Peasant, Tribal Uprisings & Revolt of 1857
High-Yield Fact Sheet
📊 High-Yield Data & Statistical Fact Sheet
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| List chronological anchors, named actors, quantitative markers and Acts for Rangpur Dhing, Kol, Moplah, Santal Hul, Indigo Revolt, Deccan Uprising (Chunk 1); Munda Ulgulan, Pabna Revolt, Great Revolt of 1857 Causes & Outbreak (Chunk 2); and 1857 Storm Centres, Suppression, Failure & Character, Post-1857 peasant shift, and 20th-century Kisan Movements (Chunk 3). | Rangpur Dhing (`1783`) Anchors:
Kol Rebellion (
Moplah / Mappila Rebellion (
Santal Hul (
Indigo Revolt (
Deccan Uprising (
Munda Ulgulan (
Pabna Revolt (
Great Revolt of
Great Revolt of
Post-
20th-Century Kisan Movement Anchors:
|
Overview
Overview
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What is the central historical problem of peasant, tribal and 1857 resistance in this note for UPSC Mains? | From Ijaradari Dhing through Munda Ulgulan and Pabna to the Outbreak of `1857`: Peasant and tribal risings of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries register successive modes of resistance to the Company’s (and later Crown’s) fiscal extraction and to the non-tribal agents — *ijardars*, *jenmis*, *dikus*, planters and *sahukars* — who implemented or exploited the new property and revenue order. The Rangpur Dhing of `1783` exposed the evils of Warren Hastings’s *Ijaradari* farming under Debi Singh and Gangagobinda Singh: ryots after failed petition to Goodland elected Kena Sarkar as “nawab,” invoked pre-colonial state symbols (Dewan, Bakshi), held Tepa–Kazirhat–Kakina for five weeks, and fought as joint Hindu–Muslim force until Pattong and Hastings’s troops restored order — paving the path toward a permanent settlement and standing as precursor of later Bengal risings. Tribal autonomy crises produced the Kol uprising of `1831–32` in Chota Nagpur–Singbhum after Porhat taxation of the Hoes, Mahajan interest at 70 per cent or more, and transfer of Munda lands to Sikh and Muslim revenue farmers; arson and plunder against outsiders (carpenters and blacksmiths spared) “wiped off the Raj from Chota Nagpore in a matter of weeks” until troops from Calcutta, Danapur and Benares restored order. In Malabar the Moplah (Mappila) series from `1836` to `1921` fused class and religious overtones: Arab-descended and convert peasantry (*kanamdar*/*verumpattamdar*) against Hindu *jenmi* after British absolute ownership reversed the traditional three-way share and the Mysorean interlude; twenty-two outbreaks (`1836–54`), messianic *Ahadis*, and the `1921` climax after Manjeri/Khilafat mobilisation, the Tirurangadi mosque raid and Ali Musaliar’s arrest — ending in communalisation, Besant and Sankaran Nair’s denunciations, and political demoralisation till independence. The Santal Hul of `1855` under Sidhu, Kanhu, Chand and Bhairav Murmu in *Damin-i-koh* against the “unholy trinity” of zamindar, mahajan (50–500 per cent interest) and government collapsed Company rule between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal until blank-fire treachery and 15,000–20,000 deaths forced the Santal Parganas Tenancy Act `1856`. Post-`1857`, the Indigo Revolt (`1859–60`) combined spontaneous *Nilbidroha* (dadon, *lathyals*, Biswas brothers, Kader Molla, Rafique Mondal, Ramratan Mullick) with constitutional agitation (Grant, Rent Act X `1859`, Indigo Commission, Tower’s “human blood” line, *Nil Darpan*–Long–Hindoo Patriot) and wiped indigo from Bengal by end-`1860`. The Deccan Uprising of `1875` under Ryotwari — cotton boom and crash (`1861–65`), 50–100 per cent revenue hike, Kunbi–Marwari/Gujarati sahukar tension (Kumar vs Catanach vs Charlesworth), Kardab social boycott and Supe bond-burning of 12 May — yielded the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act `1879`. The millenarian tribal strand continued in the Munda Ulgulan of `1899–1900` under Birsa Munda (“Birsa Bhagwan”): defence of *Khuntkatti* against *dikus* and *beth-begari*, wasteland agitation (`1893–94`), self-declaration as god (`1894`), Christmas Eve armed struggle (`24 December `1899`), aim of “Birsa Raj and a Birsaite religion,” martyrdom in Ranchi jail (`9 June `1900`), and the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act `1908` recognising Khuntkatti and banning forced labour. In East Bengal the Pabna Revolt (`1873`–early `1880s`) organised the Yusufshahi Agrarian League’s rent-strikes and legal resistance against rent enhancement and denial of occupancy under Act X of `1859`, spread through Dacca–Mymensingh–Tripura–Bakarganj–Faridpur–Bogra–Rajshahi, secured imperfect protection under the Bengal Tenancy Act `1885`, and exposed middle-class ambivalence (Bankim Chandra Chatterjea and R.C. Dutt vs *Hindoo Patriot*/*Amrita Bazar Patrika* pro-landlord; Indian Association under Surendranath Banerjee for the Rent Bill). The Great Revolt of `1857` is framed not as greased-cartridge monism but as the explosion of a century of economic ruin (Marx `1853`; Awadh’s 21,000 taluqdars), political annexation (Doctrine of Lapse, Subsidiary Alliance, Oudh `1856`, Canning’s Mughal title renunciation), administrative *quo warranto* and Inam Commission confiscations (20,000 estates; Coverly Jackson in Oudh), socio-religious intrusion (Religious Disabilities Act `1856`; missionaries), and military grievances (General Service Enlistment Act `1856`; Post Office Act `1854`; Enfield cartridges) — erupting from Berhampur (`February `1857`) through Mangal Pandey (`29 March`) and Meerut (`10 May`) to the sepoys’ appeal at Delhi (`11 May`) and the proclamation of Bahadur Shah as *Shahenshah-e-Hindustan*, which transformed mutiny into revolutionary war. Together these movements supply Mains frames on agrarian class conflict, tribal political action versus crime, middle-class mediation and ambivalence, communal harmony versus communalisation of peasant protest, colonial remedial legislation short of structural anti-colonial consciousness, and the multi-causal architecture of the `1857` outbreak. Chunk 3 completes the Great Revolt with its storm centres and leaders — General Bakht Khan at Delhi, Nana Saheb and Tantia Tope at Kanpur, Begum Hazrat Mahal and Birjis Qadir at Lucknow, Khan Bahadur at Bareilly, Kunwar Singh in Bihar, Maulvi Ahmadullah at Faizabad, Rani Laxmibai at Jhansi and the Gwalior episode under a loyal Sindhia — and with civil participation (peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, day labourers, zamindars, mendicants, priests, civil servants) that gave the rising the character of a popular revolt, including destruction of debt records and attacks on tehsils and police stations. Suppression ran from the September `1857` recapture of Delhi (John Nicholson killed; Lieut Hodson shooting the Emperor’s sons and grandson) through Colin Campbell’s recovery of Lucknow and Kanpur and Sir Hugh Rose’s capture of Jhansi (`3 April `1858`) and Gwalior (`June `1858`, Rani died fighting; Tantia hanged `April `1859`), to the near-complete end of rebellion by July `1858` and the deaths or flight of the principal leaders by `1859`, with Indians repaying the entire cost of suppression. Causes of failure include limited territorial and social spread (about one-fourth of area and one-tenth of population; Bombay and Madras armies loyal; big zamindars as “breakwaters to storm”; modern educated Indians viewing the revolt as backward-looking), superior British resources after Crimean and Chinese wars (`1,12,000` British troops; `3,10,000` additional Indian recruits; Enfield; telegraph), poor organisation and absence of a common programme beyond anti-foreign sentiment, and active help from princes (Patiala, Jhind, Gwalior, Hyderabad; Dinkar Rao; Salar Jang) whom Canning rewarded (Berar to Nizam; Oudh territory to Nepal). The revolt is assessed as mainly feudal in character carrying some nationalistic elements, with complete Hindu–Muslim cooperation during the rising (Bahadur Shah as emperor; ban on cow slaughter; Azimullah with Nana Saheb; Afghan support for Laxmibai). The post-`1857` shift in peasant movements features greater legal awareness, middle-class mediation (Ravinder Kumar’s “channel of communication” versus Ranajit Guha’s paternalism–humanism concoction and “futility of liberalism”), limited economic aims against immediate enemies rather than colonialism itself, and colonial compromise short of structural change — weaknesses overcome in the twentieth century when peasant discontent merged with the anti-imperialist movement. Twentieth-century kisan politics then run from the UP Kisan Sabha (`1918`) and Baba Ramchandra’s *nai-dhobi bandhs*, through the Awadh Kisan Sabha (`October `1920`), the Eka Movement (`1921–22`) under Madari Pasi, the Bardoli Satyagraha (`1928`) under Vallabhbhai Patel (30% hike reduced to 6.03%), the All India Kisan Sabha (`1936`, Lucknow) of Swami Sahajanand Saraswati and N.G. Ranga with the Kisan Manifesto and Faizpur agrarian programme, high-water-mark mobilisation under Congress Ministries (`1937–39`), wartime People’s War split, to the post-war Tebhaga (Floud Commission; *bargardars*; one-third share) and the Telangana guerrilla war against the Nizam’s *vethi* and feudal order via the Andhra Mahasabha — movements that eroded landed power, popularised zamindari abolition, and remained indissolubly linked with the national freedom struggle. |
1. Rangpur Dhing (1783) — Background and Colonial Revenue Context
1. Rangpur Dhing (1783) — Background and Colonial Revenue Context
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why is the Rangpur rebellion of `1783` treated as an ideal example of peasant initiative against British rule? | Peasant Initiative in Northern Bengal: The peasants themselves often on their own initiative offered resistance to British rule. The Rangpur rebellion of `1783` in the northern districts of Bengal is an ideal example of such opposition. In `1783` Rangpur became the scene of a formidable peasant revolt caused by gross acts of provocation from the land revenue farmer or *ijardar*. |
| How did acquisition of the Diwani (`1765`) structure the Company’s fiscal drive and conflict with the population? | Diwani Wealth and Violent Conflict: The acquisition of the right to collect Bengal’s territorial revenues in `1765` presented the British East India Company with access to a potentially vast source of wealth. In attempting to exploit fully this revenue-bearing territory, Company officials were brought into violent conflict with the overburdened population — an example of which is the Dhing, or peasant rebellion, in the northern district of Rangpur in `1783`. After acquisition of the Diwani, the first object of the Company was to raise as large a sum from the country as could be collected. |
| What did Henry Verelst observe about the post-Diwani period? | Verelst on Oppression and Intrigues:Henry Verelst, who became the Governor of Bengal in January `1767`, observed that in the period following the acquisition of Diwani there had been oppression and intrigues unknown at any other period. During the years of the Diwani, the Rangpur district was overburdened with very large demands. |
| How did the five-year settlement of `1772` and the shift to annual settlements deepen the crisis? | Five-Year Failure (`1772`–`1777`) and Annual Experiments: When the five-year settlement was introduced in `1772`, the district was already in a languishing condition. Yet the rate of assessment was further increased. The Collector of the district admitted that it was beyond the capacity of the district to bear the increased burden. By the year `1777` the five-year settlement proved to be a failure. The Company insisted on annual settlements — a system which they had condemned earlier. There followed another period of indecisive experiments till the permanent settlement was introduced. |
| How did the European collector and Indian *ijardar* jointly oppress the peasantry? | Collector–Ijardar Dyad and Illicit Opportunity: The European collector operated in tandem with an Indian revenue farmer (*ijardar*), who had been contracted to pay a set amount of tax to the Company, and whose profit lay in any surplus he could extort from his cultivators. Likewise, for the collector a district posting provided considerable opportunity to benefit from illicit private trade and the misappropriation of government funds. Hence, in the early days of the revenue farming system, the peasantry was oppressed by the revenue contractors and company officials, imposing high revenue demands and often collecting illegal cesses. |
| Who were Debi Singh and Gangagobinda Singh, and what was the immediate cause of the rising? | Debi Singh, Gangagobinda Singh, and Disposal of Holdings: All sorts of compulsion were employed against the zamindars to enforce payment of the heavy demand of the farmer. As the demands and exactions of the farmer increased, the zamindars passed on their burden to the ryots. In a mass petition, the ryots stated: “We raiyats are ruined. In our house we have nothing left, our grain, our cattle, and other effects we have sold.” The worst offenders were revenue contractors like Debi Singh or Gangagobinda Singh, who had unleashed a reign of terror in the villages of Rangpur and Dinajpur districts. Debi Singh, appointed *ijardar* of Rangpur and Dinajpur in `1780`, practised untold severity to realise the revenue. The immediate cause of the rising was the large-scale disposal of the agricultural holdings of the defaulting ryots at nominal price. As the petition sent to Goodland, the chief of the district, failed to produce any relief, the ryots took the law into their own hands. |
2. Rangpur Dhing — Course, Leadership and Pre-Colonial Symbols
2. Rangpur Dhing — Course, Leadership and Pre-Colonial Symbols
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the rebellion of the ryots unfold after the failed petition? | Petition, Army and Attack on Cutchery (`18 January `1783`): The peasants initially sent a petition to the Company’s government asking for redress. But when their appeal for justice went unheeded, they organised themselves, elected their own leader, raised a huge army, equipped themselves with primitive bows, arrows and swords, attacked the local *cutchery* (a court of law), looted grain stores and forcibly released prisoners. On 18 January `1783`, the uprising took place. For full five weeks the rebels were virtually in control of the parganas of Tepa, Kazirhat and Kakina in the district of Rangpur. The mass character of the revolt is reflected in the huge assemblage of peasants irrespective of their caste and community. |
| Who led the rebels and how did they legitimise a parallel government? | Kena Sarkar as “Nawab”; Dewan and Bakshi:Kena Sarkar of Gotamari in the pargana of Kakina was the main leader of the uprising. The rebels formed a government of their own. They sought to legitimise their movement by invoking what Sugata Bose has called “the symbols of the pre-colonial state system.” They called their leader “nawab.” They appointed officers like the Dewan and the Bakshi to run a regular government. The rebel government issued proclamations forbidding all payments of revenue to the existing government. It levied tax to defray the expenses of the uprising. The trouble spread to Dinajpur. Both Hindu and Muslim peasants fought side by side. |
| How was the Dhing suppressed and what followed? | Hastings’s Troops, Pattong (`22 February`) and Limited Reforms: On Debi Singh’s appeal, the Company’s government under Warren Hastings sent troops to put down the rebellion, and troops with the Collector of Rangpur, Goodland, took measures to put down the insurrection. On 22 February, the rebels made a desperate attempt at Pattong. In the battle that ensued, a great many were killed and many taken prisoner. It was an unequal fight. A reign of terror was unleashed throughout the district of Rangpur. Its brutal suppression was, however, followed by some reforms in the revenue farming system. |
3. Rangpur Dhing — Causes, Significance and Lineage of Later Risings
3. Rangpur Dhing — Causes, Significance and Lineage of Later Risings
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the assigned causes of the Rangpur uprising of `1783`? | Ijaradari Speculation, Highest Burden and Combined Rebellion: The Rangpur uprising is called the first formidable peasant uprising against the rule of the East India Company. First, the period of Warren Hastings was marked by several experiments in land settlement. Under the *Ijaradari* system, land was farmed out for, say, one or five years. Naturally the *Ijaradar* wanted to squeeze out as much money as possible during the period for which the land was taken by him. Thus the *Ijaradar* was basically a speculator in land. The Rangpur uprising took place because the burden of revenue was placed at the highest on the zamindars. Second, failure to pay revenue would deprive the zamindar of his estate. Third, alongside the revenue other illegal demands made the total demand so high that the ryots were unable to pay even after selling their wives and children. Fourth, as remedial measures the ryots and the zamindars combined to rebel against the *Ijaradar* — in this case Devi Singh, the *ijaradar* of Rangpur and Dinajpur. |
| What was the significance of the Rangpur Dhing? | Exposure of Colonial Chain, Weakness of Farming, Path to Permanent Settlement: The rebellion of `1783` clearly exposed the evils associated with the system of colonial exploitation. All the native agents of the East India Company were linked with the Company’s high officials in the same chain in oppressing the people of the country. Rangpur rebellion made clear the evils of the *Ijaradari* system. Devi Singh showed the way how people could be exploited beyond their endurance. The peasant uprising of `1783` exposed the weakness of the farming (*Ijaradari*) system. Farmer having no certainty of holding lands beyond the year made no improvements. Pressed with the uncertainty of their situation, they raised the rents, to the last farthing, on the wretched tenants. Rangpur uprising paved the way for devising a land settlement that would be permanent in nature. Both Hindu and Muslim peasants fought side by side. The peasants initially sent a petition to the Company’s government asking for redress. |
| Of which later Bengal peasant risings was Rangpur a precursor? | Lineage — Wahabi/Farazi, Santhal, Indigo, Pabna: This rebellion was precursor of a long series of peasant risings in Bengal. Among these, main rebellions were: the Wahabi and Farazi rising (`1830–70`); the Santhal rebellion (`1855`); the Indigo revolt (`1860`); the peasant rising in Pabna. |
4. Tribal Autonomy under Threat — Bhils, Kolis and the Path to the Kol Rising
4. Tribal Autonomy under Threat — Bhils, Kolis and the Path to the Kol Rising
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did some pre-`1857` peasant rebellions become exclusively tribal? | Political Autonomy and Non-Tribal Agents: Some of the peasant rebellions in pre-`1857` India were participated in exclusively by the tribal population whose political autonomy and control over local resources were threatened by the establishment of British rule and the advent of its non-tribal agents. |
| What was the course of Bhil resistance in Khandesh after `1818`? | Bhils, `1819` Insurrection and Umaji Raje (`1831`): The Bhils, for example, were concentrated in the hill ranges of Khandesh in the previous Maratha territory. British occupation of this region in `1818` brought in the outsiders and accompanying dislocations in their community life. A general Bhil insurrection in `1819` was crushed by the British military forces and though some conciliatory measures were taken to pacify them, the situation remained unsettled until `1831` when the Ramoshi leader Umaji Raje of Purandhar was finally captured and executed. |
| How did the Kolis of Ahmadnagar challenge British power? | Kolis `1829` and `1844–46`: The Bhils’ local rivals for power, the Kolis of Ahmadnagar district, also challenged the British in `1829`, but were quickly subdued by a large army contingent. The seeds of rebellion however persisted, to erupt again in `1844–46`, when a local Koli leader successfully defied the British government for two years. |
5. Kol Rebellion (1831–32) — Porhat Prelude, Causes and Course
5. Kol Rebellion (1831–32) — Porhat Prelude, Causes and Course
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Where did the Kol uprising take place and who inhabited the region? | Chota Nagpur–Singbhum; Kols, Hoes, Mundas, Oraons: Another major tribal revolt, the Kol uprising of `1831–32`, took place in Chota Nagpur and Singbhum region of Bihar and Orissa. The tribal inhabitants of Chota Nagpur comprised Kols, Bhils, Hoes, Mundas and Oraons. They led an independent life. Chhotanagpur area remained a centre of turbulent uprisings throughout the 19th century. In these areas, they used to enjoy independent power for centuries. |
| What was the early Kol–Porhat conflict of `1820–21`? | Porhat Allegiance, Ho Taxation and Surrender (`1821`): In `1820` the king of Porhat owed allegiance to the British and agreed to pay huge taxes annually. He claimed the neighbouring Kol region as his own with the consent of the British. He went on to collect taxes from the Ho segment of the Kols which they resented. A few officials were killed too. The British sent troops in support of the king. The Kols took up traditional arms like bows and arrows to face British troops armed in modern weapons. They put up a very brave fight but had to surrender in `1821`. |
| What structural threats and economic grievances produced the `1831–32` insurrection? | Hereditary Chiefs, *Sudor*, Mahajans 70%+, Sikh and Muslim Farmers: British penetration and imposition of British law posed a threat to the power of the hereditary tribal chiefs. The Raja of Chota Nagpur started evicting tribal peasants by farming out land to outsiders for higher rents. This settlement of non-tribals and constant transfer of land to merchants and moneylenders — generally referred to as the *sudor* outsiders — led to a popular uprising, as their plea for justice failed to move the authorities. The transfer of tribal lands and the coming of moneylenders, merchants and British laws created a lot of tension. The Mahajans extracted 70 per cent or more interest and many Kols became bonded labourers for life. The Chhota Nagpur region was leased out to money-lenders for revenue collection. Their oppressive tactics, high revenue rates, British judicial and revenue policies devastated the traditional social framework of the Kols. The trouble increased with large-scale transfers of land from Kol headmen (Mundas) to outsiders like Sikh and Muslim farmers. Above factors prompted the Kol tribe to organise themselves and rebel. |
| What forms did Kol rebellion take and how far did it spread? | Arson, Plunder, Selective Sparing; Ranchi to Manbhum: The Kol tribals organised an insurrection in `1831–32` which was directed mainly against Government officers and private money-lenders. Other tribes also followed the same. It consisted of attacks on the properties of the outsiders, but not their lives. Plunder and arson were the chief modes of peasant protest, while the rate of killings was negligible. But sometimes insurgents adopted cruel means. They torched houses and killed the enemies (mainly outsiders). Only carpenters and blacksmiths were spared since they made weapons and other useful goods for them. The rebellion soon spread over a considerable area, including Ranchi, Hazaribagh, Palamau and Manbhum. |
| How was the Kol rebellion suppressed and what was its immensity? | Troops from Calcutta, Danapur and Benares: After two years of intense resistance they lost to modern weapons of the British. The rebellion “wiped off the Raj from Chota Nagpore in a matter of weeks.” The British army had to move in to quell the disturbances and restore order. Thousands of tribal men, women and children were killed and the rebellion was suppressed. The immensity of the Kol rebellion could be gauged from the fact that troops had to be rushed from far-off places like Calcutta, Danapur and Benares to quell it. |
6. Moplah Rebellion — Identity, Land Hierarchy and Mysorean Interlude
6. Moplah Rebellion — Identity, Land Hierarchy and Mysorean Interlude
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What were the Mappila Riots and how is the `1921` rebellion related to them? | Series `1836–1921` and Culmination of `1921`: Mappila Riots were a series of riots by the Mappila (Moplah) Muslims of Malabar, Kerala in the 19th century and the early 20th century (`1836–1921`) against mainly Hindu landlords and the state. The Malabar Rebellion of `1921` is often considered as the culmination of Mappila riots. The first such outbreak occurred in `1836` and thereafter between `1836` and `1854`, 22 similar uprisings occurred, of which two — one in `1841` and the other in `1849` — were quite serious. The Moplah movement of `1920–21` was of altogether different scale of violence. |
