab’s fate after Ranjit Singh was foredoomed as the impulse of neo-Victorian Imperialism was bound to overwhelm it’. Annexation of Punjab was part of a broad north-west frontier policy set in motion after the exit of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and annexation of Punjab (`1849`) was logical sequence of the annexation of Sindh (`1843`). Strategic location: The British wanted a scientific and safe frontier in the North-West apart from Punjab being a buffer state between British India and Afghanistan and Persia. But after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, there was instability in Punjab which would have been dangerous for British India and this was one of the reasons of the annexation of Punjab. Russophobia: The conquest of Punjab was also as a result of the growing Anglo-Russian rivalry and the consequent British fears that Russia might attack India through the north-west region as British were apprehensive of the Russian design in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Compensating lost prestige: One of the reasons of the annexation of Punjab was the debacle of British in the First Anglo-Afghan War (`1839–42`) which was great humiliation for British and setback to its invincibility. British had felt need for a conquest to compensate the loss of the prestige after debacle in the First Anglo-Afghan war. First they annexed Sindh and next in the sequence was Punjab. Commercial consideration: British had commercial interest in Punjab as Indus river linked Punjab to sea route and hence making it important trade route as well as important for military consideration. Punjab also had fertile land which was commercially important for British for revenue purpose as well as for commercial plantation. |
| Q: “The annexation of the Punjab was no annexation, it was a sacred breach of trust.” Comment. [10 Marks] | Guardian of Minor Duleep Singh; Resident as Internal Ruler; Army Rebellion not Maharaja’s; Currie vs Dalhousie: The annexation of Punjab to British dominions in India on 2 April `1849` after defeating the Sikh army in the Second Anglo-Sikh War by Lord Dalhousie put an end to the sovereignty of the Sikhs over northwestern India about 10 years after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Internal dissensions and treachery had caused the defeat of the Sikh army in the first Anglo-Sikh war (`1845–46`). When on 16 December `1846` the Lahore Darbar was forced to sign the treaty of Bhyrowal (Bharoval), the kingdom of the Punjab was made a virtual British protectorate. The British assumed the guardianship of the young Maharaja Duleep Singh during his minority, and a British Resident was appointed to direct and control the entire civil and military administration of the State of Lahore with a council of ministers nominated by himself. For political, financial and military reasons, Lord Hardinge had avoided annexation of the territory. The ultimate British aim was full annexation of Punjab, which was achieved by Governor General Lord Dalhousie after the victory in the Second Anglo-Sikh War in `1849`. The immediate pretext for aggression was the rebellion of two Sikh governors, Diwan Mul Raj of Multan and Sardar Chattar Singh Atariwala and his son Raja Sher Singh of Haripur. After defeat, on 29 March `1849` Maharaja Dalip Singh signed the document of annexation; Punjab hereafter became a province of East India Company’s Empire in India. Ever since the treaty of Bhyrowal (22 December `1846`) the Resident was the internal ruler of the Punjab and exercised all civil and administrative powers in the name of Maharaja. It was Sikh army and not the Maharaja or the Council of Regency which had risen in rebellion. As the Regent for the Maharaja, it was bounden duty of Fredrick Currie, the British Resident, to suppress the rebellion of Mul Raj or the Sikh army. Since the Maharaja could not be held responsible for the rebellion, it was evidently unjust to deprive him of his kingdom on that plea. The English Company through the Resident was acting as the guardian of the minor Maharaja and when it annexed the kingdom of the ward it was evidently a sacred breach of trust. Having once recognised and undertaken to protect Dalip Singh by British, it was mockery to punish him for the fault of his subjects. Dalhousie’s announcement that he considered the state of Lahore to all intents and purposes to be directly at war with the British Government greatly puzzled Fredrick Currie, the British Resident at Lahore, who was the administrator of the Punjab. Dalhousie was, however, up for a higher game and was determined to annex the Punjab on one plea or the other. |
| Consideration | Analytical core (from source PYQ answer) |
|---|---|
| Immediate pretext | Mul Raj (Multan); Chattar Singh Atariwala & Sher Singh (Haripur) |
| Dalhousie’s imperialism | Neo-Victorian impulse; All-India Empire; logical sequel to Sindh (1843) |
| Strategic location | Scientific NW frontier; buffer vs Afghanistan & Persia; post-Ranjit instability |
| Russophobia | Anglo-Russian rivalry; fear of attack via NW through Afghanistan/Central Asia |
| Lost prestige | First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42) humiliation → Sindh then Punjab |
| Commercial | Indus sea-link; fertile land for revenue and commercial plantation |
| “Sacred breach of trust” | Guardian of minor Duleep Singh annexes ward’s kingdom for subjects’ rebellion |
UPSC Relevance
UPSC Relevance
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What Mains angles does this note support under Modern Indian History? | Key Angles UPSC Targets:
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I'll read the specified section of the notes file and convert every PYQ analysis and historical argument into VitePress Cornell Notes format with full fidelity.Checking an existing Cornell Notes example for format consistency, and reading a bit past line 270 so the Salbai section doesn't cut off mid-point.Checking for an existing Modern India Cornell Notes file to match the project's structure.Producing zero-loss Cornell Notes for every PYQ in that range. Completing the Salbai answer (it cuts off mid-point at line 270) from the same source so the treaty analysis stays intact.```markdown
Ruin of Handicraft Industries under the East India Company
Write a critical note on: “Consequences of the ruin of handicraft industries under the rule of the East India Company.”