| Who were the Moplahs and how did Cherumar conversion enlarge their ranks? | Arab Descent, Nair/Tiyar Marriage, Cherumars after `1843`: The Moplahs (or Mappilas) were the descendants of Arab traders who had settled in this region and had married local Nair and Tiyar women. Later their ranks inflated through conversion of lower-caste Hindus like the Cherumars, a slave caste whose emancipation under the Slavery Abolition Act of `1843` had put them in greater social problems and who hoped to gain better social status upon conversion. Gradually the Moplahs became dependent on agriculture and turned into a community of cultivating tenants, landless labourers, petty traders and fishermen. |
| How was traditional Malabar land hierarchy structured among jenmi, kanamdar and cultivator? | Jenmi, Kanamdar, Verumpattamdar and Equal Three-Way Share: In the traditional Malabar land system, the *Jenmi* held land by birthright and were mostly Hindus, and let it out to others for cultivation. The other main sections of Malabar society were: the *kanamdar* who were mostly Moplahs; the *verumpattamdar* (cultivators) and agricultural labourers who were also Moplahs. The *jenmi*, consisting mainly of the Nambudiri Brahmins and Nambiar chieftains, were the highest level of the hierarchy, and a class of people given hereditary land grants by the Naduvazhis or rulers. Owing to their ritual status as priests (Nambudris), the jenmis could neither cultivate nor supervise the land but would give it to other groups in return for a fixed share of the crops produced. Traditionally, the net produce of the land was shared equally between the three: by the *janmi* (holder of *janmam* tenure), the *Kanamdar* or *Kanakkaran* (holder of *kanam* tenure) and the cultivator. |
| How did the Mysorean interlude under Haider Ali and Tipu reshape Malabar land and Moplah position? | Flight of Hindu Landowners and Produce-Based Revenue (`1788–1792`): But during the reigns of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, Namboodiri Brahmins and Nayar chiefs fled and the subsequent vacuum was filled by the Moplahs. During the Mysorean interlude (`1788–1792`), when Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan captured Malabar, it led to atrocities on the Hindu landowners who were forced to take refuge in neighbouring states. The Malabar government under suzerainty of Tipu’s Islamic Sultanate, having driven out the Hindu landlords, reached accord with the Muslim peasants. A new system of land revenue was introduced for the first time in the region’s history with the government share fixed on the basis of actual produce from the land. |
| How heterogeneous was Moplah society economically? | Elite Traders and Mass Small Agriculturists; Warrior Reputation: The social and economic background of the Moplah has been quite heterogeneous. The elites among the Moplah earned their livelihood by working as petty traders and merchants. However, the masses of Moplah earned their livelihood by working as small agriculturists. They were the tenants of the big landlords who happened to be high-caste Hindus. Though the Moplahs were poor they imitated the traditional ways of Nayars and acquired the reputation of warriors. |
7. Moplah Rebellion — British Land Settlement and Nineteenth-Century Outbreaks
7. Moplah Rebellion — British Land Settlement and Nineteenth-Century Outbreaks
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did British takeover after the Fourth Mysore War reverse traditional land shares? | Absolute Janmi Ownership and Reduction of Moplahs to Tenants (`1792`): When the British took over Malabar in `1792` following the 4th Mysore War, they sought to revamp land relations by creating individual ownership right in land. Hence with the return of the exiled Namboodiri Brahmins and Nayars, the government reestablished and acknowledged their landlord rights. The traditional system stipulated an equal sharing of the net produce of the land by the *janmi*, the *Kanamdar* and the cultivator. The British system upset this arrangement by recognising the *janmi* as absolute owners of land, with right to evict tenants, which did not exist earlier, and reduced the other two categories (Moplah Muslims) to the status of tenants and leaseholders. |
| What twin exactions of lord and state pauperised Malabar peasantry? | Overassessment, Cesses, Renewal Fees, Insecurity, Pro-Landlord Law: Apart from that, other factors meant that the peasantry in Malabar lived and worked in conditions of extreme penury entailed by the twin exactions of the lord and the state: overassessment; a huge burden of illegal cesses and renewal fees; high rents and other oppressive landlord exactions; lack of any security of tenure; a pro-landlord attitude of the judiciary and the police. The courts and the law officers sided with the jenmis. A series of incidents therefore occurred in Malabar throughout the nineteenth century, which registered the protest and resistance of the rural poor to acts of oppression and exploitation. Once the jenmi landlords, who had the backing of the revenue officials, the law courts and the police, started tightening their hold and demands on the subordinate classes, the Moplah peasantry rose up in revolt. |
| How did religion and economic grievance intermingle in Moplah outbreaks? | Class Conflict with Religious Overtones; Justification not Motive: But the most important aspect of these agrarian relations was that the majority of the *janmi* were high-caste Hindus like Namboodri and Nair and the peasants were the Muslim Moplahs. Here the religion and economic grievances intermingled to produce a mentality of open resistance. Moplah outbreaks assumed the dimensions of a class conflict with religious overtones. Mosques became the centres of mobilisation and the targets were the Hindu *janmi*, their temples and the British officials who came to their rescue. Many Moplahs believed that the cruel landlord merited death and it was religious virtue to kill oppressive landlords (who also happened to be *kafirs* or non-believers). Thus the act of violence helped a Moplah to wipe out the source of injustice. Seen in this light, what religion provided was justification, not a motive to violence. After few serious incidents, British armed forces were deployed to suppress the revolt. The repressive measures restored peace for about twenty years, but then the Moplahs rose again in `1870` and the events followed a similar trajectory. |
| What were the phases and uniform pattern of nineteenth-century Moplah revolts? | Twenty-Two Revolts (`1836–54`), *Ahadis*, `1882–85`, `1896`: The first phase of the uprisings from `1836` to `1854` witnessed 22 revolts (with the ones in `1841` and `1849` being quite serious) and had messianic overtones. The faithful sacrificed their lives in the belief that as *Ahadis* they would go straight to heaven. The second phase of the revolts was recorded in `1882–85`, and another spate of outbursts in `1896`. The pattern of the rebellion was uniform with usually: a group of Moplah youths attacking a Brahmin *jenmi* or a Nayar official or a *jenmi*’s servant, burning or defiling a temple or attacking the landlords’ house. The police would then crack down on them and the rebels would then seek refuge in either a mosque or the temple. |
8. Moplah Rebellion of 1921 — Causes, Khilafat Link and Course
8. Moplah Rebellion of 1921 — Causes, Khilafat Link and Course
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What twin grievances and land conditions caused the Moplah agitation of `1920–21`? | Landlord Oppression, Anti-Khilafat Policy, Insecurity of Tenure: The Moplah rebellion of `1921` stemmed from twin grievances of the Moplah Muslim’s continued oppression by landlord and British government’s anti-Khilafat policies. The Moplahs were Muslim peasants. Their landlords who were called Jenmis were mostly Hindus. The relations between the Jenmis and the Moplahs were historically quite unfriendly — both economically and religiously antagonistic. Since `1835` the Hindu landlords suppressed the Moplah tenants. Thus, the basic cause of the Moplah agitation was the operation against the Jenmis. The land tenure system in Malabar was quite unfavourable to the Moplah tenants. There was total insecurity of tenure to the Moplahs and they could be ejected from their land without any appropriate notice. The immediate cause of Moplah agitation in `1920` was the renewal of fee at an exorbitant rate fixed by the Jenmis. This was unbearable for the Moplahs. The exactions practised by the Jenmis were of very high order. More than often the Moplahs were discriminated against the Hindu tenants. |
| How did Manjeri conference, tenant association and Khilafat mobilise the Moplahs? | Manjeri/Minjeri `1920`, Prohibitory Notices (`5 February `1921`), Jihad Call: The first impetus for Moplah resistance against the landlords came from the Malabar District Congress Committee held at Majeri in April `1920`. This conference supported the tenants’ cause and demanded legislation to regulate landlord-tenant relations. Following the Minjeri conference of `1920`, the Moplah tenants formed an association which had its branches in the whole of Kerala. This brought the Moplah tenants under one organisation. Yet another motivating factor for `1921` Moplah agitation was the Khilafat movement which constituted a wider part of national struggle for independence. This movement developed its roots in Malabar also. The Khilafat movement was introduced into the district of Malabar by a Resolution at the Malabar District Conference at Manjeri. The Moplahs took active part in Khilafat movement. Actually, in practice, the meetings of the Moplahs and the Khilafat could hardly be separated. The bonds between the Khilafat movement and Moplah tenants became so much mixed that the government issued prohibitory notices on all Khilafat meetings on 5th February `1921`. This displeased the Moplahs and ended up with the agitation of the Moplah peasantry. |
| How did post-WWI weakness, Khilafat spirit and Majlis-ul-Ulema radicalise the peasantry? | War Weakness, Loss of Discipline, Forced Conversions Alleged: The British government was weakened as a result of the First World War. It was not in a position to take strong military action against the Moplahs. As a result of this, the Moplahs began to exhibit increasing signs of turbulence and defiance of authority. Due to Moplah’s participation in the Khilafat movement, the Moplah peasantry learned how to give a coherent expression to their grievances. Violent tendencies soon appeared in the Khilafat movement, as the masses lost self-discipline and the leaders failed to control them and it was visible in the Moplah uprising, where the poor Moplah peasants, emboldened by the Khilafat spirit, rose against the Hindu moneylenders and the state. Moplahs became more militant after the Majlis-ul-Ulema (council of Muslim learned men), an all-India militant Muslim organization, called upon the Moplah masses to launch a jihad; the cause of swaraj and Non-Cooperation waned between March and August `1921`. There was alleged increase in the number of forced conversions of Hindus. |
| What triggered the final break at Tirurangadi and how did the rebellion spread? | Raid of `20 August `1921`, Ali Musaliar, Targets and Communal Flavour: The final break came only when the district magistrate of Eranad taluka, on 20th August `1921`, raided the mosque at Tirurangadi to arrest Ali Musaliar, a Khilafat leader and a Muslim priest (with militia). The people became violent and the police opened fire on the unarmed crowd and many were killed. A clash ensued and government offices were destroyed, records burnt and the treasury looted. The rebellion soon spread into all Moplah strongholds. Government deployed the army to take control of the civil administration. In the agitation the targets of Moplah attack were the unpopular Jenmis Hindus, police stations, treasuries and offices, and British planters. The Hindu landlords who were lenient in their relations with the Moplahs were spared by the latter. This gave a communal flavour to the peasant agitation. As a matter of fact, the Malabar people in general lost all their sympathy with the Moplahs. Communalisation of peasant agitation was suicidal for the Moplahs. |
| How was the rebellion crushed and what became of its leaders? | December `1921` End; Ali Musliyar Hanged; Kunjahammed Haji Shot: The communalisation of the rebellion completed the isolation of Moplahs. British repression did the rest and by December `1921` all resistance had come to a stop. The militant Moplahs were so completely crushed and demoralised that till independence their participation in any form of politics was almost nil. Ali Musliyar was among a dozen leaders who were tried and sentenced to death. He was subsequently hanged at the Coimbatore Prison on 17 February `1922`. Kunjahammed Haji was another important Mappila rebel leader. He was shot dead by the British police on 20 January `1922`. |
9. Moplah Rebellion — Analysis, Wider Peasant Frame and Contemporary Reactions
9. Moplah Rebellion — Analysis, Wider Peasant Frame and Contemporary Reactions
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why is the Moplah movement analysed as a failure story? | Communal Swing, Violence vs Non-Violence, Isolation, Pre-Political Nature: The movement of Moplah is a failure story. Much of its defeat lies in the fact that it took to communal swing. Secondly, when the Khilafat movement stood for non-violence and also the struggle for independence the Moplah took to violence as a method of agitation. Thirdly, the movement did not motivate the peasantry of the neighbourhood to stand in arms against the landlords. It was perhaps a lone tragedy of Moplahs that their landlords happened to be Hindus. This was never a case in any of the agitations which took place during the 1920s and earlier. The `1921` uprising was in essence an expression of long-standing agrarian discontent, which was only intensified by the religious and ethnic identity and by their political alienation. It was essentially ‘pre-political’ in nature. The `1921` Moplah rebellion was “in essence an expression of long-standing agrarian discontent which was intensified by the religious and ethnic identity.” |
| How do nineteenth- and early twentieth-century peasant movements relate to the national struggle in the source frame? | Satyagraha Experiments, Intelligentsia, Causes; Moplah as Exception to Non-Violence: It can be said that the peasant movements which took place in 19th and early 20th centuries were a part of wider national struggle. On the one hand, these movements were influenced by the freedom struggle and on the other hand they had their impact on the struggle also. Most of these movements were the experiments in satyagraha and noncooperation of Gandhiji. Then, there was participation of intelligentsia and educated people in these movements. There were several causes of these movements; the major causes were increase in land tax, security of tenure and exploitation of the poor peasantry by the landlords. The big and middle peasants also participated in the movements. Most of the movements, leaving aside Moplah, were characterised by non-violence. |
| How did C. Sankaran Nair react to the `1921` rebellion? | Sankaran Nair against Gandhi and Khilafat; Atrocities on Women: Citing the actions of the Mappilas during the rebellion, C. Sankaran Nair (President of the Indian National Congress in `1897`) wrote a strongly worded criticism of Gandhi and his support for the Khilafat Movement, accusing him of being an anarchist. He was highly critical of the “sheer brutality” of the atrocities committed on women during the rebellion, finding them “horrible and unmentionable.” |
| What did Annie Besant report after visiting the affected areas? | Besant’s Articles, Khilafat Raj Quote, One Lakh and Melathur Atrocity:Annie Besant visited the affected areas of Malabar soon after the Moplah rebellion in `1921` and wrote a series of powerful articles about the carnage let loose by the Moplah Muslims which opened the eyes of the government of India and that of Britain. Mrs Besant wrote: “Malabar has taught what Islamic rule means and we do not want to see another specimen of Khilafat Raj in India.” Annie Besant reported that Muslim Mappilas forcibly converted many Hindus, raped and killed or drove away all Hindus who would not apostatise, totaling more than one lakh. Quoting Mrs. Besant: “A respectable Nair lady at Melathur was stripped naked by the rebels in the presence of her husband and brothers who were made to stand close by with their hands tied behind. When they shut their eyes in abhorrence, they were compelled at the point of a sword to open their eyes and witness the rape committed by the brute in their presence. I loathe even to write of such a mean action. This instance of rape was communicated to me by one of her brothers confidentially. There are several instances of such mean atrocities which are not revealed by people….” |
10. Santal Hul (1855) — Background, Damin-i-koh and Diku Oppression
10. Santal Hul (1855) — Background, Damin-i-koh and Diku Oppression
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Where did the Santals live and how is the Hul characterised? | Geography, Timeline and Four Murmu Brothers: The Santhals lived scattered in various districts of Curtack, Dhalbhum, Manbhum, Barabhum, Chota Nagpur, Palamau, Hazaribagh, Midnapur, Bankura and Birbhum in eastern India. The Santal rebellion or Santal Hul was a native rebellion in present-day Jharkhand against both the British colonial authority and zamindari system by the Santal people. It was the most effective tribal movement of this period. It started on June 30, `1855` and on November 10, `1855` martial law was proclaimed which lasted until January 3, `1856` when martial law was suspended and the movement was brutally ended by troops loyal to the British Raj. The Santal Hul was masterminded by four Murmu brothers — Sidhu, Kahnu (Kanhu), Chand and Bhairav; a heroic episode in India’s prolonged struggle for freedom. It was, in all probability, the fiercest liberation movement in India next to Great Sepoy Mutiny in `1857`. |
| How were the Santals driven into *Damin-i-koh* and then betrayed there? | Rajmahal Hills, Clearing of *Damin-i-koh*, Return of *Diku* Claims: The insurrection of the Santals began as a tribal reaction to money-lending practices and the zamindari system in the tribal belt of what was then known as the Bengal Presidency. The Santals were good cultivators and possessed good pieces of agricultural land. They were engaged in their agrarian way of life by clearing the forest and also by hunting for subsistence. But as the agents of the new colonial rule claimed their rights on the lands of the Santals, they retreated to reside in the hills of Rajmahal. Driven from their homeland, they cleared the area around the Rajmahal Hills and called it *Damin-i-koh*. After a brief period, the British operatives along with the local landlords and zamindars [outsiders (*Diku*)] jointly started claiming their rights in this new land as well. The unsophisticated and unlettered Santals felt cheated and betrayed. |
| How did interest rates, bonded labour and railroad officers destroy the Santal world? | 50–500% Interest, Endless Compound Debt, Police and Railway Officers: They were gradually driven to a desperate situation as tribal lands were leased out to non-Santhal zamindars and moneylenders. To this was added the oppression of the local police and the European officers engaged in railroad construction. The Santal tribes were turned into bonded labor by the zamindars and the money lenders who first appeared to them as businessmen and traders and had allured them first by goods lent to them on loans. However hard a Santal tried to repay these loans, they never ended. In fact through corrupt practices of the money lenders, the compound interest accumulated on the principal amount of the loan multiplied to a large sum — an amount for repaying which an entire generation of an indigent Santal family had to work as bonded labor. Interest rates ranged from 50 to 500% and their land was grabbed. This penetration of outsiders called *dikus* by the Santhals completely destroyed their familiar world, and the loss of freedom and respect that the Santals enjoyed turned them into rebels and finally they took oath to launch an attack on their oppressors. |
11. Santal Hul — Insurrection, Suppression and Santal Parganas Settlement
11. Santal Hul — Insurrection, Suppression and Santal Parganas Settlement
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did open insurrection begin under Sidhu and Kanhu in July `1855`? | Unholy Trinity; Collapse between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal: In July `1855`, when their ultimatum to the zamindars and the government went unheeded, several thousand Santhals, armed with bows and arrows under two Santal rebel leaders, Sidhu and Kanhu, started an open insurrection “against the unholy trinity of their oppressors — the zamindars, the mahajans and the government.” They attacked the houses of moneylenders, zamindars, white planters, railway engineers and British officials. Many moneylenders, native agents of the Company etc. were killed. The insurrection spread rapidly and in a wide region between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal the Company’s rule virtually collapsed, spreading panic in government circles. The rebels cut off the postal and railway communications between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal. Rebels proclaimed the end of the Company’s rule and commencement of the Santhal regime. At this stage the Santhal rebels were also being actively helped by the low-caste non-tribal peasants. |
| How did the British turn Santal archery into a trap and crush the Hul? | Blank Fire then Bullets; 15–20 Thousand Killed; Elephants of Murshidabad: The Santals initially gained some success in guerilla war tactics using bows and arrows but soon the British found out a new way to tackle these rebels. Santals skilled in archery could fire arrows extremely accurately and with great impact. The British soon understood that there was no point fighting them in the forest but to force them come out of the forest. So in a conclusive battle which followed, the British, equipped with modern firearms, stationed themselves at the foot of the hill on which the Santals were stationed. When the battle began, the British officer ordered fire without bullets. As the Santals could not trace this trap set by the much experienced British war strategists, they charged in full force. This step proved to be disastrous for them for as soon as they neared the foot of the hill, the British army attacked with full power and this time by using real bullets. The hapless Santals were cut to pieces. Brutal counter-insurgency measures started. The army was mobilised and Santhal villages were burnt one after another with vengeance. According to one calculation, out of thirty to fifty thousand rebels, fifteen to twenty thousand were killed before the insurrection was finally suppressed. Elephants supplied by the Nawab of Murshidabad were used to demolish Santal huts and likewise atrocities were committed by the British army and its allies in suppressing the Rebellion. Thereafter, the revolt was brutally crushed; the two celebrated leaders Sidhu and Kanhu were killed. |
| What institutional settlement followed the Hul? | Santal Parganas Tenancy Act `1856` and Separate Administrative Unit: British passed the Santal Parganas Tenancy Act, `1856` which tried to appease the Santhals by giving some sort of protection to them from colonial exploitation. Santhal inhabited areas were constituted into a separate administrative unit, called the Santhal Parganas, which recognised the distinctiveness of their tribal culture and identity. Land alienation was checked; regular police was abolished and the local administration was vested in the hands of locals and village headman. Hence the Santhal hool had economic reasons at its core causing the agrarian discontent and it was attempted to be solved by British through an agrarian act i.e. Santal Parganas Tenancy Act. |