The ruin of traditional industries (handicrafts) was the product of the establishment of British rule in India. This was mainly due to the competition posed by the machine-made goods that were imported from Britain. The ability of mass production of goods helped Britain to flood the Indian markets with cheap products especially cotton textiles. The railways facilitated the reach of these goods to remotest parts in India and the procurement of raw materials from these parts. The traditional handicrafts industry faced a tough competition from these goods produced in bulk. Indian goods were also subjected to high tariffs in the English market whereas the British goods gained duty-free access into the Indian markets.
Ruin of Handicraft Industries under EIC | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| Why were traditional handicrafts ruined under Company rule? |
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| What were the negative consequences of the ruin of handicrafts? |
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| What were the positive / long-run structural consequences? |
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Treaty of Bassein, 1802 — “Changed the Footing” (Dean Hutton)
“The Treaty of Bassein, 1802 was‚ a step which changed the footing on which we the English stood in western India. It trebled the English responsibilities in an instant.” Comment.
The Treaty of Bassein was concluded in 1802 between the British East India Company and the Peshwa Baji Rao II, when Peshwa Baji Rao II fled to British protection after having been defeated by Holkar. In the words of historian Dean Hutton: “a step which changed the footing in which we (the English) stood in Western India. It trebled the English responsibilities in an instant.”
Treaty of Bassein 1802 — Footing & Responsibilities | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| Background: why was Bassein signed (1802)? |
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| How did Bassein change English footing and treble responsibilities? |
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Sindh Conquest 1843 — “Humane Piece of Rascality” (Charles Napier)
“We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be.” Comment.
Conquest of Sindh 1843 | |
|---|---|
| Cue Words | Notes |
| Why was Sindh strategically and commercially important for the British? |
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| How was Sindh annexed (1839–1843)? |
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| Why was annexation of Sindh totally unjustified? |
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| What did contemporaries say about the ‘rascality’? |
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Treaty of Bassein 1802 — “Wise, Just and a Politic Measure” (Wellesley)
“Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein was wise, just and a politic measure.” Comment.
The Treaty of Bassein was concluded in 1802 between the British East India Company and the Peshwa Baji Rao II, when Peshwa Baji Rao II fled to British protection after having been defeated by Holkar. As per the treaty, Peshwa agreed to receive from the company a regular army to be stationed in Poona. Peshwa had to surrender territories yielding 26 lakhs of rupees apart from surrendering Surat. The Peshwa had to accept the company’s arbitration in all differences between him and the other states. This treaty was an important landmark in the history of British paramountcy in India. It put an end to the Maratha independence and gave the Company unquestionable supremacy over Maratha state. The treaty was not acceptable to leading Maratha chiefs and hence followed by 2nd Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1806).
Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control, criticised the treaty by saying that it appeared “hopeless to govern the Maratha Empire through a feeble and perhaps disaffected Peshwa.” The treaty which provided for the Peshwa’s acceptance of the British arbitrations in his disputes with other powers was according to Castlereagh fraught with the danger of involving the English in the endless and complicated distractions of the turbulent Maratha Empire.
Major General Arthur Wellesley, while replying to the criticism of the political wisdom of the treaty of Bassein, called the treaty a wise, just and politic measure.