| What is the lasting significance of Santal Hul despite suppression? | Turning Point in Santal Pride; 20,000 Casualties; Shadow of `1857`: Although the revolution was brutally suppressed, it marked a great change in the colonial rule and policy. The day of rebellion is still celebrated among the Santal community with great respect and spirit for the thousands of the Santal martyrs who sacrificed their lives along with their two celebrated leaders in their glorious albeit unsuccessful attempt to win freedom from the rule of the zamindars and the British operatives. Although its impact was largely shadowed by that of the other rebellion, the Indian Rebellion of `1857`, the legend of the Santal Rebellion lives on as a turning point in Santal pride and identity. Santal Hul was one of the fiercest battles in the history of Indian freedom struggles causing greatest number of loss of lives in any battles during that time. The number of casualties of Santal Hul was 20,000. |
12. Character of Tribal and Peasant Rebellions — Public Action, Space and Golden Age
12. Character of Tribal and Peasant Rebellions — Public Action, Space and Golden Age
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did these tribal rebellions differ from crime? | Open, Public, Programmatic Action: These tribal rebellions were political action, different from crime, because they were open and public. The Santhals gave ample warning in advance; the Rangpur leaders imposed a levy for insurrection on the peasantry. There were public conferences, assemblies, and planning which definitely spoke of a programme. There were grand ceremonies of rebel marches. |
| How did rebels’ perception of space and ethnicity shape the spread of revolt? | Fatherland, Ethnic Boundary and Cross-Regional Kol Rising: These rebellions also differed from modern nationalism. The spread of the rebellion depended on the rebels’ own perception of space and ethnic boundary; it was most effective within the geographical area within which that community lived and worked. The Santhals’ battle, for example, was for their ‘fatherland’; but sometimes ethnic ties extended across the territorial boundaries, as in Kol insurrection we find the Kols of different regions rose in revolt simultaneously. |
| What role did an imagined Golden Age play in peasant ideology? | Restoration of Distant Past — Faraizi and Santhal: The rebels’ own perception of time played a significant role as well. There is often an evocation of history in the conception of a “Golden Age” in a distant past. An urge for the restoration of that imagined golden past provided an ideology for peasant action, the Faraizi and Santhal rebellions being prime examples of that. |
13. Indigo Revolt (1859–60) — Post-1857 Features and Middle-Class Mediation Debate
13. Indigo Revolt (1859–60) — Post-1857 Features and Middle-Class Mediation Debate
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What new features marked peasant and tribal movements in post-`1857` India? | Awareness of Colonial Institutions and Intelligentsia as Spokespersons: In post-`1857` India we witness first of all a continuation of some of the earlier forms of protest against various oppressive aspects of colonial rule, the tribal and peasant movements being the foremost among them. But now these movements acquired some new features as well. In this period there was a greater awareness of colonial policies, laws and institutions among the peasantry, both tribal and non-tribal. And what is more important, some of them even embraced those institutions — the law courts for example — as an extended and legitimate space for venting their anger or for seeking redress to existing injustices. The other important feature was the growing involvement of the educated middle-class intelligentsia as spokespersons for the aggrieved peasantry, thus adding new dimensions to their protests and linking their movements to a wider agitation against certain undesirable aspects of colonial rule. |
| How do Ravinder Kumar and Ranajit Guha differ on middle-class intervention in peasant movements? | Channel of Communication vs Paternalism–Humanism Concoction: The nature of this outside intervention in peasant movements has been a subject of intense debate. Ravinder Kumar, on the one hand, would think that these middle-class leaders performed an important and effective function as “a channel of communication, between rural society and the administration,” at a time when the traditional channels and methods had become ineffective. Ranajit Guha, on the other hand, has described the nineteenth-century middle-class attitude to peasants as “a curious concoction of an inherited, Indian style paternalism and an acquired, western-style humanism.” Their actions at every stage betrayed their innate collaborative mind and revealed “the futility of liberalism as a deterrent to tyranny.” But whatever might have been the nature or impact of this middle-class mediation, this was nonetheless a new feature of nearly all the peasant movements in the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the major events in which the old and new features of peasant movements were equally visible was the indigo rebellion in Bengal in `1859–60`. |
14. Indigo Revolt — Plantation System, Dadon and Causes
14. Indigo Revolt — Plantation System, Dadon and Causes
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the Indigo revolt (*Nilbidroha*) directed against? | Fraudulent Contracts and Least Profitable Terms: The Indigo revolt (*Nilbidraha*) that arose in Bengal was directed against British planters who forced peasants to take advances and sign fraudulent contracts which forced the peasants to grow Indigo under terms which were the least profitable to them. The oppressive aspects of the indigo plantation system had been the targets of peasant protest in the central and eastern Bengal for a long time. In `1832` in Barasat, the followers of Titu Mir had given the local indigo planters the fright of their lifetime. Almost around the same time the Faraizi movement under Dudu Mian in eastern Bengal had the indigo planters as one of their selected targets of attack. |
| Why did planter oppression intensify in the second half of the nineteenth century? | Loss of Export Importance and Union Bank Failure (`1847`): The oppression of the planters increased in the second half of the nineteenth century as indigo lost its economic importance as an export item and the Union Bank, which was the chief financier for the planters, failed in `1847`. The oppressed peasantry continued to bear with the coercive planters for a while, but their attitudes changed when in May `1859` a sympathetic John Peter Grant took up office as the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and with his encouragement some of the district officers — though not all — began to take a pro-peasant position, thinking that the coercive methods of the planters went against the ethos of free enterprise. |
| How was indigo established as a major cash crop and where was it planted? | Worldwide Demand, `1777`, European Monopoly: Indigo was identified as a major cash crop for the East India Company’s investments in the 18th Century. Indigo had worldwide demand similar to cotton piece-goods, opium and salt. Indigo planting in Bengal dated back to `1777`. With expansion of British power in Bengal, indigo planting became more and more commercially profitable due to the demand for blue dye in Europe. It was introduced in large parts of Burdwan, Bankura, Birbhum, Murshidabad, etc. European Indigo planters had a monopoly over Indigo farming. The foreigners used to force Indian farmers to harvest Neel and to achieve their means they used to brutally suppress the farmer. The European indigo planters left no stones unturned to make money. |
| How did *dadon*, fraudulent contracts and *lathyals* trap the cultivator? | Lifelong Debt, Best Land, Bribes, Coercion above Law: They mercilessly pursued the peasants to plant indigo instead of food crops. They provided loans, called *dadon*, at a very high interest. Once a farmer took such loans he remained in debt for whole of his life before passing it to his successors. The farmers were totally unprotected from the brutal indigo planters, who resorted to mortgages or destruction of their property if they were unwilling to obey them. The planters forced the peasants to take a meager amount as advance and enter into fraudulent contracts. The price paid for the indigo plants was far below the market price. The peasant was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whether or not he wanted to devote his land and labour to more paying crops like rice. At the time of delivery, he was cheated even of the due low price. He also had to pay regular bribes to the planter’s officials. He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in a position to repay it, but even if he could he was not allowed to do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go on cultivating indigo. For the enforcement of forced and fraudulent contracts, the planters resorted to a reign of terror to coerce the peasants. They hired or maintained bands of *lathyals* (armed retainers) for the purpose. Farmers were illegally beaten up, detained in order to force them to sell Neel at non-profitable rates. If any farmer refused to grow Indigo and started growing rice, he was kidnapped, women and children were attacked, and crop was looted, burnt and destroyed. If farmer approached court, the European judge would rule in favour of the European planter. The privileges and immunity enjoyed by the British planters placed them above the law and beyond all judicial control. Those few magistrates who tried to be fair were soon transferred. Even many planters were appointed as Honorary Magistrates. Government rules favoured the planters. By an act in `1833`, the planters were granted a free hand in oppression. Sometimes even the zamindars, money lenders and other influential persons sided with the planters. Finally Indigo peasants launched revolt in Nadia district of Bengal presidency. Refused to grow Indigo. If police tried to intervene, they were attacked. European Planters responded by increasing the rent and evicting farmers. Led to more agitations and confrontations. |
15. Indigo Revolt — Course, Government Response and Indigo Commission
15. Indigo Revolt — Course, Government Response and Indigo Commission
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the indigo disturbances spread from autumn `1859` through `1860`? | Refuse Advances, Jessore Joins, Strike, Temporary Law, No-Rent: The indigo disturbances started in the autumn of `1859` when peasants refused to accept advances from the planters in a wide region in the districts of Nadia, Murshidabad, and Pabna. The Jessore peasants joined hands in the spring sowing season of `1860`, by which time the entire delta region of Bengal had become affected. In April `1860` all the cultivators of the Barasat subdivision and in the districts of Pabna and Nadia resorted to strike. They refused to sow any indigo. As the planters’ men tried to coerce the peasants to sow indigo, they met with stiff resistance and sometimes their Indian agents were subjected to organised social boycott. The panic-stricken pro-planter lobby in Calcutta had a temporary legislation passed in March `1860`, compelling the peasants to fulfill their contractual obligations to sow indigo. The courts were flooded with such cases and some of the overzealous magistrates forced the peasants to cultivate the hated crop. But Grant refused to extend the legislation beyond its life of six months and forbade the magistrates to compel peasants to accept advances to cultivate indigo. The peasants also took their cases to courts, which were inundated with such law suits. The movement at this stage turned into a no-rent campaign and as the planters sought to evict their defaulting tenants, the latter went to court to establish their right as occupancy ryots under the Rent Act X of `1859`. |
| Why was the Government’s response restrained compared with civil and tribal risings? | Memory of Santhal and `1857`; Intelligentsia and Missionary Support: It was restrained and not as harsh as in the case of civil rebellions and tribal uprisings. It had just undergone the harrowing experience of the Santhal uprising and the Revolt of `1857`. It was also able to see, in time, the changed temper of the peasantry and was influenced by the support extended to the Revolt by the intelligentsia and the missionaries. |
| What did the Indigo Commission establish and what was E.W.L. Tower’s famous line? | Commission `1860`, Human Blood Quote, End of Bengal Indigo: The revolt had a strong effect on the government, which immediately appointed the “Indigo Commission” in `1860` to inquire into the problem of indigo cultivation. Evidence brought before the Indigo Commission and its final report exposed the coercion and corruption underlying the entire system of indigo cultivation. In the commission report, E. W. L. Tower noted that “not a chest of Indigo reached England without being stained with human blood.” Government issued a notification that the Indian farmers cannot be compelled to grow indigo and that it would ensure that all disputes were settled by legal means. But the planters were already closing down the factories — they felt that they could not make their enterprises pay without the use of force and fraud. By the end of `1860`, Indigo planters shut down their factories and cultivation of indigo was virtually wiped out from Bengal. Evidently it was a major triumph of the peasants to incite such emotion in the European’s minds. Thus the revolt was a success. |
| What factors explain the success of the Indigo Revolt? | Ryot Organisation, Hindu–Muslim Unity, Leadership, Intelligentsia: The tremendous initiative, cooperation, organization and discipline of the ryots. The complete unity among Hindu and Muslim peasants. Leadership for the movement was provided by the more well-off ryots and in some cases by petty zamindars, moneylenders and ex-employees of the planters. Support of intelligentsia of Bengal. |
16. Indigo Revolt — Leadership, Press, Nil Darpan and Cultural Impact
16. Indigo Revolt — Leadership, Press, Nil Darpan and Cultural Impact
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Who provided rural and zamindari leadership to the revolt? | Biswas Brothers, Kader Molla, Rafique Mondal, Ramratan Mullick: The revolt enjoyed the support of all categories of the rural population, missionaries, the Bengal intelligentsia and Muslims. The substantial peasants and village headmen provided leadership. The Biswas brothers of Nadia, Kader Molla of Pabna, Rafique Mondal of Malda were popular leaders. The local zamindars, who resented the European planters usurping their prime position of power in the countryside, often sympathised with the ryots, sometimes even offering leadership; but soon they lost control of the situation. The most important of Zamindars who supported the revolt was Ramratan Mullick of Narail. In this whole episode another important feature was the intervention of the educated middle classes and some of the European missionaries. |
| How did the Bengal intelligentsia use press and *Nil Darpan* for the peasants? | Newspaper Campaigns, Mitra, Madhusudan, Long’s Libel Trial: The Bengal intelligentsia played an important role by organizing a powerful campaign in support by using Press as the tool. It had a deep impact on the emerging nationalist intellectuals. It carried on newspaper campaigns, organized mass meetings, prepared memoranda on peasants’ grievances and supported them in their legal battles. It established a tradition with long-run implications for the national movement. Dinabandhu Mitra published in September `1860` a play in Bengali called *Neel Darpan* (literally, ‘blue mirror’), which depicted the atrocities of the indigo planters in the boldest possible colour. It effectively brought out the fact that indigo planters forced the ryots to cultivate without remuneration, confined, beat and compelled the villagers as well as corrupted their own servants. With such powerful expression *Nil Darpan* became an example of an awakening of intelligentsia, to gain their sympathy towards the peasantry. The play was translated into English by the famous Bengali poet Michael Madhusudan Dutta and was published by Rev. James Long of the Church Missionary Society to bring it to the notice of the liberal political circles in India and London. For this, Rev. James Long was tried for libel in the Calcutta Supreme Court and was fined Rs. 1,000 with a jail sentence of one month. Conviction of Rev. James Long enraged the Calcutta literati, as the Indian press, particularly the *Hindoo Patriot* and *Somprakash* took up the cause of the indigo peasants, and the British Indian Association came to their side as well. |
| What roles did Harish Chandra Mukherjee and Sisir Kumar Ghosh play? | *Hindoo Patriot* from `1853`; Ghosh from Nadia and Jessore:Harish Chandra Mukherjee thoroughly described the plight of the poor peasants in his newspaper *The Hindu Patriot*. The *Hindu Patriot*, first published as a weekly in January `1853`, from the very beginning took a hostile tone toward the indigo planters. Sisir Kumar Ghosh, who later founded *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, was one of the important muffasal correspondents of the Patriot. He reported from Nadia and Jessore. His brave fight for justice for the ryots became invaluable in a situation where there was no political organisation to support the people’s cause. Although their appeal was to the liberal political opinion among the imperial bureaucrats and it betrayed their unflagging faith in British justice system, these middle-class protagonists, however, succeeded in bringing the peasants’ issue to the wider arena of institutional politics and this resulted in a growing pressure on the planters to behave. |
| What was the nature, historical place and cultural afterlife of the revolt? | Non-Violent Character, Forerunner Frame, Theatre and Girish Ghosh: The revolt is described as a non-violent revolution (except in few instances) and this is given as a reason why the indigo revolt was a success compared to the Sepoy Revolt. Historically, the Indigo Rebellion can be termed the first form of resistance of the countryside against the British in economic and social terms. Unlike the spontaneous revolt of the soldiers in the Sepoy Mutiny, this countryside revolt evolved over the years and, in the process, rallied different strata of society against the British — a thread of dissent that lasted many decades thereafter. Many consider this revolt as a forerunner of the non-violent passive resistance later successfully adopted by Gandhi. Indigo Rebellion not only forewarned agrarian uprisings, but also showed the shape of things to come. One historian says: “Although the hard pressed ryots and minor landholders looked upon the great Zamindars for their initial encouragement, not frequently, the Zamindars lost control of the movement… and initiative devolved to the lower classes.” Indigo Rebellion was not a class struggle in any way as there was no struggle between the Zamindars and the peasantry; rather the real objective of the Zamindars was to oppose the encroachment of Europeans on principle and to fight for their own vested interests, though they espoused the cause of peasantry and cultivators against the planters. Support of middle class educated intelligentsia and greater awareness of colonial policies, laws and institutions (for e.g. use of legal system under Rent Act X of `1859`) marked the revolt. Dinabandhu Mitra’s `1859` Bengali play *Nildarpan* was based on Indigo revolt. It was also essential to the development of theater in Bengal and influenced Girish Chandra Ghosh, who, in `1872`, would establish The National Theatre in Calcutta where the first ever play commercially staged was *Nildarpan*. In order to feel the pulse of the local people, following the popularity of this play, W.S. Seton Karr, Secretary to the Governor of Bengal, assigned Rev. James to translate the work into English and circulate it among like-minded Britons. The planters, depicted as villains in the drama, instead of taking on the Government, fell upon the unfortunate translator. In the ensuing libel case, the jury found Rev. James Long guilty. The sentence was a fine of Rs. 1,000 and a month’s imprisonment. The indigo rebellion has been portrayed in drama, poetry and popular history in Bengal, thereby drawing the attention of the intelligentsia. Thus it entered the political awareness and had a far-reaching consequence in the later movements of Bengal. |
17. Indigo Revolt — PYQ Frame: Spontaneous Resistance Meets Constitutional Agitation
17. Indigo Revolt — PYQ Frame: Spontaneous Resistance Meets Constitutional Agitation
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why does the Indigo Revolt hold a significant place in the history of national liberation? | Two Currents in Mutual Contact for the First Time: “The Indigo Revolt of `1859–60` holds a very significant place in our history of national liberation movement. For the first time in the history of our anti-colonial struggle, its two independent currents — spontaneous peasant resistance and constitutional agitation in defence of peasantry — came into mutual contact.” Peasant protests were a recurrent feature of British India. But the Indigo revolt of `1859–60` marks a significant departure from all the previous peasants’ protests. In this peasant revolt, for the first time, spontaneous peasant resistance and constitutional agitation for the cause of peasantry came into the picture together. |
| How did Hem Chandra Kar’s proclamation and peasant action constitute spontaneous resistance? | Kalaroa Proclamation; Digambar and Bishnu Biswas; Rent Strike: The oppression of the Indigo planters increased in the 2nd half of the 19th century as Indigo lost its importance as an export item and the Union Bank, which was the chief financier for the planters, failed in `1847`. The discontent of indigo growers in Bengal boiled over in the autumn of `1859` when their case seemed to get Government support. Hem Chandra Kar, Deputy Magistrate of Kalaroa, proclaimed to policemen that the ryots can sow the crops they want and the Police will be careful that no Indigo Planter nor anyone else be able to interfere in the matter. The news of Kar’s proclamation spread all over Bengal, and peasant felt that the time for overthrowing the hated system had come. The indigo disturbances started in the autumn of `1859` when peasants refused to accept advances from the planters in a wide region in the districts of Nadia, Murshidabad, and Pabna. Digambar Biswas and Bishnu Biswas played the role of leadership in Nadia district. The Jessore peasants also joined hands later. Soon, the entire delta region of Bengal had become affected. As the planters’ men tried to coerce the peasants to sow indigo, they met with stiff resistance and sometimes their Indian agents were subjected to organised social boycott. The substantial peasants and village headmen provided leadership. Any coercive action of planter and policemen met with same action and village men defended themselves with whatever weapons came to hand. When the planters resorted to use their zamindari powers and threatened the rebellious ryots with eviction or enhancement of rent, the ryots replied by going on a rent strike. They physically resisted attempts to evict them. |
| How did constitutional agitation, intelligentsia and government response complete the dual current? | Courts, Press, Missionaries, Commission, November `1860` Notification: Using legal system: the peasants also took their cases to courts. The united peasants raised funds to fight court cases and initiated legal action on their own against the planters. As the planters sought to evict their defaulting tenants, the latter went to court to establish their right as occupancy ryots under the Rent Act X of `1859`. Ultimately, the planters could not withstand the united resistance of the ryots, and they gradually began to close their factories. The cultivation of indigo was virtually wiped out from the districts of Bengal by the end of `1860`. The intelligentsia of Bengal organized a powerful campaign in support of the rebellious peasantry. It carried on newspaper campaigns, organized mass meetings, prepared memoranda on peasants’ grievances and supported them in their legal battles. The Indian press, particularly the *Hindoo Patriot* (by Harish Chandra Mukherji) and *Somprakash* took up the cause of the indigo peasants, and the British Indian Association came to their side as well. Dinabandhu Mitra published in September `1860` *Neel Darpan*. Missionaries were another group which extended active support to the indigo ryots in their struggle. The Government’s response was rather restrained and not as harsh as in the case of civil rebellions and tribal uprisings. It appointed a commission to inquire into the problem of indigo cultivation. Evidence brought before the Indigo Commission and its final report exposed the coercion and corruption underlying the entire system. The Government issued a notification in November `1860` that ryots could not be compelled to sow indigo and that it would ensure that all disputes were settled by legal means. Intelligentsia succeeded in bringing the peasants’ issue to the wider arena of institutional politics. By the time the movement was over the planters were already closing down and had almost disappeared from Bengal. |