Bassein 1802 — Wise, Just & Politic (Wellesley’s Defence) | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| What were the main terms of the Treaty of Bassein (1802)? |
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| What was Castlereagh’s criticism of Bassein? |
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| Why did Wellesley call Bassein wise, just and politic? |
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Rebellion of 1857 — Symbol of Challenge to British Power
“Whatever might have been its original character, it (Rebellion of 1857) soon became a symbol of challenge to the mighty British power in India.” Comment.
There has been a great controversy amongst the scholars over the character of the 1857 rebellion.
1857 Rebellion — Character & Symbolic Legacy | |
|---|---|
| Cue Words | Notes |
| What were the rival interpretations of the character of 1857? |
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| How did 1857 become a symbol of challenge despite failure? |
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Safety-Valve Theory & Foundation of the Indian National Congress
Discuss ‘the safety valve’ theory. Does it satisfactorily explain the foundation of the Indian National Congress?
The Safety-valve thesis was a conspiracy theory relating to the birth of the Congress. The thesis originated from William Wedderburn’s biography of Hume published in 1913.
Safety-Valve Theory & INC Foundation | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| What is the safety-valve thesis (Wedderburn–Hume–Dufferin story)? |
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| Why does safety-valve thesis NOT satisfactorily explain INC foundation? |
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Arya Samaj as Outcome of Western Conditions (Lala Lajpat Rai)
“The Arya Samaj may quite logically be pronounced as the outcomes of conditions imported into India by the west.” (Lala Lajpat Rai). Comment.
Arya Samaj was founded by Dayanand Saraswati in 1875 as a socio-religious movement which aimed at reforming Hinduism through propagation of the infallibility of Vedas as the source of all truths. The opposition of idolatry, polytheism, rituals, caste system and child marriage and support for widow remarriage, inter-caste marriage and female education were reform policies of Arya Samaj. Authors are divided on the question of the extent to which western influence shaped the policy of reformers like Dayanand Saraswati.
Arya Samaj & Western Influence Debate | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| What was Arya Samaj’s reform programme (Dayanand, 1875)? |
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| First viewpoint: Arya Samaj as outcome of Western conditions |
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| Second viewpoint: Arya Samaj not influenced by the West |
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| Balanced conclusion on Arya Samaj and the West |
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Social Composition of Early Congress Leadership
Analyze the social composition of the early Congress leadership.
Early Congress Leadership — Social Composition | |
|---|---|
| Cue Words | Notes |
| What was the social composition of early Congress leadership? |
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Why Congress Accepted Partition of India in 1947
Discuss as to why the Congress accepted the partition of India in 1947.
Congress had a two-fold task during freedom movements: (a) Integrating diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation; (b) Securing independence from British rulers for this emerging nation. While Congress succeeded in building up a nationalist consciousness sufficient to exert pressure on British to quit India, it failed in completing the task of welding the nation, especially in integrating the Muslim community into the nation. This was the Success–Failure dichotomy for Congress. This contradiction — the success and failure of the national movement — is reflected in the other contradiction — independence but with partition. The Congress accepted partition due to several prevailing circumstances and not because of its lust for immediate power.
Congress Acceptance of Partition 1947 | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| What was Congress’s Success–Failure dichotomy leading to partition? |
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| (1) Why was acceptance the final act of a long process of concessions? |
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| (2–4) Mountbatten Plan, League mobilisation, unrelenting League |
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| (5–8) Communal violence, strong Centre preference, immediate freedom, reunification hope |
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English Utilitarianism & Paternalism in India
“Sprung from Paternalism the English Utilitarian Philosophy as introduced in India rejected its human warmth between rulers and the ruled.” Comment.
Utilitarianism, Paternalism & Loss of Human Warmth | |
|---|---|
| Cue Words | Notes |
| What was English Utilitarian philosophy and how did it link to colonial paternalism? |
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| How did Utilitarian paternalism reject human warmth between rulers and ruled? |
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Bengal Base + Command of the Sea (Plassey Aftermath vs Pondicherry/French Position)
“Neither Alexander the Great nor Napoleon could have won the empire of India by starting from Pondicherry as a base and contending with a power which held Bengal and command of the Sea.” Comment.