18. Deccan Uprising (1875) — Ryotwari Context, Indebtedness and Cotton Boom–Crash
18. Deccan Uprising (1875) — Ryotwari Context, Indebtedness and Cotton Boom–Crash
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Why was Ryotwari introduced in the Bombay Deccan rather than Permanent Settlement? | Temporary Settlements to Maximise Revenue Beyond Bengal: As British rule expanded from Bengal to other parts of India, new systems of revenue were imposed. The Permanent Settlement was rarely extended to any region beyond Bengal. Since the revenue demand was fixed under the Permanent Settlement, the colonial state could not claim any share of this enhanced income. Keen on expanding its financial resources, the colonial government had to think of ways to maximise its land revenue. So in territories annexed in the nineteenth century, temporary revenue settlements were made. The revenue system that was introduced in the Bombay Deccan came to be known as the Ryotwari Settlement. Unlike the Bengal system, the revenue was directly settled with the ryot. The average income from different types of soil was estimated, the revenue-paying capacity of the ryot was assessed and a proportion of it fixed as the share of the state. The first revenue settlement in the Bombay Deccan was made in the 1820s. |
| How did high demand, price fall and the famine of `1832–34` produce mass indebtedness? | Desertion, Price Collapse, Half Population Dead, Loans for Survival: The revenue that was demanded was so high that in many places peasants deserted their villages and migrated to new regions. When rains failed and harvests were poor, peasants found it impossible to pay the revenue. By the 1830s the problem became more severe. Prices of agricultural products fell sharply after `1832` and did not recover for over a decade and a half. This meant a further decline in peasants’ income. At the same time the countryside was devastated by a famine that struck in the years `1832–34`. One third of the cattle of the Deccan were killed, and half the human population died. Those who survived had no agricultural stocks to see them through the crisis. Inevitably, they borrowed. Revenue could rarely be paid without a loan from a moneylender. But once a loan was taken, the ryot found it difficult to pay it back. As debt mounted, and loans remained unpaid, peasants’ dependence on moneylenders increased. They now needed loans even to buy their everyday needs and meet their production expenditure. By the 1840s, officials were finding evidence of alarming levels of peasant indebtedness everywhere. |
| How did the American Civil War create a cotton boom in the Deccan? | From American Dependence to 90% Indian Supply (`1862`): Before the 1860s, three-fourths of raw cotton imports into Britain came from America. British cotton manufacturers had for long been worried about this dependence on American supplies. When the American Civil War broke out in `1861`, a wave of panic spread through cotton circles in Britain. Raw cotton imports from America fell to less than three per cent of the normal. Frantic messages were sent to India and elsewhere to increase cotton exports to Britain. In Bombay, cotton merchants visited the cotton districts to assess supplies and encourage cultivation. As cotton prices soared, export merchants in Bombay were keen to secure as much cotton as possible to meet the British demand. So they gave advances to urban *sahukars* who in turn extended credit to those rural moneylenders who promised to secure the produce. The ryots in the Deccan villages suddenly found access to seemingly limitless credit. Between `1860` and `1864` cotton acreage doubled. By `1862` over 90 per cent of cotton imports into Britain were coming from India. |
| What happened when the Civil War ended and revenue was revised upward? | Credit Dries Up; 50–100% Revenue Rise; Rs 2,000 Interest on Rs 100: As the Civil War ended in `1865`, cotton production in America revived and Indian cotton exports to Britain steadily declined. Export merchants and *sahukars* in Maharashtra were no longer keen on extending long-term credit. While credit dried up, the revenue demand increased. The first revenue settlement was in the 1820s and 1830s. And in the new settlement, the demand was increased dramatically: from 50 to 100 per cent. Yet again farmers had to turn to the moneylender. But the moneylender now refused loans. He no longer had confidence in the ryots’ capacity to repay. The refusal of moneylenders to extend loans enraged the ryots. What infuriated them was not simply that they had got deeper and deeper into debt, or that they were utterly dependent on the moneylender for survival, but that moneylenders were being insensitive to their plight. In one of the many cases investigated by the Deccan Riots Commission, the moneylender had charged over Rs 2,000 as interest on a loan of Rs 100. |
19. Deccan Uprising — Land Transfer Debate and Revenue Revision Historiography
19. Deccan Uprising — Land Transfer Debate and Revenue Revision Historiography
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How does Ravinder Kumar explain the Deccan Uprisings? | Redistribution of Social Power; Kunbi vs Sahukar; Tenants on Own Land: As per Ravinder Kumar: Deccan Uprisings took place because of a “redistribution of social power in the villages of Maharashtra.” The roots of discontent lay in the changing relationship between the Maratha Kunbi peasants and the *sahukar* moneylenders. The *sahukars* used to lend money to the Kunbi peasants in the past, but were never interested to take more intimate control of the village economy. The introduction of the ryotwari system, however, changed the situation, as each peasant individually needed more credit, and the creation of property right in land and the courts protecting such rights created a land market and hence there was now more demand for land. The moneylenders now lent money by mortgaging the peasants’ land at a high interest rate and in case of failure to repay, he took possession of the land through a decree of the court. Caste prejudices prevented the moneylenders from touching the plough; so the same land was now leased out to their former owner-cultivators, who thus became tenants in their own land. |
| How do Ian Catanach and Neil Charlesworth differ from Kumar on land transfer? | Catanach: Not Main Reason; Charlesworth: Only ~5% but Most Fertile: The amount of land transfer that took place in Maharashtra during this period and to what extent that caused the riots are of course matters of controversy. Ian Catanach (`1993`) agrees that there were land transfers, but does not accept Ravinder Kumar’s position that it was the main reason behind peasant discontent. Neil Charlesworth, on the other hand, completely dismisses this factor, as he believes that only about 5 per cent of the cultivable land in Deccan had passed on to the hands of the Marwari or Gujarati moneylenders at the time of the riots. But one has to admit that this small proportion of land was the most fertile in the whole region and their loss would therefore be much resented. |
| How did the `1867` revenue increase interact with the post-boom crash, and how does Charlesworth read the tax factor? | Indapur 50% (up to 200%); Inappropriate Timing; Charlesworth’s Caveat: A situation for open conflict was soon created when the government increased the revenue rates in `1867` on grounds of extension of cultivation and rise in agricultural prices. In the taluka of Indapur, the increase in revenue demands was on the average of 50 percent, but in some villages it was as high as 200 per cent. Charlesworth thinks that the new taxes were hardly the reasons behind the riots, as villages most affected by the disturbances in the Ahmadnagar district did not face any tax revision at all, while some of the revised talukas remained completely passive during the whole period. But even then, one can hardly ignore the fact that these new rates were announced at a time that could not have been more inappropriate. The cotton boom in Deccan, created by the artificial demand generated by the American Civil War, had just crashed after the end of the war. The peasants were impoverished and were bound to become hopelessly indebted; the rise in revenue in such a situation would inevitably increase panic. |
20. Deccan Uprising — Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, Kardab Boycott and Supe Rising
20. Deccan Uprising — Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, Kardab Boycott and Supe Rising
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the Kunbis appeal for revision and how did the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha intervene? | `1873` Report, Volunteers, Movable-Property Concession: The Kunbis made appeals for a revision of the new rates; but their traditional leadership had been completely out of touch with the new institutions and their novel demand for a new rational and legal language of communication. The Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, the new association of the middle-class intellectuals, now intervened and presented in `1873` a “Report” or a case for a revision of the revenue rates. It also sent volunteers to the villages to arouse the Kunbi peasants against the new rates. Pressurized by this, the Bombay government now granted a major concession, that in case of a failure to pay revenue, first the movable properties of a peasant would be attached; his land would be put up for auction only if his movable properties proved to be insufficient. This concession actually became the source of conflict between the peasants and moneylenders, as the latter in `1874` refused to offer credit to the peasants to pay their land revenue because of what they thought a lack of sufficient security. |
| What combination of factors produced the riots of `1875`? | Civil War Dislocation, Ill-Conceived Tax Revision, Sabha Agitation, Kunbi–Moneylender Hostility: But the riots of `1875` were not the result of any single factor; they stemmed from a combination of factors, such as the dislocation of the economy by the American Civil War, an ill-conceived revision of land tax, agitation initiated by the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, and the longstanding hostilities between the Kunbi peasants and the moneylenders. |
| How did the Kardab social boycott of December `1874` operate? | Kalooram, *Bullotedars*, Spread to Four Districts: A spontaneous protest movement began in December `1874` in Kardab village in Sirur taluq. When the peasants of the village failed to convince the local moneylender, Kalooram, that he should not act on a court decree and pull down a peasant’s house, they organized a complete social boycott of the ‘outsider’ moneylenders to compel them to accept their demands in a peaceful manner. They refused to buy from their shops. No peasant would cultivate their fields. The *bullotedars* (village servants) — barbers, washermen, carpenters, ironsmiths, shoemakers and others — would not serve them. No domestic servant would work in their houses. The peasants also imposed social sanctions against those peasants and *bullotedars* who would not join the boycott of moneylenders. This social boycott spread rapidly to the villages of Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara districts. The social boycott was soon transformed into agrarian riots when it did not prove very effective. |
| How did the Deccan Uprising begin at Supe on 12 May `1875` and spread? | Debt Bonds, 6,500 sq km, Patels, Limited Violence for Documents: The riots first broke out on 12 May `1875` at a village called Supe (Supa) in Bhimthadi taluka in Poona district and began a systematic attack on the moneylenders’ houses and shops and soon it spread to other villages in Poona and Ahmadnagar districts. Supa was a market centre where many shopkeepers and moneylenders lived. Ryots from surrounding rural areas gathered and attacked the shopkeepers, demanding their account books and debt bonds. They burnt account books, looted grain shops, and in some cases set fire to the houses of *sahukars* (persons who acted as both a moneylender and a trader). From Poona the revolt spread to Ahmednagar. Then over the next two months it spread even further, over an area of 6,500 square km. More than thirty villages were affected. The rioters’ specific purpose was to obtain and destroy the debt bonds and deeds (signed under pressure, in ignorance, or through fraud), decrees, and other documents dealing with their debts in the possession of the moneylenders. Violence was used only when the moneylenders refused to hand over the documents. Villagers were led by traditional headmen (*Patels*). This uprising also involved social boycott of moneylender and social boycott of any villager who didn’t socially boycott the moneylender. Later they got support from Poona Sarvajanik Sabha led by Justice Ranade. As the revolt spread, Police posts were established in villages to frighten rebellious peasants into submission. Troops were quickly called in and many convicted. But it took several months to bring the countryside under control. If the British had not acted promptly in suppressing the revolt, the rioting spirit was highly likely to have spread to the whole of Maharashtra. The Bombay government acted promptly in preventing the recurrence of such rioting; the peasants were protected against such future land grabbing through the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act of `1879`. Although contemporary colonial officials and some recent historians have referred to these events of `1875` as the Deccan Riots, the peasants looked at it as a revolt or *band*, and thus incorporated their uprising into a long tradition of revolt in Maharashtra. |
21. Deccan Uprising — Commission, DARA 1879, Character and Limits
21. Deccan Uprising — Commission, DARA 1879, Character and Limits
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the Governments of Bombay and India respond and what Act resulted? | Deccan Riots Commission `1878`; No Arrest for Debt under DARA `1879`: When the revolt spread in the Deccan, the Government of Bombay was initially unwilling to see it as anything serious. But the Government of India, worried by the memory of `1857`, pressurised the Government of Bombay to set up a commission of inquiry to investigate into the causes of the riots. The Deccan Riots Commission produced a report that was presented to the British Parliament in `1878`. Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of `1879` was passed. Now the peasants could not be arrested and sent to jail if they failed to pay their debts. |
| What was the character of the Deccan disturbances regarding targets and violence? | Marwari/Gujarati Focus; Documents not Persons; Not Grain Riots: Everywhere the Gujarati and Marwari moneylenders were attacked not simply because they were “outsiders,” but because they were thought to be more avaricious. They also lived in the villages and therefore were more exposed to such attacks, unlike the Brahman moneylenders who usually resided in better-protected cities. There was very little violence against the person of the *sahukars*; only their debt bonds were seized and destroyed. Moreover, violence was resorted to only if there was resistance in handing over these legal documents. This very feature distinguishes these riots from the average genre of “grain riots” engineered by poverty-stricken peasants. In most places, the ‘riots’ were demonstrations of popular feeling and of the peasants’ newly acquired unity and strength. Though moneylenders’ houses and shops were looted and burnt in Supa, this did not occur in other places. The rioters had clearly identified their target — an instrument of oppression and dominance — and thus seemed to have been quite aware of the new institutional framework of power relations within which they had of late found themselves locked in. This uprising also involved social boycott of moneylender and any villager who didn’t socially boycott the moneylender. |
| How did the nationalist intelligentsia support the peasants, and what were the limits of the revolt? | Ranade’s Sabha; Limited Objectives; No Anti-Colonial Consciousness: Once again, the modern nationalist intelligentsia of Maharashtra supported the peasants’ cause. Already, in `1873–74`, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, led by Justice Ranade, had organized a successful campaign among the peasants, as well as at Poona and Bombay against the land revenue settlement of `1867`. This agitation had generated a mentality of resistance among the peasants which contributed to the rise of peasant protest in `1875`. The Sabha as well as many of the nationalist newspapers also supported the D.A.R. Bill (Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Bill). The Deccan disturbances had very limited objectives. There was an absence of anti-colonial consciousness. It was, therefore, possible for the colonial regime to extend them a certain protection against the moneylenders through the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of `1879` by British Parliament on the recommendation of the Deccan Riots Commission. |
22. Munda Ulgulan (1899–1900) — Background, Khuntkatti and Dikus
22. Munda Ulgulan (1899–1900) — Background, Khuntkatti and Dikus
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the millenarian tribal tradition continue after `1857`, and what was the Munda Ulgulan? | Post-`1857` Millenarian Continuity under Birsa Munda: Along with the unrest among the settled agriculturists, the earlier tradition of millenarian movements among the tribal peasants also continued well into the post-`1857` period, a major example of this tradition being the Munda *ulgulan* of `1899–1900`, under the guidance of a charismatic religious leader, Birsa Munda. |
| How did British forest, land and commercial agents strip Mundas of natural rights? | Forests as Mother; Moneylenders, Landlords, Traders, Mahajans: The forests were like mother to the tribals. The British came with their forest, land and other laws and stripped the tribals of their natural rights. They introduced moneylenders, landlords, traders, mahajans into the region, through which to loot the adivasis. They usurped the tribal lands, and reduced them to a slave-like existence. |
| What was the Khuntkatti system and how did dikus and thekedars subvert it? | *Khuntkatti* vs Zamindari-Tenancy; *Beth-Begari*: Munda tribals practiced the Khuntkatti system (joint holding by tribal lineages). But rich farmers, merchants, moneylenders, *dikus* (outsiders who made the tribal people dependent upon them), and *thekedars* from Northern India came and tried to replace it with a typical zamindari-tenancy system. These new landlords caused indebtedness and *beth-begari* (forced labour) among the tribal. Against this oppression the Munda tribes fought continuously, for over three decades. And it was to this on-going struggle that Birsa Munda gave a new turn and a new meaning. The alienation of Munda land and the advent of *dikus* had spurred an agitation under their leaders in `1890–95`. This movement gradually came under the leadership of Birsa, who for two years mobilised the Munda tribal peasants from a wide region in Chota Nagpur in Bihar, by promising to protect them from an apocalyptic disaster. |
23. Munda Ulgulan — Birsa Munda, Organisation and Armed Struggle
23. Munda Ulgulan — Birsa Munda, Organisation and Armed Struggle
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Who was Birsa Munda and what early actions built his authority? | “Birsa Bhagwan”; Wasteland Agitation `1893–94`; God `1894`:Birsa Munda, born in `1875` to a poor family of the Munda tribe, referred to often by Jharkhand’s tribal residents as “Birsa Bhagwan,” led what came to be known as “*Ulgulan*” (revolt) or the Munda rebellion against the British colonial government-imposed feudal state. In `1893–94`, he had participated in a movement to prevent village wastelands being taken over by the Forest Department. His initial popularity was based on medicinal and healing powers, by which Birsa claimed to make his followers invulnerable. In `1894` Birsa declared himself a god, and began to awaken the masses and arouse them against the landlord–British combine. Combining religion and politics he went from village to village giving discourses and building a politico-military organisation. He declared an end to Victorian rule and the establishment of Munda Rule. He organised the people to stop paying debts/interest to moneylenders and taxes to the British. He broke all links with the missionaries and took the path of “*Ulgulan*” (revolt). The British retaliated and brought in the armed police. One night, while in his sleep, Birsa was arrested. He spent two years in jail. |
| How did Birsa reorganise after November `1897` and what ideology did meetings spread? | Underground Organisation; *Satjug*/*Kaljug*; Dikus and Sahibs: When he left jail in November `1897`, he once again began organising the tribals. He now went underground. He sowed the seeds of revolt against the landlords and British. He raised the self-confidence of the tribals, who increased their attacks on the landlords. He formed two military units: one for military training and armed struggle, the other for propaganda. Rumours spread about his occult powers, ability to heal diseases and perform miracles. In tribal imagination, he appeared as a messiah who could turn British bullets into water. He took tribals on a pilgrimage to Munda holy places and on the way held large public meetings, talking about a golden past or *satjug* that was gone and the dark *kaljug* that had befallen, when the Munda land or *disum* was ruled by Queen Mandodari, the wife of the demon King Ravana — probably a metaphor for the Raj under Queen Victoria. What came out in these meetings was the tribal peasants’ antipathy towards the foreigners, the *dikus* — the landlords and the moneylenders and their patrons, the *sahibs* (Europeans) — both officials and Christian missionaries. The grounds were thus prepared for a massive anticolonial tribal uprising that started during the Christmas of `1899`. |
| How did the Christmas Eve `1899` armed struggle unfold and end for Birsa? | `24 December `1899` Launch; 550 sq. miles; Capture and Martyrdom: He declared December 24, `1899`, as the day for the launching of the armed struggle. On Christmas Eve the attacks began. It targeted churches, temples, policemen and other symbols of the new regime. In the first phase police stations were attacked at Khunti, Jamar, Basia, Ranchi, etc. Eight policemen were killed, while 32 fled; 89 houses of landlords were burnt down; churches and British property were reduced to ashes. The flames of the struggle spread to 550 sq. miles in the Chota Nagpur region. The struggle was so intense that on the fourth day itself, Ranchi’s deputy commissioner called in the Army. Not only were attacks launched on the moneylender–landlord–mahajan–contractor combine, but directly against the British. Using poisoned arrows many police and Britishers were killed; many traders’ houses were burnt; the flames of armed struggle spread far and wide. But the British army entered with their guns, brutally massacring the tribals. Finally, on February 3, `1900` Birsa was caught. Severe cases were put on him, and 482 others. On June 9, `1900`, Birsa Munda became a martyr in Ranchi’s Central Jail, aged just 25. British declared he died of cholera. |
24. Munda Ulgulan — Political Character and Results
24. Munda Ulgulan — Political Character and Results
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What made the Munda Ulgulan new among late nineteenth-century tribal movements? | Birsa Raj and Birsaite Religion; Wider Colonial Politics: What was important about the Munda *ulgulan* was their greater awareness of the wider political realities of the colonial state. Tribal territoriality notwithstanding, Birsa’s ambitions were no longer localised. The aim of his movement was not merely to drive out the *dikus*, but “to destroy their enemies and put an end to the British Raj” and establishing in its place “a Birsa Raj and a Birsaite religion.” It was this political awareness and ability to connect to the broad picture that was new in the late nineteenth century tribal movements. |
| What legislative and symbolic results followed the Ulgulan? | Chotanagpur Tenancy Act `1908`; Khuntkatti; Ban on *Beth-Begari*: Government enacted the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act `1908`. Government recognized Khuntkatti rights. Government banned *Beth Begari* (forced labour). Birsa Munda became a legend to the tribals of Chota Nagpur, and a symbol of the anti-feudal, anti-colonial struggle of that time. |
25. Pabna Revolt (1873–early 1880s) — Causes, Agrarian League and Course
25. Pabna Revolt (1873–early 1880s) — Causes, Agrarian League and Course
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What Bengal context produced the Pabna Revolt of the 1870s and early 1880s? | Faraizi Moral Ground and Yusufshahi New Landlords: In Bengal — where the spirit of rebellion had been kindled among the peasants of eastern and central districts, particularly where the Faraizi movement had prepared a moral ground for greater righteousness — dissent and resistance persisted through to the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The next most important event was the forming in `1873` of the Agrarian League in the Yusufshahi pargana of Pabna district, where the oppression of a few new landlords pushed the peasants to the threshold of tolerance. Pabna Revolt was an agrarian unrest in large parts of East Bengal during the 1870s and early 1880s. |
| What zamindari practices violated Act X of `1859` and provoked the league? | Rent Enhancement, Occupancy Denial, *Abwabs*, Coercion: The zamindars tried to enhance rent beyond legal limits and to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights under Act X of `1859` (by denying them leases in the same plot of land continually for twelve years which would entitle them to the protection of the law). This they tried to achieve through illegal coercive methods such as forced eviction and seizure of crops and cattle as well as by dragging the tenants into costly litigation in the courts. They also charged the illegal cesses or *abwabs*. The peasants were no longer in a mood to tolerate such oppression. |
| How did the May `1873` Agrarian League organise rent-strike and legal resistance? | Mass Meetings, Rent-Strike, Courts; Largely Non-Violent: In May `1873`, an agrarian league or combination was formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the demands of the zamindars. The league organized mass meetings of peasants. Large crowds of peasants would gather and march through villages frightening the zamindars and appealing to other peasants to join them. The league organized a rent-strike — the ryots were to refuse to pay the enhanced rents — and challenged the zamindars in the courts. Funds were raised from the ryots to meet the costs. The struggle gradually spread throughout Pabna and then to the other districts of East Bengal. Everywhere agrarian leagues were organized, rents were withheld and zamindars fought in the courts. The movement, which was mainly spearheaded by the substantial peasants, but aided by the lower peasantry as well, remained largely non-violent and within the bounds of law, with a profound faith in the British justice system. The main form of struggle was that of legal resistance. There was very little violence. Hardly any zamindar or zamindar’s agent was killed or seriously injured. In the course of the movement, the ryots developed a strong awareness of the law and their legal rights and the ability to combine and form associations for peaceful agitation. |
| Where did the Pabna experiment of “high landlordism” resistance spread? | Dacca to Rajshahi; Courts Choked with Rent Suits: What was more important, the Pabna experiment was repeated soon in other districts of eastern and central Bengal where the zamindars had recently resorted to “high landlordism,” i.e., defying all laws in the management of their estates, enhancing rent at their will, imposing illegal *abwabs* and persistently trying to destroy the occupancy rights of the substantial peasants. Agrarian leagues came up in Dacca, Mymensingh, Tripura, Bakarganj, Faridpur, Bogra and Rajshahi districts, where civil courts were choked with rent suits. |
26. Pabna Revolt — Government Response, Bengal Tenancy Act and Character
26. Pabna Revolt — Government Response, Bengal Tenancy Act and Character
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the colonial government respond to violence versus legal agitation? | Defence of Zamindars on Violence; Neutrality on Legal Battles: The Government rose to the defence of the zamindars wherever violence took place. Peasants were then arrested on a large scale. But it assumed a position of neutrality as far as legal battles or peaceful agitations were concerned. The Government also promised to undertake legislation to protect the tenants from the worst aspects of zamindari oppression, a promise it fulfilled however imperfectly in `1885` when the Bengal Tenancy Act was passed. |
| What did the Bengal Tenancy Act of `1885` provide, and for whom? | Village-Level Twelve-Year Occupancy; Lesser Peasantry Undefined: Bengal Tenancy Act of `1885` provided for relatively greater protection of occupancy rights of the substantial peasants who leased land in the same village (not just the same piece of land) continuously for twelve years. But the rights of the lesser peasantry remained undefined as before. |
| Why could the colonial regime reconcile itself to the movement, and what was its communal character? | Limited Aims; No Anti-Zamindari or Anti-Colonial Edge; Hindu–Muslim Solidarity: The colonial regime could reconcile themselves to the movement because its aims were limited to the redressal of the immediate grievances of the peasants and the enforcement of the existing legal rights and norms. It was not aimed at the zamindari system. It also did not have at any stage an anti-colonial political edge. Once again the Bengal peasants showed Hindu–Muslim solidarity, even though the majority of the ryots were Muslim and the majority of zamindars Hindu. There was also no effort to create peasant solidarity on the grounds of religion or caste. Although some leaders were Hindus and there was remarkable communal harmony, these were also the regions where the Faraizi movement had a large following and Naya Mian, the son of Dudu Mian, was himself active in organising the agrarian combination in Mehendigunge in `1880`. |
27. Pabna Revolt — Middle-Class Support and Ambivalence
27. Pabna Revolt — Middle-Class Support and Ambivalence
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Which intellectuals and associations supported the Pabna peasants and the Rent Bill? | Bankim Chandra Chatterjea, R.C. Dutt; Indian Association: A number of young Indian intellectuals supported the peasants’ cause. These included Bankim Chandra Chatterjea and R.C. Dutt. During the discussion of the Bengal Tenancy Bill, the Indian Association, led by Surendranath Banerjee, Anand Mohan Bose and Dwarkanath Ganguli, campaigned for the rights of tenants, helped form ryot unions, and organized huge meetings in support of the Rent Bill. They also asked for permanent fixation of the tenant’s rent. |
| How did the Calcutta native press split over indigenous landlord oppression? | *Hindoo Patriot*/*Amrita Bazar Patrika* vs *Bengalee*/Anglo-Indian Press: But one interesting feature of the Pabna uprising and its aftermath was the ambivalence of the educated middle classes. The Calcutta native press, which had been able to take an unequivocal position against the European planters, now was divided when the oppression of the indigenous landlords was under attack. The same *Hindoo Patriot*, along with the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, took an overtly pro-landlord position, while *Bengalee* and the Anglo-Indian press ridiculed them when their grandiose reports on peasant violence turned out to be mere landlord propaganda. This was a dilemma which the middle-class Indian nationalists suffered from since the beginning of their career and which they never succeeded in overcoming completely. |
28. Great Revolt of 1857 — Context, Prior Risings and Causal Framework
28. Great Revolt of 1857 — Context, Prior Risings and Causal Framework
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Whom did British expansion, exploitation and administrative innovation affect, and what did the Lucknow Proclamation pinpoint? | All Classes except Western-Educated Townsmen; Four Sacred Things: The effect of British expansionist policies, economic exploitation and administrative innovations over the years had adversely affected the position of all — rulers of Indian states, sepoys, zamindars, peasants, traders, pundits, moulvies etc. — excepting the Western educated class in towns who owed their ‘position’ to the Company’s Government. The Lucknow Proclamation pinpointed that British rule had endangered all the four things dear to Hindus and Muslims alike — religion, honour, life and property. |
| What earlier mutinies and insurrections preceded the violent storm of `1857`? | Vellore to Santhal — A Century of Simmering Discontent: The resentment of the Indians had found expression in a number of mutinies and insurrections from time to time in different parts of the country which arose out of a wide range of political, economic and administrative causes, like: the mutiny at Vellore in `1806`; the mutiny at Barrackpore in `1824`; the mutiny at Ferozepur in February `1842`; the mutiny of the 7th Bengal Cavalry and 64th Regiment; the mutiny of the 22nd N.I. in `1849`, of the 66th N.I. in `1850`, of the 38th N.I. in `1852` etc.; the Bareilly rising of `1816`; the Kol insurrection of `1831–32`; the `1848` revolt of the Rajas of Kangta, Jaswar and Datarpur; the Santhal rising of `1855–56` etc. The simmering discontent burst out into a violent storm in `1857` which shook the British empire in India to its very foundations. |
| Why is the greased cartridge not treated as the sole or principal cause? | Matchstick on a Century of Fuel — Plassey to Mangal Pandey: Earlier historians have greatly emphasised the importance of military grievances and the greased cartridges affair as the most potent causes which led to the great rising of `1857`. But the greased cartridge was not the only cause, nor even the most important of them. The causes of the Rebellion lay deeper and are to be found in the history of the hundred years of British rule from the Battle of Plassey (June `1757`) to the rebellion of Mangal Pandey when on March 29, `1857`, he murdered an English Adjutant. The greased cartridge and the Mutiny of soldiers was merely the match stick which exploded the inflammable material which had gathered in heap on account of a variety of causes — political, social, religious and economic. |
29. Great Revolt of 1857 — Economic Causes
29. Great Revolt of 1857 — Economic Causes
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Company colonial policy destroy traditional trade and industry? | Karl Marx `1853` on Hand Loom, Twist and Cotton Inundation: The colonial policies of the East India Company destroyed the traditional Indian trade and industry. Writing in `1853` Karl Marx remarked: “It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand loom and destroyed the spinning wheel. England began with depriving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindustan and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons.” Ruination of industry increased the pressure on agriculture and land and resulted in pauperization of the country. |
| How were peasantry, artisans and zamindars differently ruined? | Revenue + Moneylenders; Loss of Patronage; Quo Warranto and Awadh Taluqdars: For the peasantry, unpopular revenue settlement combined with loans from moneylenders/traders led to their eviction from land. The moneylender became the new zamindar. Artisans and handicraftsmen suffered loss of patronage; British policy discouraged Indian handicrafts and promoted British goods. The destruction of Indian handicrafts was not accompanied by the development of modern industries. Zamindars were the traditional landed aristocracy and often saw their land rights forfeited with frequent use of a *quo warranto* (by what authority someone has an office) by the administration. In Awadh, the storm centre of the revolt, 21,000 taluqdars had their estates confiscated and were suddenly trapped into extreme poverty. These people were looking for opportunity which was presented by the sepoy revolt to oppose the British and regain what they had lost. |
30. Great Revolt of 1857 — Political Causes
30. Great Revolt of 1857 — Political Causes
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Company annexation policies destroy prestige and alarm princes? | Effective Control, Subsidiary Alliance, Doctrine of Lapse: Loss of political prestige of the East India Company stemmed from their greedy policy and frequent breaking of pledges and oaths. Policies such as ‘Effective Control’, ‘Subsidiary Alliance’ under Lord Wellesley and ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ under Dalhousie caused suspicion and uneasiness in the minds of almost all ruling princes in India. The right of succession was denied to Hindu princes. The distinction between ‘dependent states’ and ‘protected allies’ was very thin. In case of disputed interpretation, the decision of the East India Company was binding and that of the Court of Directions final. There was no Supreme Court to give an impartial verdict on questions of right and wrong. While the Punjab, Pegu, Sikkim had been annexed by the ‘Right of Conquest’, Satara, Jaipur, Sambhalpur, Baghat, Udaipur, Jhansi and Nagpur were annexed by the application of the Doctrine of Lapse. Oudh was annexed on the pretext of “the good of the governed.” Regal titles of the Nawabs of Carnatic and Tanjore were abolished and the pension of Peshwa Baji Rao’s adopted son was stopped. The Indians held that the existence of all states was threatened and absorption of all states was a question of time. Sir Charles Napier wrote: “Were I Emperor of India for twelve years… no India prince should exist. The Nizam should no more be heard of.. Nepal would be ours…” |
| How was the House of Mughal humbled under Dalhousie and Canning? | Faqir-ud-din’s Conditional Succession; Canning’s Renunciation Terms `1856`:Bahadur Shah II, the Mughal Emperor, was an old man and might die any moment. Lord Dalhousie had recognised the succession of Prince Faqir ul Din, but imposed many strict conditions on him. After Prince Faqiruddin’s death in `1856` (whose succession had been recognized conditionally by Lord Dalhousie, `1848–1856`), Lord Canning announced that the next prince on succession would have to renounce the regal title and the ancestral Mughal palaces, in addition to renunciations agreed upon by Prince Faqiruddin. These acts greatly unnerved the Indian Muslims. All these caused suspicion in the minds of almost all ruling princes in India. |
| What was ‘absentee sovereignty’ and how did Pax Britannica swell rebel ranks? | Drain of Wealth; Disbanded Pindaris, Thugs and Irregulars: The ‘absentee sovereignty’ of the British rule in India was an equally important political factor which worked on the minds of the Indian people against the British. The Pathans and the Mughals who had conquered India had, in course of time, settled in India and become Indians. The revenues collected from the people were spent in this very country. In the case of the British, the Indians felt that they were being ruled from England from a distance of thousands of miles and the country was being drained of her wealth. Besides, the policy of Pax Britannica pursued by the British during the past four decades had led to the disbanding of Pindaris, Thugs, and irregular soldiers who formed the bulk of the native armies. These people had lived mostly on plunder, and when deprived of the means of livelihood by the British, they formed the nucleus of antisocial elements in different areas. When in `1857` there occurred some disturbances they swelled the ranks of the rebels. |
31. Great Revolt of 1857 — Administrative Causes
31. Great Revolt of 1857 — Administrative Causes
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How were Indians excluded from power and promotion under Company rule? | Subedar and Sadr Amin Ceilings; Munro on Scorn; Charter Act `1833`: The Indian aristocracy was deprived of power and position. It found little chance to gain the same old position in the new administrative set-up, as under the British rule all high posts, civil and military, were reserved for the Europeans. In the military services, the highest post attainable by an Indian was that of a Subedar on a salary of Rs. 60 or Rs. 70 and in the civil services that of Sadr Amin on a salary of Rs. 500 per month. The chances of promotion were very few. Sir Thomas Munro, pleading for the employment of Indians, wrote in `1817`: “Foreign conquerors have treated the natives with violence, and often with cruelty, but none has treated them with so much scorn as we; none has stigmatized the whole people as unworthy of trust, as incapable of honesty and as fit to be employed only where we cannot do without them. It seems to be not only ungenerous, but impolitic, to debase the character of the people fallen under our dominion...” Despite the recommendations contained in the Charter Act of `1833`, the policy had remained more or less the same. |
| Why was the Company’s administrative machinery unpopular in newly annexed territories? | Inefficient Revenue Police; Panipat Horsemen; Henry Lawrence’s Indictment: The administrative machinery of the East India Company was ‘inefficient and insufficient’. The land revenue policy was most unpopular. Many districts in the newly annexed states were in permanent revolt and military had to be sent to collect the land revenue. In the district of Panipat, for example, 136 horsemen were maintained for the collection of land revenue, while only 22 were employed for the performance of police duties. At the outbreak of the Rebellion, Sir Henry Lawrence is reported to have remarked: “It was the Jackson, the John Lawrence, the Thomason, the Edmonstones who brought India to this.” |
| How did land settlement, quo warranto, Coverly Jackson and the Inam Commission hit taluqdars and aristocracy? | Oudh Taluqdars; 20,000 Estates; Speculators; Sympathy for Dispossessed Landlords: In the land revenue settlement of newly acquired territories, the English administration had eliminated the middleman by establishing direct contact with the peasants. Many talukdars, the hereditary landlords (and tax collectors for the Government) were deprived of their positions and gains. The taluqdars of Oudh were the hardest hit. Many holders of rent free tenures were dispossessed by the use of a *quo warranto* requiring the holders of such lands to produce evidence like title deeds by which they held that land. Large estates were confiscated and sold by public auction to the highest bidders. Such estates were usually purchased by speculators who did not understand the tenants and fully exploited them. It was Coverly Jackson’s policy of disbanding the native soldiers and of strict inquiry into the titles of the talukdars of Oudh that made Oudh the chief centre of the Rebellion. The Inam Commission appointed in `1852` in Bombay confiscated as many as 20,000 estates. Thus, the new land revenue settlements made by the East India Company in the newly annexed states drove poverty in the ranks of the aristocracy without benefiting the peasantry which groaned under the weight of heavy assessments and excessive duties. The peasants whose welfare was the chief motive of the new revenue policy did not like the passing of the old ways. They fell in the clutches of unprincipled moneylenders; they often expressed their sympathy for their dispossessed landlords. Rampant corruption and the above features gave a foreign and alien look to the administration in the eyes of Indians. |
32. Great Revolt of 1857 — Socio-Religious Causes and Outside Events
32. Great Revolt of 1857 — Socio-Religious Causes and Outside Events
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did racial contempt and judicial discrimination rankle Indian minds? | *Nigger* and *Suar*; Light Punishment for European Criminals: Racial overtones and a superiority complex characterised British rule. The rulers followed a policy of contempt towards the Indians and described the Hindus as barbarians with hardly any trace of culture and civilisation, while the Muslims were dubbed as bigots, cruel and faithless. The Indian was spoken as *nigger* and addressed as a *suar* or pig, an epithet most resented by the Muslims. The European juries, which alone could try such cases, acquitted European criminals with light or no punishment. Such discrimination rankled in the Indian mind. It may be easy to withstand physical and political injustices but religious persecution touches tender conscience and forms complexes that are not easy to eradicate. |
| How did missionary activity and reform legislation appear as religious aggression? | Edwards; American Missionary Society; Religious Disabilities Act `1856`: One of the aims of the English in India was to convert the Indians to Christianity. Major Edwards had openly declared that “the Christianization of India was to be the ultimate end of our continued possession of it.” Sepoys were promised promotions if they accepted the True Faith. The missionaries were given ample facilities and the American Missionary Society at Agra had set up an extensive printing press. Idolatry was denounced, Hindu gods and goddesses ridiculed, Hindu superstitions dubbed as ignorance. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan mentions that “it has been commonly believed that government appointed missionaries and maintained them at its own cost.” The Evangelical opinion was voiced by Lord Shattesbury who believed that the failure to Christianize India was the cause of the whole trouble. The attempts at socio-religious reform such as abolition of sati, support to widow remarriage and women’s education were all seen as interference in the social and religious domains of Indian society. Government’s decision to tax mosque and temple lands deepened the sense of intrusion. The Religious Disabilities Act, `1856` modified Hindu customs. It declared that a change of religion did not debar a son from inheriting the property of his heathen father. |
| Which outside military setbacks had psychological repercussions before `1857`? | Afghan, Punjab, Crimean Wars; Santhal Rebellion: British suffered serious losses — the First Afghan War (`1838–42`), Punjab Wars (`1845–49`), Crimean Wars (`1854–56`), Santhal rebellion (`1855–57`). These had obvious psychological repercussions. |
33. Great Revolt of 1857 — Military Causes and Greased Cartridges
33. Great Revolt of 1857 — Military Causes and Greased Cartridges
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the state of army discipline and the social character of the Bengal Army? | Dalhousie’s Indictment; Brotherhood; Oudh High-Caste Recruits: Since the Afghan adventure of Lord Auckland, the discipline in the army had suffered a serious setback. Lord Dalhousie had written to the Home authorities that “the discipline of the army from top to bottom officers and men alike, is scandalous.” The Bengal Army was “a great brotherhood in which all the members felt and acted in union,” and service in the army was hereditary. Three fifth of the recruits of the Bengal Army were drawn from Oudh and the North Western Provinces and most of them came from high caste Brahmin and Rajput families who were averse to accepting that part of the army discipline which treated them on par with the low caste recruits. During the Governor Generalship of Lord Dalhousie three mutinies had occurred in the army. The Bengal Army sepoys reflected all the feelings of the civil population of Oudh. In the opinion of Maulana Azad, the annexation of Oudh “marked the beginning of a rebellious mood in the army generally and in the Bengal army in particular.” It gave a rude shock to the people. They suddenly realised that the power which the Company had acquired through their service and sacrifice was utilised to liquidate their own king. |