Note on Plassey–Buxar continuum in this PYQ: The answer frames English occupation of Bengal in 1757 (Plassey) as unlocking inexhaustible wealth and a mainland base that French Pondicherry could never match. The strategic logic that ‘verdict of Plassey’ required consolidation (classically completed at Buxar 1764 in related PYQs) is here expressed as Bengal resources + naval supremacy making French continental designs impossible.
The English occupation of Bengal in 1757 enabled them to use the inexhaustible source of wealth and material resources of Bengal for fighting against the French. Bengal was rich due to fertile land and trade. Bengal was also strategically important. It gave the English a firm base of operation on the mainland. Bengal had an excellent harbour useful in trade and military supply. Ganges and its tributaries in Bengal offered opportunity to the British to approach its remote parts by means of boats without any hazard. They collected Bengal gold and sent its men continuously to fight their battle in Madras.
At that time French were facing great financial difficulties. The resources that French could get from the Deccan and Carnatic with Pondicherry as a base were quite inadequate. Deccan was less fertile than Bengal. It could finance neither wild political ambition of Dupleix nor the reckless military schemes of Lally. French had a harbour and sea base at Mauritius, but it was distant and ill-equipped. Both for commercial purposes and for purposes of war the French seat of power was less advantageous compared to that of the English.
Bengal + Sea Power vs Pondicherry Base (V.A. Smith) | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| Why did holding Bengal (post-1757/Plassey) give English an unbeatable base? |
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| Why was Pondicherry an inferior French base vs Bengal? |
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| How did English command of the sea destroy French designs? |
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Third Mysore War (1790–92) — Circumstances & Could Cornwallis Have Avoided It?
Examine the circumstances which led to the Third Mysore War. Could Cornwallis have avoided it?
Third Anglo-Mysore War 1790–92 | |
|---|---|
| Cue Words | Notes |
| What circumstances led to the Third Mysore War (1790–92)? |
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| Could Cornwallis have avoided the Third Mysore War? |
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Commercialisation of Indian Agriculture — Meaning & Results [60 Marks]
What do you mean by commercialisation of Indian Agriculture? Discuss its result.
Commercialisation of agriculture is a phenomenon where agriculture is governed by commercial consideration i.e. certain specialised crops began to be grown not for consumption in village but for sale in national and international market. Commercialisation of agriculture in India began during British rule. It became prominent around 1860 A.D. (during American Civil War which boosted demand of Cotton from India to Britain as America was not able to export Cotton). The commercialisation of Indian Agriculture was done primarily to feed the British industries — taken up and achieved only in cases of those agricultural products which were either needed by British industries or could fetch cash commercial gain to the British in the European or American market. For example, several efforts were made to increase production of cotton in India to provide raw and good quality cotton to cotton-textile industries of Britain growing fast after the Industrial Revolution. Indigo, tea and coffee plantations were encouraged because these could get commercial market abroad. Jute received attention because jute-made products got a ready market in America and Europe. Most of the plantations for commercial crops were controlled by the English.
Commercialisation of Indian Agriculture | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| Define commercialisation of Indian agriculture under British rule |
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| Negative results of commercialisation |
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| Positive results of commercialisation |
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Treaty of Salbai (1782) — Neither Honourable nor Advantageous to the English
“The Treaty of Salbai (1782) was neither honorable to the English nor advantageous to their interests.” Comment.
The First Anglo-Maratha War (1775–1782) happened when the British interfered in Maratha affairs backing Raghunath Rao for Peshwaship against Madhavrao II who was supported by Nana Phadnavis. The Treaty of Salbai was signed in 1782 between the British and the Marathas after the First Anglo-Maratha War. Both sides had tasted each other’s strength which ensured mutual respect and peace for the next 20 years.
The English restored to the Peshwa all places captured by them during the war except island of Shashti (Sashti) and small islands near Bombay. The Company retained control of Salsette and Broach. The Marathas also guaranteed that the French would be prohibited from establishing settlements on their territories. In return, the British acknowledged Madhavrao II as Peshwa of the Maratha Empire. Marathas agreed to pay Raghunathrav an allowance. Both sides decided not to molest each other’s allies. The British would enjoy trade privilege as before. Peshwa was not to support any other European nation.
Treaty of Salbai 1782 — Honour & Advantage Debate | |
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| Cue Words | Notes |
| Background & main terms of the Treaty of Salbai (1782) |
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| Why was Salbai neither honourable nor advantageous to the English? |
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| Counter views — long-run British advantage & Maratha losses |
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