| How had service conditions, *bhatta*, caste and postage worsened for sepoys? | No Extra *Bhatta*; General Service Enlistment Act `1856`; Post Office Act `1854`: The extension of British dominion in India had adversely affected the service condition of the sepoys. They were required to serve in areas away from their homes without the payment of extra *bhatta*. Their emoluments were far less than those of their British counterparts. The sepoys yearned for the good old days when the Indian rulers used to crown their meritorious deeds by bestowing *jagirs* and other prizes upon them whereas their victories in Sind and the Punjab had brought worse days for them. In `1824` the sepoys at Barrackpore had refused to serve across the seas in Burma. In `1844` four Bengal regiments had refused to move to Sind till extra *bhatta* was sanctioned. More recently there was order that they would not be given the foreign service allowance (*bhatta*) when serving in Sindh or in Punjab. The Indian sepoy was made to feel a subordinate at every step and was discriminated against racially and in matters of promotion and privileges. The sepoy was a ‘peasant in uniform’ whose consciousness was not divorced from that of the rural population. So their grievances were not limited to matters of military; they reflected the general disenchantment with and opposition to British rule. There had been a long history of revolts in the British Indian Army — in Bengal (`1764`), Vellore (`1806`), Barrackpore (`1825`) and during the Afghan Wars (`1838–42`) among many others. The conditions of service came into conflict with the religious beliefs and prejudices of the sepoys. There were restrictions on wearing caste and sectarian marks and rumours of proselytizing. In `1856` Canning’s government passed the General Service Enlistment Act which decreed that all future recruits for the Bengal army would have to give an undertaking to serve anywhere their service might be required by the Government. For Hindus crossing the seas meant loss of caste. Those soldiers who had been sent in the army of invasion of Afghanistan during `1839–42` had not been taken back in the folds of the caste. The privilege of free postage so long enjoyed by the sepoys was withdrawn with the passing of the Post Office Act of `1854`. |
| How did numerical disparity and the Enfield greased cartridge provide the occasion for open mutiny? | 238,000 vs 45,322; Brown Bess to Enfield; Pig and Cow Fat Rumour: Besides, the disparity in numbers between European and Indian troops had lately been growing greater. In `1856`, the Company’s army consisted of 238,000 native and 45,322 British soldiers. This disproportion was rendered more serious by the deficiency of good officers in the army, most of whom were employed in administrative posts in the newly annexed states and the frontier. The distribution of the troops was also faulty. Moreover, disasters in the Crimean war had lowered the general morale of the British soldiers. All these factors made the Indian soldiers feel that if they had struck at that hour, they had reasonable chances of success. So they were waiting only for an occasion which was provided by the ‘greased cartridge’ incidents. The greased cartridges did not create a new cause of discontent in the army, but supplied the occasion when the underground discontent came out in the open. In `1856` the Government decided to replace the old fashioned musket, ‘Brown Bess’, by the ‘Enfield rifle’. The training for the use of the new weapon was to be imparted at Dum Dum, Ambala and Sialkot. The loading process of the Enfield rifle involved bringing the cartridge to the mouth and biting off the top paper with mouth. In January `1857` a story got currency in the Bengal regiments that the greased cartridge contained the fat of pig and cow. At once a denial was issued by the military authorities without investigating into the matter. Assurances of superior officers and slight concessions proved of no avail. The sepoys became convinced that the introduction of greased cartridges was a deliberate move to defile their religion. The reports about the mixing of bone dust in *atta* (flour) and the introduction of the Enfield rifle enhanced the sepoys’ growing disaffection with the Government. Administration did nothing to allay these fears and the sepoys felt their religion was in grave danger. |
34. Great Revolt of 1857 — Outbreak: Berhampur to Delhi and Shahenshah-e-Hindustan
34. Great Revolt of 1857 — Outbreak: Berhampur to Delhi and Shahenshah-e-Hindustan
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the sequence from Berhampur (February `1857`) to Mangal Pandey and the 7th Awadh Regiment? | Disbandments before Meerut: The revolt began at Meerut on May 10, `1857` and soon embraced a vast area from the Punjab in the north and the Narmada in the south to Bihar in the east and Rajputana in the west. Sequence of events till capture of Delhi: At Berhampur Infantry refused to use Enfield rifle (with greased cartridges) and broke out in mutiny (February `1857`); the regiment was disbanded. Then Mangal Pande (34th Native Infantry, Barrackpore) fired at the sergeant major. He was executed on April 6 and the regiment was disbanded in May. The 7th Awadh Regiment which defied its officers on May 3 met with a similar fate. |
| How did the Meerut explosion of 10 May `1857` unfold? | 3rd Native Cavalry; Ninety Refuse; Eighty-Five Fettered; 10 May Revolt: And then came the explosion at Meerut. On April 24, ninety men of the 3rd Native Cavalry refused to accept the greased cartridges. On May 9, eighty-five of them were dismissed, sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and put in fetters. On May 10, Indian soldiers released their imprisoned comrades, killed their officers and unfurled the banner of revolt. |
| How did 11 May at Delhi transform mutiny into revolutionary war? | Bahadur Shah as *Shahenshah-e-Hindustan*; Letters for Confederacy: On 11 May `1857`, a band of sepoys from Meerut marched to the Red Fort. They made appeal to Bahadur Shah II to become their leader, thus give legitimacy to their cause. Two events gave positive political meaning to the revolt. First, Bahadur Shah was proclaimed *Shahenshah-e-Hindustan*: the long reign of Mughal dynasty had become the traditional symbol of India’s political unity. With this single act, the sepoys had transformed a mutiny of soldiers into a revolutionary war, while all Indian chiefs who took part in the revolt hastened to proclaim their loyalty to the Mughal emperor. Though Bahadur Shah vacillated as he was neither sure of the intentions of the sepoys nor of his own ability to play an effective role, he was however persuaded, if not coerced. He wrote letters to all the chiefs and rulers of India urging them to organize a confederacy of Indian states to fight and replace the British regime. Second, the sepoys captured Delhi. Simon Fraser, the Political Agent and several other Englishmen were killed. The public offices were either occupied or destroyed. Very soon the rebellion spread throughout Northern and Central India at Lucknow, Allahabad, Kanpur, Bareilly, Banaras, in parts of Bihar, Jhansi and other places. Thus, Delhi became the centre of the Great Revolt and Bahadur Shah its symbol. Within a month of the capture of Delhi, the revolt spread to different parts of the country. |
35. Great Revolt of 1857 — Storm Centres and Leadership (Delhi, Kanpur, Lucknow)
35. Great Revolt of 1857 — Storm Centres and Leadership (Delhi, Kanpur, Lucknow)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Who held real command at Delhi and how did Bahadur Shah’s personality damage the revolt’s nerve centre? | General Bakht Khan; Political Weakness at Delhi: Thus, Delhi became the centre of the Great Revolt and Bahadur Shah its symbol. Within a month of the capture of Delhi, the revolt spread to different parts of the country. At Delhi, real command was under General Bakht Khan. He had led the revolt of Bareilly troops and brought them to Delhi. Weak personality, old age and lack of leadership qualities of Bahadur Shah created political weakness at the nerve centre of the revolt and did incalculable damage to it. |
| How did Nana Saheb and Tantia Tope organise the rising at Kanpur? | Nana Saheb as Peshwa-Governor; Wheeler’s Surrender (`27 June`); Tantia Tope: At Kanpur the leader was Nana Saheb, the adopted son of the last Peshwa, Baji Rao II. He was refused the family title and, banished from Poona, was living near Kanpur. Nana Saheb expelled the English from Kanpur, proclaimed himself the Peshwa, acknowledged Bahadur Shah as the emperor of India and declared himself to be his governor. General Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding the station, surrendered on June 27. Some Europeans, men, women and children, were murdered. At Kanpur Nana Sahib was joined by his able and experienced lieutenant, Tantia Tope. |
| How did Begum Hazrat Mahal and Birjis Qadir lead Lucknow, and what happened at the Residency? | 4 June `1857`; Birjis Qadir as Nawab; Henry Lawrence Killed: At Lucknow the leader was Begum Hazrat Mahal, who took over the reins where the rebellion broke out on June 4, `1857` and popular sympathy was overwhelmingly in favour of the deposed Nawab. Her son, Birjis Qadir, was proclaimed the Nawab. Henry Lawrence, the British Resident, the European inhabitants and a few hundred loyal sepoys took shelter in the Residency. The Residency was besieged by the Indian rebels and Sir Henry was killed during the siege. |
36. Great Revolt of 1857 — Storm Centres (Bareilly, Bihar, Faizabad, Jhansi, Gwalior)
36. Great Revolt of 1857 — Storm Centres (Bareilly, Bihar, Faizabad, Jhansi, Gwalior)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Who led at Bareilly, in Bihar and at Faizabad? | Khan Bahadur; Kunwar Singh; Maulvi Ahmadullah: At Bareilly the leader was Khan Bahadur, a descendant of the former ruler of Rohilkhand. He proclaimed himself the Nawab Nazim. In Bihar the revolt was led by Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur. At Faizabad the leader was Maulvi Ahmadullah. |
| How did Rani Laxmibai and Tantia Tope act at Jhansi and Gwalior? | Rani Proclaimed; March on Gwalior; Loyal Sindhia; Plans for the South: At Jhansi the leader was Rani Laxmibai. In the beginning of June `1857` the troops at Jhansi mutinied. Rani Lakshmi Bai, the widow of the late Raja Gangadhar Rao, was proclaimed the ruler of the state. After the loss of Kanpur, Tantia Tope joined the Rani. The Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Tope marched towards Gwalior where they were hailed by the Indian soldiers. The Sindhia, however, decided to remain loyal to the English and took shelter at Agra. Nana Sahib was proclaimed the Peshwa and plans were chalked out for a march into the South. |
37. Great Revolt of 1857 — Civil Population Participation and Popular Character
37. Great Revolt of 1857 — Civil Population Participation and Popular Character
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What gave the Revolt of `1857` its real strength and the character of a popular revolt? | Peasantry, Artisans, Shopkeepers, Labourers, Zamindars, Mendicants, Priests, Civil Servants: The revolt of the sepoys was accompanied by a rebellion of the civil population, particularly in the north-western provinces and Awadh. It is the widespread participation in the revolt by the peasantry, the artisans, shopkeepers, day laborers, zamindars, religious mendicants, priests and civil servants which gave it real strength as well as the character of a popular revolt. Here the peasants and petty zamindars gave free expression to their grievances by attacking the moneylenders and zamindars who had displaced them from the land. They destroyed the moneylenders’ account books and debt records. They also attacked the British-established law courts, revenue offices (*tehsils*), revenue records and police stations. At Banaras a rebellion had been organised which was mercilessly suppressed by Colonel Neill. |
38. Great Revolt of 1857 — Suppression
38. Great Revolt of 1857 — Suppression
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How was Delhi recaptured and what vengeance followed? | September `1857`; John Nicholson; Lieut Hodson: The revolt was finally suppressed. The recapture of Delhi could be of great psychological importance and English efforts were directed towards that end. Troops from the Punjab were rushed and took their position to the north of Delhi. In September `1857` Delhi was recaptured by the English, but John Nicholson, the hero of the siege, was badly wounded during the operations and succumbed to his injuries. The Emperor was arrested. Terrible vengeance was wrecked on the inhabitants of Delhi. Two sons and a grandson of the Emperor were publicly shot by Lieut Hodson himself. |
| How were Lucknow and Kanpur recovered under Colin Campbell? | Havelock and Outram Fail; November `1857` Relief; March `1858` Reduction; Kanpur 6 December: The early attempts of Havelock and Outram to recover Lucknow met with no success. Some relief came in November `1857` when Sir Colin Campbell, the new Commander-in-Chief, sent from England, entered the city with the help of Gorkha regiments and evacuated the Europeans. In March `1858` the city was finally reduced. The military operations for the recapture of Kanpur were closely associated with the recovery of Lucknow. Sir Campbell occupied Kanpur on December 6. Tantia Tope escaped and joined the Rani of Jhansi. Nana Saheb, defeated at Kanpur, escaped to Nepal in early `1859`, never to be heard of again. |
| How did Hugh Rose take Jhansi and Gwalior, and what was the fate of the principal rebel leaders? | Jhansi 3 April `1858`; Gwalior June `1858`; Leader Deaths by `1859`:Sir Hugh Rose recaptured Jhansi by assault on 3rd April `1858`. Gwalior was recaptured by the English in June `1858`; the Rani of Jhansi died fighting. Tantia Tope escaped southward; in April `1859` he was captured by one of Sindhia’s feudatory who handed him over to the British to be hanged. By `1859`, Kunwar Singh, Bakht Khan, Khan Bahadur Khan of Bareilly, Rao Sahib (brother of Nana Saheb) and Maulvi Ahmadullah were all dead, while the Begum of Awadh was compelled to hide in Nepal. By July `1858` the rebellion had been almost completely suppressed. The British Government had to pour immense supplies of men, money and arms into the country. Indians had to repay the entire cost through their own suppression. |
39. Great Revolt of 1857 — Causes of Failure: Limited Spread and Social Groups
39. Great Revolt of 1857 — Causes of Failure: Limited Spread and Social Groups
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How limited was the territorial and military spread of the Revolt? | Localized; Bombay and Madras Armies Loyal; One-Fourth Area, One-Tenth Population: The Revolt of `1857` was localized, restricted and poorly organised. The eastern, southern and western parts of India remained more or less unaffected. The Bombay and the Madras armies remained loyal. India south of the Narmada was very little disturbed. Sind and Rajasthan remained quiet and Nepal’s help proved of great avail in the suppression of the Revolt. Dost Mohammad, the ruler of Afghanistan, remained friendly. The Punjab was effectively controlled by John Lawrence. The worst affected areas were Western Bihar, Oudh, Rohilkhand, Delhi, and the territory between the Chambal and the Narbada. By one estimate, not more than one-fourth of the total area and not more than one-tenth of the total population was affected. |
| Which classes and groups worked against the revolt or refused to join? | “Breakwaters to Storm”; Moneylenders; Educated Indians; Loyal Princes: Certain classes and groups did not join and, in fact, worked against the revolt. Big zamindars acted as “breakwaters to storm”; even Awadh taluqdars backed off once promises of land restitution were spelt out. Moneylenders and merchants suffered the wrath of the mutineers badly and anyway saw their class interests better protected under British patronage. Modern educated Indians viewed this revolt as backward looking, and mistakenly hoped the British would usher in an era of modernisation. Most Indian rulers refused to join and often gave active help to the British (e.g. Scindhia). |
40. Great Revolt of 1857 — Causes of Failure: Resources, Organisation, Leadership and Ideology
40. Great Revolt of 1857 — Causes of Failure: Resources, Organisation, Leadership and Ideology
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did British material and communication superiority decide the military contest? | 1,12,000 British Troops; 3,10,000 Recruits; Enfield; Telegraph: The resources of the British Empire were far superior to those of the rebels. Luckily for the British the Crimean and the Chinese wars had been concluded by `1856`, and British troops numbering 1,12,000 poured into India from all parts of the world. About 3,10,000 additional Indian soldiers were recruited in India. The Indian soldiers had very few guns and muskets and mostly fought with swords and spears. On the other hand, the European soldiers were equipped with the latest weapons of war like the Enfield rifle about which Nana Sahib said: “The blue cap kills before they fire.” Better communication among the British: the electric telegraph kept the commander-in-chief informed about the movements and strategy of the rebels. |
| Why was the Revolt poorly organised and without a concerted plan? | No Plan Found; Surprise to Bahadur Shah; Guerrilla Limits: The leaders of the Revolt were not lacking in bravery, but were deficient in experience, organising ability and concerted operations. Surprise attacks and guerilla tactics could not win them their lost independence. The various commissions and boards appointed by the Government of India and provincial governments after the suppression of the rebellion could not find any plan behind the rebellion or any scheme on which the movement was launched. The trial of Bahadur Shah proved that the rebellion was as much a surprise to him as to the British. |
| How did generalship, ideology and the absence of a common programme weaken the rebels? | British Exceptional Abilities; Diverse Grievances; Feudal Character with Nationalistic Elements: The principal rebel leaders — Nana Saheb, Tantia Tope, Kunwar Singh, Laxmibai — were no match to their British opponents in generalship. The East India Company was fortunate in having the services of men of exceptional abilities in the Lawrence brothers, Nicholson, Outram, Havelock, Edwards etc. They fought the toughest battles in the initial stages of the Revolt and controlled the situation till reinforcements were received from abroad. The mutineers lacked a clear understanding of colonial rule; nor did they have a forward looking programme, a coherent ideology, a political perspective or a societal alternative. The rebels represented diverse elements with differing grievances and concepts of current politics. The rebels had no common ideal before them except the anti-foreign sentiments. Bahadur Shah II was declared the Emperor at Delhi, while at Kanpur and Gwalior Nana Sahib was proclaimed the Peshwa. Hindu Muslim differences lay dormant against the common enemy, but were not dead. The peasants and the inferior castes showed no active sympathies; the soldiers in the Bombay and Madras armies were recruited from the lower castes and they remained loyal. The revolt of `1857` was mainly feudal in character carrying with it some nationalistic elements. The feudal elements of Oudh, Rohilkhand and some other parts of Northern India led the rebellion; other feudal princes like the Rajas of Patiala, Jhind, Gwalior, Hyderabad helped in its suppression. |
41. Great Revolt of 1857 — Princes Rewarded and Hindu–Muslim Unity
41. Great Revolt of 1857 — Princes Rewarded and Hindu–Muslim Unity
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did Canning win the princes and how were loyal rulers rewarded? | Dinkar Rao; Salar Jang; Berar; Nepal’s Oudh Territory: European historians have greatly praised Sir Dinkar Rao, the Minister of Gwalior, and Salar Jang, the Wazir of Hyderabad, for their loyalty. Canning acted very wisely when he gave solemn assurances to the Indian princes and thus won over their support. The Indian princes were amply rewarded after the suppression of the Rebellion. The districts of Berar were restored to the Nizam and his debts remitted. Nepal was rewarded by the cession of some Oudh territory. The Sindhia, the Gaikwar and the Rajput princes also received some rewards or concessions. Lack of unity among Indians: modern nationalism was yet unknown in India. In fact, the revolt of `1857` played an important role in bringing the Indian people together and imparting to them the consciousness of belonging to one country. |
| What was the character of Hindu–Muslim cooperation during the Revolt? | Bahadur Shah as Emperor; Ban on Cow Slaughter; Azimullah; Afghan Support for Laxmibai: During the entire revolt, there was complete cooperation between Hindus and Muslims at all levels — people, soldiers, leaders. All rebels acknowledged Bahadur Shah Zafar, a Muslim, as the emperor. Rebels and sepoys, both Hindu and Muslim, respected each other’s sentiments. Immediate banning of cow slaughter was ordered once the revolt was successful in a particular area. Both Hindus and Muslims were well represented in leadership. Nana Saheb had Azimullah, a Muslim and an expert in political propaganda, as an aide; Laxmibai had the solid support of Afghan soldiers. |
42. Post-1857 Shift in the Character of Peasant Uprisings
42. Post-1857 Shift in the Character of Peasant Uprisings
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What continued and what new features marked peasant and tribal movements after `1857`? | Greater Legal Awareness; Law Courts as Extended Space: In post-`1857` India we witness first of all a continuation of some of the earlier forms of protest against various oppressive aspects of colonial rule, the tribal and peasant movements being the foremost among them. But now these movements acquired some new features as well. There was greater awareness of colonial policies, laws and institutions among the peasantry, both tribal and non-tribal. Some of them even embraced those institutions, the law courts for example, as an extended and legitimate space for venting their anger or for seeking redress to existing injustices. The peasant asserted their legal rights in and outside the courts. And if an effort was made to deprive him of his legal rights by extra-legal means or by manipulation of the law and law courts, he countered with extra-legal means of his own. Often, they believed that the legally-constituted authority (*sarkar*) approved his actions or at least supported his claims and cause. |
| How did the social composition and aims of agrarian movements change after princes and landlords were crushed or co-opted? | Peasants as Main Force; Limited Economic Objectives; Colonialism Not the Target: Princes, chiefs and landlords having been crushed or co-opted, peasants emerged as the main force in agrarian movements. They now fought directly for their own demands, centered almost wholly on economic issues, and against their immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous zamindars and moneylenders. Their struggles were directed towards specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular grievances. They did not make colonialism their target. Nor was their objective the ending of the system of their subordination and exploitation. They did not aim at turning the world upside down. The territorial reach was also limited. They were confined to particular localities with no mutual communication or linkages. They also lacked continuity of struggle or long-term organization. Once the specific objectives of a movement were achieved, its organization, as also peasant solidarity built around it, dissolved and disappeared. Thus, the Indigo strike, the Pabna agrarian leagues and the social-boycott movement of the Deccan ryots left behind no successors. Consequently, at no stage did these movements threaten British supremacy or even undermine it. |
| How did notions of legitimacy shape what peasants fought for and against? | Eviction not Landlordism; Fraud not Interest; Overstepped Tax; Planter Crop Coercion: These movements represented an instinctive and spontaneous response of the peasantry to its social condition. The peasant often rebelled only when he felt that it was not possible to carry on in the existing manner. He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what was justifiable and what was not. That is why he did not fight for land ownership or against landlordism but against eviction and undue enhancement of rent. He did not object to paying interest on the sums he had borrowed; he hit back against fraud and chicanery by the moneylender and when the latter went against tradition in depriving him of his land. He did not deny the state’s right to collect a tax on land but objected when the level of taxation overstepped all traditional bounds. He did not object to the foreign planter becoming his zamindar but resisted the planter when he took away his freedom to decide what crops to grow and refused to pay him a proper price for his crop. In these movements, the Indian peasants showed great courage and a spirit of sacrifice, remarkable organizational abilities, and a solidarity that cut across religious and caste lines. They were also able to wring considerable concessions from the colonial state. The latter, too, not being directly challenged, was willing to compromise and mitigate the harshness of the agrarian system though within the broad limits of the colonial economic and political structure. In this respect, the colonial regime’s treatment of the post-`1857` peasant rebels was qualitatively different from its treatment of the participants in the civil rebellions, the Revolt of `1857` and the tribal uprisings which directly challenged colonial political power. |
| What weaknesses limited nineteenth-century peasant movements, and how were they overcome in the twentieth century? | No Colonial Analysis; No Alternative Society; Need for Modern Intelligentsia: Weaknesses included the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism and of the social framework of the movements themselves; they did not possess a new ideology and a new social, economic and political programme based on an analysis of the newly constituted colonial society; their struggles, however militant, occurred within the framework of the old societal order; they lacked a positive conception of an alternative society. This weakness was, of course, not a blemish on the character of the peasantry which was perhaps incapable of grasping on its own the new and complex phenomenon of colonialism. That needed the efforts of a modern intelligentsia which was itself just coming into existence. Most of these weaknesses were overcome in the 20th century when peasant discontent was merged with the general anti-imperialist discontent and their political activity became a part of the wider anti-imperialist movement. Changed nature after `1857` may be summarised as: (1) peasants as main force fighting directly for their own demands; (2) demands centred almost wholly on economic issues; (3) directed against immediate enemies — foreign planters and indigenous zamindars and moneylenders; (4) specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular grievances; (5) colonialism not the target; (6) not the objective to end the system of subordination or exploitation; (7) territorial reach limited; (8) no continuity of struggle or long-term organisation; (9) strong awareness of legal rights asserted in and outside the courts. Nineteenth-century weaknesses restated: (1) lack of adequate understanding of colonialism; (2) no new ideology and social, economic and political programme; (3) struggles within the old societal order lacking a positive conception of an alternative society. |
43. Post-1857 Peasant Movements — Middle-Class Mediation Debate
43. Post-1857 Peasant Movements — Middle-Class Mediation Debate
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How do Ravinder Kumar and Ranajit Guha differ on middle-class intervention in peasant movements? | “Channel of Communication” versus Paternalism–Humanism and “Futility of Liberalism”: The other important feature of the post-`1857` period was the growing involvement of the educated middleclass intelligentsia as spokespersons for the aggrieved peasantry, thus adding new dimensions to their protests and linking their movements to a wider agitation against certain undesirable aspects of colonial rule. The nature of this outside intervention in peasant movements has been a subject of intense debate. Ravinder Kumar would think that these middle-class leaders performed an important and effective function as “a channel of communication, between rural society and the administration,” at a time when the traditional channels and methods had become ineffective. Ranajit Guha has described the nineteenth century middle-class attitude to peasants as “a curious concoction of an inherited, Indian style paternalism and an acquired, western-style humanism.” Their actions at every stage betrayed their innate collaborative mind and revealed “the futility of liberalism as a deterrent to tyranny.” But whatever might have been the nature or impact of this middle-class mediation, this was nonetheless a new feature of nearly all the peasant movements in the second half of the nineteenth century. (The early movements of this phase — Indigo Revolt `1859–60`, Pabna Agrarian Leagues, and Deccan Riots — are treated in full in sections 13–21 and 25–27 of this note; the post-`1857` analytical frame above situates their limited aims, legal methods, and intelligentsia support.) |
44. Nationalism and Twentieth-Century Peasant Movements — Structural Context
44. Nationalism and Twentieth-Century Peasant Movements — Structural Context
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What structural processes impoverished the Indian peasantry under colonialism? | Colonial Policies; Handicraft Ruin; Revenue; Courts; Moneylender Cascade: The impoverishment of the Indian peasantry was a direct result of the transformation of the agrarian structure due to: (1) colonial economic policies; (2) ruin of the handicrafts leading to overcrowding of land; (3) the new land revenue system; (4) colonial administrative and judicial system. The peasants suffered from high rents, illegal levies, arbitrary evictions and unpaid labour in Zamindari areas. In Ryotwari areas, the Government itself levied heavy land revenue. The overburdened farmer, fearing loss of his only source of livelihood, often approached the local moneylender who made full use of the former’s difficulties by extracting high rates of interests on the money lent. Often, the farmer had to mortgage his land and cattle. Sometimes, the moneylender seized the mortgaged belongings. Gradually, over large areas, the actual cultivators were reduced to the status of tenants-at-will, share croppers and landless labourers. The peasants often resisted the exploitation, and soon they realised that their real enemy was the colonial state. Sometimes, the desperate peasants took to crime to come out of intolerable conditions. These crimes included robbery, dacoity and what has been called social banditry. Peasant discontent against established authority was a familiar feature of the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth century, the movements that emerged out of this discontent were marked by a new feature: they were deeply influenced by and in their turn had a marked impact on the ongoing struggle for national freedom. |
45. UP Kisan Sabha, Baba Ramchandra and Awadh Kisan Sabha (1918–1921)
45. UP Kisan Sabha, Baba Ramchandra and Awadh Kisan Sabha (1918–1921)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What agrarian conditions in Awadh prepared tenants for a message of resistance? | Taluqdars Restored; *Bedakhali*; *Nazrana*; War Prices: Following the annexation of Avadh in `1856` and after the `1857` revolt, the Awadh Talukdars had got back their lands. The second half of the nineteenth century had seen the strengthening of the hold of the taluqdars or big landlords over the agrarian society of the province. The majority of the cultivators were subjected to high rents, summary evictions (*bedakhali*), illegal levies, renewal fees or *nazrana*. The high price of food and other necessities that accompanied and followed World War I made the oppression all the more difficult to bear, and the tenants of Avadh were ripe for a message of resistance. |
| How was the UP Kisan Sabha founded and how did the *nai-dhobi bandh* under Baba Ramchandra unfold? | February `1918`; Gauri Shankar Mishra; Indra Narayan Dwivedi; Malaviya; 450 Branches: Mainly due to the efforts of the Home Rule activists, kisan sabhas were organised in UP. The UP Kisan Sabha was set up in February `1918` by Gauri Shankar Mishra and Indra Narayan Dwivedi. Madan Mohan Malaviya supported their efforts. Towards the end of `1919`, the first sign of grass-root peasant activity was evident in the reports of *nai-dhobi band* (a form of social boycott) on an estate in Pratapgarh district. Led by Baba Ramchandra — a sanyasi who had earlier been to Fiji as an indentured labourer — peasants started *Nai dhobi bandhs* in various places. These bandhs were organized by Panchayats to deprive landlords of the services of even barbers and washermen. By June `1919`, the UP Kisan Sabha had 450 branches. Other prominent leaders included Jhinguri Singh, Durgapal Singh and Baba Ramchandra. In June `1920`, Baba Ramchandra urged Nehru to visit these villages. During these visits, Nehru developed close contacts with the villagers. |
| What role did Roor, Mehta and Gauri Shankar play before the Awadh Kisan Sabha split? | One Lakh Complaints; *Bedakhli* and *Nazrana*; Easy Victory and Confidence: Meanwhile, the kisans found sympathy in Mehta, the Deputy Commissioner of Pratapgarh, who promised to investigate complaints forwarded to him. The Kisan Sabha at village Roor in Pratapgarh district became the centre of activity and about one lakh tenants were reported to have registered their complaints with this Sabha on the payment of one anna each. Gauri Shankar was also very active in Pratapgarh during this period, and was in the process of working out an agreement with Mehta over some of the crucial tenant complaints such as *bedakhli* and *nazrana*. Mehta withdrew the case of theft and attempted to bring pressure on the landlords to change their ways. This easy victory, however, gave a new confidence to the movement and it burgeoned forth. |
| Why was the Awadh Kisan Sabha formed in October `1920` and how did activity escalate then decline? | Non-Cooperation Split; Refuse *Bedakhali* Land, *Hali* and *Begar*; January `1921` Violence; Rent Act: In October `1920`, the Awadh Kisan Sabha came into existence in Pratapgarh because of differences in nationalist ranks. Congress at Calcutta had chosen the path of non-cooperation and many nationalists of UP had committed themselves to it. But there were others like Malaviya who preferred constitutional agitation. These differences were reflected in the UP Kisan Sabha as well and soon Non-cooperators formed the Awadh Kisan Sabha. This new body succeeded in integrating under its banner all the grass-roots kisan sabhas that had emerged in Awadh. The Awadh Kisan Sabha asked the kisans to refuse to till *bedakhali* land, not to offer *hali* and *begar* (forms of unpaid labour), to boycott those who did not accept these conditions and to solve their disputes through Panchayats. From the earlier forms of mass meetings and mobilisation, the patterns of activity changed rapidly in January `1921` to the looting of bazaars, houses, granaries and clashes with the police. The centres of activity were primarily the districts of Rai Bareilly, Faizabad and Sultanpur. In Awadh in the early months of `1921` when peasant activity was at its peak, it was difficult to distinguish between a Non-cooperation meeting and a peasant rally. The movement declined soon, partly due to government repression and partly because of the passing of the Awadh Rent (Amendment) Act. |
46. Eka Movement (1921–1922)
46. Eka Movement (1921–1922)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| Where and on what issues did the Eka or Unity Movement resurface peasant discontent? | Hardoi, Bahraich, Sitapur; High Rents; *Thikedars*; Share-Rents: Towards the end of `1921`, peasant discontent resurfaced in some northern districts of the United Provinces — Hardoi, Bahraich, Sitapur. The issues involved were: (1) high rents — 50 per cent higher than the recorded rates; (2) oppression of *thikedars* in charge of revenue collection; and (3) practice of share-rents. |
| What vows defined the Eka Movement and who provided grass-root leadership? | Madari Pasi; Recorded Rent; No Forced Labour; Panchayat Discipline: The meetings of the Eka or the Unity Movement involved a symbolic religious ritual in which the assembled peasants vowed that they would: (1) pay only the recorded rent but would pay it on time; (2) not leave when evicted; (3) refuse to do forced labour; (4) give no help to criminals; (5) abide by Panchayat decisions. The grassroot leadership of the Eka Movement came from Madari Pasi and other low-caste leaders, and many small Zamindars. By March `1922`, severe repression by authorities brought the movement to an end. |
47. Nationalism, Violence and Rent — National Leadership Advice (UP and Malabar)
47. Nationalism, Violence and Rent — National Leadership Advice (UP and Malabar)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How were the UP and Malabar peasant movements linked to national politics, and what advice did nationalist leaders give? | Home Rule / Non-Cooperation / Khilafat Merger; Appeals against Violence and No-Rent Extremes: The peasant movements in U.P. and Malabar were closely linked with the politics at the national level. In U.P., the impetus had come from the Home Rule Leagues and, later, from the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movement. In Avadh, in the early months of `1921` when peasant activity was at its peak, it was difficult to distinguish between a Non-cooperation meeting and a peasant rally. A similar situation arose in Malabar, where Khilafat and tenants’ meetings merged into one. (The full course of the `1921` Mappila / Moplah rising — Manjeri Conference April `1920`, tenants’ associations, Ali Musaliar, martial law, communalisation, and crushing by December `1921` — is treated in sections 6–9 of this note.) But in both places, the recourse to violence by the peasants created a distance between them and the national movement and led to appeals by the nationalist leaders to the peasants that they should not indulge in violence. Often, the national leaders, especially Gandhiji, also asked the peasants to desist from taking extreme action like stopping the payment of rent to landlords. The advice of the national leadership was prompted by the desire to protect the peasants from the consequences of violent revolt, consequences which did not remain hidden for long as both in U.P. and Malabar the Government launched heavy repression in order to crush the movements. Their advice that peasants should not push things too far with the landlords by refusing to pay rent could stem from other considerations. The peasants themselves were not demanding abolition of rent or landlordism, they only wanted an end to ejectments, illegal levies, and exorbitant rents — demands which the national leadership supported. The recourse to extreme measures like refusal to pay rent was likely to push even the small landlords further into the lap of the government and destroy any chances of their maintaining a neutrality towards the ongoing conflict between the government and the national movement. |
48. Bardoli Satyagraha (1928)
48. Bardoli Satyagraha (1928)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What triggered the Bardoli movement and how did Vallabhbhai Patel organise it? | 30% Revenue Hike; “Sardar”; 13 *Chhavanis*; *Patrika*; Women’s Mobilisation: The Bardoli taluqa in Surat district had witnessed intense politicisation after the coming of Gandhi on the national political scene. The movement sparked off in January `1926` when the authorities decided to increase the land revenue by 30 per cent. The Congress leaders were quick to protest and a Bardoli Inquiry Committee was set up to go into the issue. The committee found the revenue hike to be unjustified. In February `1926`, Vallabhbhai Patel was called to lead the movement. The women of Bardoli gave him the title of “Sardar.” Under Patel, the Bardoli peasants resolved to refuse payments of the revised assessment until the Government appointed an independent tribunal or accepted the current amount as full payment. To organise the movement, Patel set up 13 *chhavanis* or workers’ camps in the taluqa. *Bardoli Satyagraha Patrika* was brought out to mobilise public opinion. An intelligence wing was set up to make sure all the tenants followed the movement’s resolutions. Those who opposed the movement faced a social boycott. Special emphasis was placed on the mobilisation of women. K.M. Munshi and Lalji Naranji resigned from the Bombay Legislative Council in support of the movement. |
| How did the Bardoli Satyagraha end and what was the final revenue recommendation? | August `1928` Tension; Railway Strike Prospect; 6.03% Rise: By August `1928`, massive tension had built up in the area. There were prospects of a railway strike in Bombay. Gandhi reached Bardoli to stand by in case of any emergency. The Government was looking for a graceful withdrawal now. It set the condition that first the enhanced rent be paid by all the occupants. Then, a committee went into the whole affair and found the revenue hike to be unjustified and recommended a rise of 6.03 per cent only. |
49. Peasant Movements in the 1930s — Depression, CDM, CSP and Formation of AIKS
49. Peasant Movements in the 1930s — Depression, CDM, CSP and Formation of AIKS
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did the Great Depression and Civil Disobedience shape 1930s peasant awakening? | No-Rent / No-Revenue; Chowkidari Tax; Forest Satyagraha; Anti-Zamindari Andhra: During the 1930s, the peasant awakening was influenced by the Great Depression in the industrialised countries and the Civil Disobedience Movement which took the form of no-rent, no-revenue movement in many areas. During CDM: no-revenue campaign (soon converted into no-rent) in UP; movement against Chowkidari Tax (villagers made to pay for upkeep of their own oppressors) in Bihar and Bengal; no-tax campaign in Surat and Kheda; no-revenue campaign in Punjab; Forest Satyagraha (defied forest laws) in Maharashtra, Bihar, Central Provinces; Anti-Zamindari struggle in Andhra. Also, after the decline of the active phase of the movement (`1932`) many new entrants to active politics started looking for suitable outlets for release of their energies and took to organisation of peasants. CDM brought leftists like Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. Also in `1934`, the Congress Socialist Party was formed. With the formation of the CSP, the process of the consolidation of the Left forces received a significant push forward. The Communists, too, got the opportunity, by becoming members of the CSP, to work in an open and legal fashion. This consolidation of the Left acted as a spur to the formation of an all-India body to coordinate the kisan movement, a process that was already under way through the efforts of N.G. Ranga and other kisan leaders. |
| How was the All India Kisan Sabha established and who were its founding leaders? | Lucknow `11 April `1936`; Sahajanand President; Ranga General Secretary: The culmination was the establishment of the All-India Kisan Congress in Lucknow in April `1936` which later changed its name to the All India Kisan Conference / Sabha. The first session was greeted in person by Jawaharlal Nehru. The Kisan Sabha movement started in Bihar under the leadership of Sahajanand Saraswati who had formed in `1929` the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha (BPKS) in order to mobilise peasant grievances against the zamindari attacks on their occupancy rights. Gradually the peasant movement intensified and spread across the rest of India. The formation of CSP in `1934` helped the Communists to work together with the Indian National Congress, however temporarily. Then in April `1935`, noted peasant leaders N.G. Ranga and E.M.S. Namboodiripad, then secretary and joint secretary respectively of South Indian Federation of Peasants and Agricultural Labour, suggested the formation of an all-India farmers body. Soon all these radical developments culminated in the formation of the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) at the Lucknow session of the Indian National Congress on April 11, `1936` with Swami Sahjanand Saraswati as the president and N.G. Ranga as the general secretary. It involved people such as Ranga, Namboodiripad, Karyanand Sharma, Yamuna Karjee, Yadunandan Sharma, Rahul Sankrityayan, P. Sundarayya, Ram Manohar Lohia, Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev and Bankim Mukerji. |
50. All India Kisan Sabha — Manifesto, Faizpur and Congress Ministries (1936–1939)
50. All India Kisan Sabha — Manifesto, Faizpur and Congress Ministries (1936–1939)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What did the Kisan Manifesto demand and how did it influence the Faizpur Congress agrarian programme? | Zamindari Abolition; Debt Cancellation; 50% Reduction; Living Wage; Peasant Unions: A kisan manifesto was issued and a periodical under Indulal Yagnik started. A Kisan Manifesto was finalized at the All-India Kisan Committee session in Bombay and formally presented to the Congress Working Committee to be incorporated into its forthcoming manifesto for the `1937` elections. The Kisan Manifesto released in August `1936` demanded abolition of the zamindari system and cancellation of rural debts. At Faizpur, in Maharashtra, along with the Congress session, was held the second session of the All India Kisan Congress presided over by N.G. Ranga. The Kisan Manifesto considerably influenced the agrarian programme adopted by the Congress at its Faizpur session, which included demands for fifty per cent reduction in land revenue and rent, a moratorium on debts, the abolition of feudal levies, security of tenure for tenants, a living wage for agricultural labourers, and the recognition of peasant unions. |
| Why were `1937`–`39` the high-water mark of the peasant movement under Congress provincial rule? | Civil Liberties; Agrarian Legislation; Kisan Conferences; Red Flag (`October `1937`): The period `1937–39` was the high watermark of the peasant movements and activity under the Congress provincial rule. The formation of Congress Ministries in a majority of the provinces in early `1937` marked the beginning of a new phase in the growth of the peasant movement. The political atmosphere in the country underwent a marked change: increased civil liberties, a new sense of freedom born of the feeling that ‘our own people are in power’, a heightened sense of expectation that the ministries would bring in pro-people measures — all combined to make the years `1937–39` the high-water mark of the peasant movement. The different Ministries also introduced varying kinds of agrarian legislation — for debt relief, restoration of lands lost during the depression, for security of tenure to tenants — and this provided an impetus for the mobilization of the peasantry either in support of proposed legislation or for asking for changes in its content. The chief form of mobilization was through the holding of kisan conferences or meetings at the thana, taluqa, district and provincial levels at which peasants’ demands would be aired and resolutions passed. In October `1937`, AIKS adopted the red flag as its banner. Soon, its leaders became increasingly distant with Congress, and repeatedly came in confrontation with Congress governments, in Bihar and United Province. |
| How did Bakasht lands, tenancy dilution and Haripura drive Kisan Sabha–Congress confrontation? | Bihar Bakasht Movement `1938–39`; UP and Orissa Frustration; Haripura Ban: In the election of `1937`, the socialists and right wing leaders acted in unison and Congress had a big victory. But after ministry formation, right wingers came back to power and they tried to stall zamindari reform. Around the issue of Bakasht land, where permanent tenancies had been converted into short-term tenancies, the conservative Congress leaders renegotiated their alignment with the landlords and entered into formal agreement with them. When proposed tenancy legislations of Congress were watered down because of landlord pressure, peasants staged in `1938–39` a militant movement under the leadership of Kisan Sabha for the restoration of Bakasht land. In its `1938` annual conference, AIKS denounced Gandhian principle of class collaboration and proclaimed agrarian revolution as ultimate goal. The panicky Zamindars activated Congress government to use its coercive power. Bihar Congress now tried to distance itself from the Kisan Sabha. In UP too, Kisan Sabha was disillusioned with Congress ministry that blunted the teeth of `1938` tenancy legislation, which originally was expected to reduce rents by half. UP Kisan Sabha leaders like Narendra Dev and Mohanlal Gautam mobilised peasant demonstration. In Orissa also, Kisan leaders were frustrated when Congress ministry allowed pro-landlord amendments to the proposed tenancy legislation. Even the diluted legislation was blocked by the governor until there was a huge Kisan Day Rally on 1 September `1938`. A resolution at Haripura Session of Congress in February `1938` prohibited Congressmen from becoming members of Kisan Sabhas, but its implementation was left to the provincial bodies. |
51. Provincial Peasant Activity under Congress Ministries (Kerala, Andhra, Bihar, Punjab and Others)
51. Provincial Peasant Activity under Congress Ministries (Kerala, Andhra, Bihar, Punjab and Others)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How were peasants mobilised in Malabar / Kerala in the late 1930s? | Karshak Sanghams; *Jathas*; Malabar Tenancy Act Amendment Day (`6 November `1938`): In the Malabar region, the peasants were mobilised mainly by the Congress Socialist Party activists. Many “Karshak Sanghams” (peasants’ organisations) came into existence. The main demands, around which the movement cohered, were for the abolition of feudal levies or *akramapirivukal*, renewal fees or the practice of *policceluthu*, advance rent, and the stopping of eviction of tenants by landlords on the ground of personal cultivation. Peasants also demanded a reduction in the tax, rent, and debt burden, and the use of proper measures by landlords when measuring the grain rent, and an end to the corrupt practices of the landlords’ managers. The main forms of mobilization and agitation were the formation of village units of the Karshaka Sanghams, conferences and meetings. But a form that became very popular and effective was the marching of *jathas* or large groups of peasants to the houses of big *jenmies* or landlords, placing the demands before them and securing immediate redressal. The main demand of these *jathas* was for the abolition of feudal levies such as *vasi*, *nuri*, etc. One significant campaign by the peasants was in `1938` for the amendment of the Malabar Tenancy Act, `1929`. The 6th of November, `1938` was observed as the Malabar Tenancy Act Amendment Day and meetings all over the district passed a uniform resolution pressing the demand. |
| What forms did the Andhra peasant movement take under N.G. Ranga and the CSP? | India Peasants’ Institute `1933`; Ellore Abolition Demand; 1,500-Mile March `1938`: This region had already witnessed a decline in the prestige of Zamindars after their defeat by Congressmen in elections of `1937`. Anti-zamindar movements were going on in some places. Many provincial ryot associations were active. The Andhra provincial Ryots Association and the Andhra Zamin Ryot Association already had a long history of successful struggle against the Government and Zamindars. A CSP activist, N.G. Ranga, had set up, in `1933`, the India Peasants’ Institute in his home village in Guntur district. He organised many marches of peasants in `1933–34` and under his stewardship at the Ellore Zamindari Ryots Conference in `1933`, the demand of abolition of Zamindari was raised. In `1935`, Ranga and EMS Namboodripad tried to spread the peasant movement to other linguistic regions of Madras Presidency and organised a South Indian Federation of Peasants and Agricultural Labour and initiated a discussion for an all India Peasant body. After `1936`, the Congress socialists started organising the peasants. At many places, the summer schools of economics and politics were held and addressed by leaders like P.C. Joshi, Ajoy Ghosh and R.D. Bhardwaj. In `1938`, the Provincial Kisan Conference organized, for the first time, a march on a massive scale — a long march in which over 2000 kisans marched a distance of over 1,500 miles, starting from Itchapur in the north, covering nine districts and walking for a total of 130 days en route; they held hundreds of meetings attended by lakhs of peasants and collected over 1,100 petitions; these were then presented to the provincial legislature in Madras on 27 March `1938`. One of their main demands was for debt relief, and this was incorporated in the legislation passed by the Congress Ministry and was widely appreciated in Andhra. In response to the peasants’ demands the Ministry had appointed a Zamindari Enquiry Committee, but the legislation based on its recommendations could not be passed before the Congress Ministries resigned. Another notable feature of the movement in Andhra was the organization of Summer Schools of Economics and Politics for peasant activists. The celebration of various kisan and other ‘days,’ as well as the popularization of peasant songs, was another form of mobilization. |
| How did the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha develop from class harmony to zamindari abolition and Bakasht struggle? | BPKS `1929`; One Lakh at Patna `1938`; Bakasht Rift; Died out August `1939`: The Kisan Sabha movement started in Bihar under the leadership of Sahjanand Saraswati who formed Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha (BPKS) in `1929` and was joined by Karyanand Sharma, Yadunandan Sharma, Rahul Sankritayan, Panchanan Sharma, Jamun Karjiti, etc. The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha used meetings, conferences, rallies and mass demonstrations, including demonstration of one lakh peasants at Patna in `1938`, to popularise the Kisan Sabha Programme. Although rich occupancy tenants provided BPKS main support base and leadership, it attracted middle and poor peasants as well. Initially BPKS was meant to promote class harmony so that landlord and tenant friction didn’t jeopardise the national movement. But in `1933`, it came under the influence of Socialists and so by `1935` it adopted abolition of Zamindari as one of its programmes. In `1935`, the Provincial Kisan Conference adopted the Zamindari abolition slogan. Other demands: stopping of illegal levies, prevention of eviction of tenants and return of bakasht lands. The Provincial Kisan Sabha developed a rift with the Congress over the ‘bakasht land’ (lands which the occupancy tenants had lost to zamindars mostly during depression years) issue because of an unfavourable Congress Ministry resolution which was not acceptable to the Sabha. The movement died out by August `1939` because of a combination of concessions, legislation and the arrest of about 600 activists. The movement was resumed in certain pockets in `1945` and continued in one form or another till zamindari was abolished. |
| What were the main lines of peasant activity in Punjab and the princely states? | Punjab Kisan Committee `1937`; Canal Colonies Strike; Patiala *Muzaras* till `1953`: The earlier peasant mobilisation here had been organised by the Punjab Naujawan Bharat Sabha, the Kirti Kisan Party, the Congress and the Akalis. Congress and Akali activists were given a new sense of direction and cohesion by the Punjab Kisan Committee formed in `1937`. The pattern of mobilization was the familiar one — kisan workers toured villages enrolling kisan Sabha and Congress members, organizing meetings, mobilizing people for the tehsil, district and provincial level conferences (which were held with increasing frequency and attended by an array of national stars). The main demands related to the reduction of taxes and a moratorium on debts. The main targets of the movement were the landlords of western Punjab who dominated the unionist ministry. The immediate issues taken up were resettlement of land revenue in Amritsar and Lahore and increase in water rates in canal colonies of Multan and Montgomery where feudal levies were being demanded by the private contractors. Here the peasants went on a strike and were finally able to win concessions. The peasant activity in Punjab was mainly concentrated in Jullundur, Amritsar, Hoshiarpur, Lyallpur and Shekhupura. The Muslim tenants-at-will of west Punjab and the Hindu peasants of south-eastern Punjab (today’s Haryana) remained largely unaffected. Princely states of Punjab also witnessed a major outbreak of peasant discontent. The most powerful was in Patiala and was based on the demand for restoration of land illegally seized by a landlord-official combine through various forms of deceit and intimidation. The *muzaras* (tenants) refused to pay the *batai* (share rent) to their *biswedar* (landlords) and in this they were led by Left leaders like Bhagwan Singh Longowalia and Jagir Singh Joga and later by Teja Singh Swatantar. The struggle continued till `1953` when legislation enabling the tenants to become owners of their land was passed. |
| What peasant activity took place in Bengal, Assam, Orissa, NWFP, Gujarat and Central Provinces? | Damodar Canal Tax; Surma Valley; Utkal Kisan Sabha; Hali; Malguzari March: Peasant activity was also organised in Bengal (Burdwan and 24 Parganas), Assam (Surma Valley), Orissa, Central Provinces and NWFP. In Bengal, under leadership of Bankim Mukherjee, peasants of Burdwan agitated against the enhancement of canal tax on Damodar Canal and secured major concessions. Kisans of 24-Parganas pressed their demands by a march to Calcutta in `1938`. In Surma Valley, Assam, a no-rent struggle continued for 6 months against zamindari oppression and Karuna Sindhu conducted a major campaign for amendment of the tenancy law. In Orissa, the Utkal Provincial Kisan Sabha organised by Malati Chowdhary and others in `1935`, succeeded getting the kisan manifesto accepted by the Provincial Congress as part of its election manifesto and the ministry that followed introduced significant agrarian reform. At the very first conference of Utkal Kisan Sabha, abolition of Zamindari was adopted as a resolution. Kisans of Ghalla Dhir state in NWFP protested against evictions and feudal exactions by their Nawab. In Gujarat the main demand was for the abolition of the system of *Hali* (bonded labour) and a significant success was registered. The Central Province Kisan Sabha led a march to Nagpur demanding the abolition of the *malguzari* system, concession in taxes and moratorium on debts. |
52. Kisan Sabha during the War, People’s War Line and Split (1939–1943)
52. Kisan Sabha during the War, People’s War Line and Split (1939–1943)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| How did World War II, Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union and Quit India fracture the kisan movement? | Resignation of Ministries; People’s War; Ranga, Sahajanand, Yagnik Leave; Split `1943`: The rising tide of peasant awakening was checked by the outbreak of World War II which brought about the resignation of the Congress Ministries and the launching of severe repression against left-wing and kisan Sabha leaders and workers because of their strong anti-War stance. Following Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union created dissensions between the Communist and non-Communist members of the kisan Sabha. These dissensions came to a head with the Quit India Movement, in which Congress Socialist members played a leading role. The CPI because of its pro-War People’s War line asked its cadres to stay away, and though local level workers did join the Quit India Movement, the party line sealed the rift in the kisan sabha ranks, resulting in a split in `1943`. By May `1942`, the Communist Party of India, which was finally legalized by the government in July `1942`, had taken over AIKS, all across India including Bengal where its membership grew considerably. It took on the Communist party’s line of People’s War, and stayed away from the Quit India Movement which started in August `1942`, though this also meant losing its popular base and many of its members defied party orders and joined the movement, and prominent members like Ranga, Indulal Yagnik and Saraswati soon left the organisation, which increasingly found it difficult to approach the peasant without the watered-down approach of pro-British and pro-war, and increasing its pro-nationalist agenda. In these years three major leaders of the All India Kisan Sabha — N.G. Ranga, Swami Sahajanand Saraswati and Indulal Yagnik — left the organization. Nevertheless, during the War years the kisan Sabha continued to play an important role in various kinds of relief work, as for example in the Bengal Famine of `1943` and helped to lessen the rigour of shortages of essential goods, rationing and the like. It also continued its organizational work, despite being severely handicapped by its taking the unpopular pro-War stance which alienated it from various sections of the peasantry. |
53. Post-War Phase — Tebhaga Movement (1946–1947)
53. Post-War Phase — Tebhaga Movement (1946–1947)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What was the Tebhaga demand and how was the movement organised in Bengal? | Floud Commission; *Bargardars* vs *Jotedars*; “*Nij Khamare Dhan Tolo*”; Rajbanshis: Many struggles that had been left off in `1939` were renewed. The demand for zamindari abolition was pressed with a greater sense of urgency. The peasants of Punnapra-Vayalar in Travancore fought bloody battles with the administration. The Tebhaga movement was a campaign initiated in Bengal by the Kisan Sabha (peasants front of Communist Party of India) in `1946–1947`. At that time share-cropping peasants (essentially, tenants) had to give half of their harvest to the owners of the land. The demand of the Tebhaga (sharing by thirds) movement was to reduce the share given to landlords to one third. In September `1946`, the Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha gave a call to implement, through mass struggle, the Floud Commission recommendations of tebhaga share to the *bargardars*, the share-croppers, instead of the one-half share. The *bargardars* worked on lands rented from the *jotedars*. The communist cadres, including many urban student militias went to the countryside to organise the *bargardars*. The central slogan was “*nij khamare dhan tolo*” — i.e., sharecroppers taking the paddy to their own threshing floor and not to the *jotedar*’s house, as before, so as to enforce tebhaga. The storm centre of the movement was north Bengal, principally among Rajbanshis — a low caste of tribal origin. Muslims also participated in large numbers. |
| How did the Muslim League ministry respond and why did Tebhaga dissipate? | Bargadari Bill; Repression; Hindu Mahasabha; Calcutta Riots; Congress Bill `1950`: As a response to the agitations, the then Muslim League ministry led by Suhrawardy in the province launched the Bargadari Bill, which provided that the share of the harvest given to the landlords would be limited to one third of the total. But the law was not fully implemented. The movement dissipated soon, because of the Muslim League ministry’s sop of the Bargardari Bill, an intensified repression, the popularisation of the Hindu Mahasabha’s agitation for a separate Bengal and renewed riots in Calcutta which ended the prospects of sympathetic support from the urban sections. The Muslim League Ministry failed to pursue the bill in the Assembly and it was only in `1950` that the Congress Ministry passed a Bargadari Bill which incorporated, in substance, the demands of the movement. |
54. Telangana Movement (1946–1951)
54. Telangana Movement (1946–1951)
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What structural oppression in Hyderabad State under the Nizam prepared the Telangana guerrilla war? | Asafjahi Nizams; *Vethi*; Deshmukhs, Jagirdars, Doras; Andhra Mahasabha: This was the biggest peasant guerrilla war of modern Indian history. The princely state of Hyderabad under Asafjahi Nizams was marked by a combination of religious-linguistic domination (by a small Urdu-speaking Muslim elite ruling over predominantly Hindu-Telugu, Marathi, Kannada-speaking groups), total lack of political and civil liberties, grossest forms of forced exploitation by deshmukhs, jagirdars, doras (landlords) in forms of forced labour (*vethi*) and illegal exactions. During the war, the communist-led guerrillas had built a strong base in Telangana villages through Andhra Mahasabha and had been leading local struggles on issues such as wartime exactions, abuse of rationing, excessive rent and *vethi*. |
| How did the Telangana uprising begin, spread and end? | July `1946` Jangaon; Warangal and Khammam; Razaqars Routed; Fizzle after Indian Takeover: The uprising began in July `1946` when a deshmukh’s thug murdered a village militant in Jangaon taluq of Nalgonda. Soon, the uprising spread to Warangal and Khammam. The peasants organised themselves into village *sanghams*, and attacked using lathis, stone slings and chilli powder. They had to face brutal repression. The movement was at its greatest intensity between August `1947` and September `1948`. The peasants brought about a rout of the Razaqars — Nizam’s stormtroopers. Once the Indian security forces took over Hyderabad, the movement fizzled out. |
| What were the positive achievements of the Telangana movement? | *Vethi* Ended; Wages; Land Restoration; Ceilings; Irrigation; Women; Path to Linguistic Andhra: Positive achievements of the Telangana movement: (1) In the villages controlled by guerrillas, *vethi* and forced labour disappeared. (2) Agricultural wages were raised. (3) Illegally seized lands were restored. (4) Steps were taken to fix ceilings and redistribute lands. (5) Measures were taken to improve irrigation and fight cholera. (6) An improvement in the condition of women was witnessed. (7) The autocratic-feudal regime of India’s biggest princely state was shaken up, clearing the way for the formation of Andhra Pradesh on linguistic lines and realising another aim of the national movement in this region. |
55. Assessment of Peasant Movements
55. Assessment of Peasant Movements
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What did twentieth-century peasant movements achieve despite limited structural aims? | Erosion of Landed Power; Climate for Post-Independence Agrarian Reform: The struggles were not clearly aimed at the overthrow of the existing agrarian structure but towards alleviating its most oppressive aspects. Nevertheless they eroded power of landed classes in many ways and prepared for transformation of its structure. Even when peasant movements did not register immediate successes, they created the climate which necessitated the post-Independence agrarian reforms. Zamindari abolition, for example, did not come about as a direct culmination of any particular struggle, but the popularization of the demand by the kisan sabha certainly contributed to its achievement. Forms of struggle and mobilisation adopted by the peasant movements in diverse areas were similar in nature as well as demands. Violent clashes were exception. They eroded the power of the landed class, thus adding to the transformation of the agrarian structure. These movements were based on the ideology of nationalism. The nature of these movements was similar in diverse areas. |
| How was the relationship between the peasant movement and the national movement structured, including the `1942` split lesson? | Mutual Feeding; Common Ground before `1942`; Mass Base Lost if Diverged Too Far: The relationship of peasant movement with national movement continued to be one of vital and integral nature. National movement and peasant movement both fed each other. In its ideology as well, the kisan movement accepted and based itself on the ideology of nationalism. Its cadres and leaders carried the message not only of organization of the peasantry on class lines but also of national freedom. Many Kisan activists were simultaneously enrolled in Congress and Kisan Sabha. Though later there was confrontation also. True, in some regions, like Bihar, serious differences emerged between sections of Congressmen and the kisan sabha and at times the kisan movement seemed set on a path of confrontation with the Congress, but this tended to happen only when both left-wing activists and right-wing or conservative Congressmen took extreme positions and showed an unwillingness to accommodate each other. Before `1942` these differences were usually contained and the kisan movement and the national movement occupied largely common ground. With the experience of the split of `1942`, the kisan movement found that if it diverged too far and too clearly from the path of the national movement, it tended to lose its mass base, as well as create a split within the ranks of its leadership. The growth and development of the peasant movement was thus indissolubly linked with the national struggle for freedom. |
| What were the typical demands of peasants, and what remained outside the movement’s scope? | Taxes, Levies, *Begar*/*Vethi*, Oppression, Debts, Seized Lands, Tenure; Agricultural Labourers Except Pockets: Demands of peasants: reduction in taxes; abolition of illegal cess or feudal levies and *begar* or *vethi*; ending oppression by Zamindar; reduction of debts; restoration of illegally seized lands; security of tenure for tenants. Except in a few pockets like Andhra and Gujarat, the demands of agricultural labourers did not really become part of the movement. |
| Movement | Years | Region | Principal Oppressors / Targets | Key Leaders | Legislative / Institutional Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rangpur Dhing | 1783 | Rangpur–Dinajpur (Bengal) | Ijardars Debi Singh, Gangagobinda Singh; Company | Kena Sarkar (“nawab”) | Reforms in farming; path toward Permanent Settlement |
| Kol Rebellion | 1831–32 | Chota Nagpur–Singbhum | Sudor, Mahajans (70%+), Sikh & Muslim farmers; officers | Tribal organisation (Mundas/Hoes etc.) | Quelled by troops (Calcutta, Danapur, Benares) |
Moplah series / 1921 | 1836–1921 | Malabar | Hindu jenmi; British; Khilafat clash | Ali Musaliar, Kunjahammed Haji | Crushed Dec 1921; political demoralisation |
| Santal Hul | 1855–56 | Rajmahal / Damin-i-koh | Diku zamindars, mahajans (50–500%), government | Sidhu, Kanhu, Chand, Bhairav Murmu | Santal Parganas Tenancy Act 1856 |
| Indigo Revolt | 1859–60 | Bengal delta | European planters (dadon, lathyals) | Biswas brothers, Kader Molla, Rafique Mondal, Ramratan Mullick | Indigo Commission 1860; indigo wiped from Bengal |
| Deccan Uprising | 1875 | Poona–Ahmadnagar etc. | Marwari/Gujarati sahukars; high revenue | Village Patels; PSS / Ranade support | Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act 1879 |
| Munda Ulgulan | 1899–1900 | Chota Nagpur | Dikus, thekedars, Forest Dept; beth-begari | Birsa Munda (“Birsa Bhagwan”) | Chotanagpur Tenancy Act 1908 (Khuntkatti; ban beth-begari) |
| Pabna Revolt | 1873–early 1880s | East Bengal (Yusufshahi, Pabna + 7 districts) | New zamindars (rent, abwabs, occupancy denial) | Agrarian leagues; Naya Mian (Mehendigunge) | Bengal Tenancy Act 1885 |
Revolt of 1857 (outbreak) | 1857 | Meerut → Delhi; Northern/Central India | Company state (multi-causal) | Mangal Pandey; sepoys; Bahadur Shah II | Mutiny → revolutionary war under Shahenshah-e-Hindustan |
Revolt of 1857 (storm centres & suppression) | 1857–59 | Delhi, Kanpur, Lucknow, Bareilly, Bihar, Jhansi, Gwalior | Company reconquest (Nicholson, Campbell, Hugh Rose) | Bakht Khan; Nana Saheb & Tantia Tope; Begum Hazrat Mahal & Birjis Qadir; Khan Bahadur; Kunwar Singh; Maulvi Ahmadullah; Rani Laxmibai | Suppressed by July 1858 / leaders dead or fled by 1859; Indians repaid cost |
Post-1857 peasant shift | later 19th c. | Localised (Indigo, Pabna, Deccan etc.) | Planters, zamindars, moneylenders (not colonialism as system) | Middle-class mediators (Kumar vs Guha debate) | Limited legal/economic concessions within colonial structure |
| UP / Awadh Kisan movements | 1918–21 | Awadh (Pratapgarh, Rai Bareilly, Faizabad, Sultanpur) | Taluqdars (bedakhali, nazrana, begar) | Gauri Shankar Mishra, Indra Narayan Dwivedi, Malaviya, Baba Ramchandra | Awadh Rent (Amendment) Act; Non-cooperation linkage |
| Eka Movement | 1921–22 | Hardoi, Bahraich, Sitapur | Thikedars; high/share rents | Madari Pasi + low-caste & small zamindars | Crushed March 1922 |
| Bardoli Satyagraha | 1928 | Bardoli, Surat | 30% revenue hike | Vallabhbhai Patel (“Sardar”) | Committee: rise cut to 6.03% |
| All India Kisan Sabha | 1936– | All-India (Lucknow founding) | Zamindari; rural debt; feudal levies | Sahajanand Saraswati, N.G. Ranga | Kisan Manifesto; Faizpur agrarian programme influence |
| Tebhaga | 1946–47 | Bengal (esp. north; Rajbanshis) | Jotedars (half-share) | Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha / CPI | Floud tebhaga demand; Bargadari Bill 1950 (Congress) |
| Telangana | 1946–51 | Hyderabad State (Nalgonda, Warangal, Khammam) | Nizam; deshmukhs; vethi | Communist guerrillas; Andhra Mahasabha | Biggest peasant guerrilla war; path toward linguistic Andhra |
UPSC Relevance
UPSC Relevance
| Cue Words | Notes |
|---|---|
| What Mains angles do Chunks 1–3 of this note support under Modern Indian History? | Key Angles UPSC Targets:
|